Right. Monads are below the quantum level and you have argued, correctly I think, that not even quantum waves are physical. However, monads may have a complex structure as you say below <snipped> and string theory derives what that complex structure looks like including the super EM flux that may be what strings are made of.
On Fri, Jan 11, 2013 at 11:05 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote: > Hi Richard Ruquist > > > For the umpteenth time, monads are not physical, they cannot be some kind of > product of EM waves. > > [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] > 1/11/2013 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Richard Ruquist > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2013-01-11, 09:56:26 > Subject: Re: Re: Subjective states can be somehow extracted from > brainsviaacomputer > > > Yes, Roger. > > They come with 500 topo holes thru which super EM flux winds. > Given perhaps 6 quantum states for the flux, > there are 6^500 different types of monads. > Richard > > On Fri, Jan 11, 2013 at 9:32 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >> Hi Craig Weinberg >> >> Due to their universal perceptions, monads should be extremely complex. >> >> >> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >> 1/11/2013 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: Craig Weinberg >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2013-01-11, 08:07:47 >> Subject: Re: Subjective states can be somehow extracted from brains >> viaacomputer >> >> >> >> >> On Friday, January 11, 2013 12:27:54 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >> On 1/10/2013 9:20 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> On Thursday, January 10, 2013 7:33:06 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >> On 1/10/2013 4:23 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> Do you think there can be something that is intelligent but not complex (and >> use whatever definitions of "intelligent" and "complex" you want). >> >> >> >> A thermostat is much less complex than a human brain but intelligent under >> my definition. >> >> But much less intelligent. So in effect you think there is a degree of >> intelligence in everything, just like you believe there's a degree of >> consciousness in everything. And the degree of intelligence correlates with >> the degree of complexity ...but you don't think the same about consciousness? >> >> Brent >> >> >> I was thinking today that a decent way of defining intelligence is just 'The >> ability to know "what's going on"'. >> >> This makes it clear that intelligence refers to the degree of sophistication >> of awareness, not just complexity of function or structure. This is why a >> computer which has complex function and structure has no authentic >> intelligence and has no idea 'what's going on'. Intelligence however has >> everything to do with sensitivity, integration, and mobilization of >> awareness as an asset, i.e. to be directed for personal gain or shared >> enjoyment, progress, etc. Knowing what's going on implicitly means caring >> what goes on, which also supervenes on biological quality investment in >> experience. >> >> >> Which is why I think an intelligent machine must be one that acts in its >> environment. Simply 'being aware' or 'knowing' are meaningless without the >> ability and motives to act on them. >> >> >> Sense and motive are inseparable ontologically, although they can be >> interleaved by level. A plant for instance has no need to act on the world >> to the same degree as an organism which can move its location, but the cells >> that make up the plant act to grow and direct it toward light, extend roots >> to water and nutrients, etc. Ontologically however, there is no way to >> really have awareness which matters without some participatory opportunity >> or potential for that opportunity. >> >> The problem with a machine (any machine) is that at the level which is it a >> machine, it has no way to participate. By definition a machine does whatever >> it is designed to do. Anything that we use as a machine has to be made of >> something which we can predict and control reliably, so that its >> sensory-motive capacities are very limited by definition. Its range of >> 'what's going on' has to be very narrow. The internet, for instance, passes >> a tremendous number of events through electronic circuits, but the content >> of all of it is entirely lost on it. We use the internet to increase our >> sense and inform our motives, but its sense and motive does not increase at >> all. >> >> Craig >> >> >> Brent >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/pf0w53nZsoMJ. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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