Hi Bruno Marchal I think it is safe to treat the One as something that at least has the features of the Christian God (or I suppose any god)-- omniscient, omnipresent, etc.
Leibniz created his metaphysics to allow everything to happen as ideas, not physically. All of the action occurs in the Ideal world. ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-23, 12:04:54 Subject: Re: Berkeley, Plato and Leibniz on existence On 23 Jan 2013, at 12:01, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal An interesting way putting it. But that matter is only dreamed sounds like a stronger version of Berkeleyism. You say that matter doesn't really exist at all, Berkeley would say that it only exists if we perceive it. Both of these positions can be saved IMHO if there is some external, continuous, omnipresent observer. Like the One. I suspect that you already hold that view. It is an open problem. Is the One a person? I don't know. It surely becomes a person when linked to belief, as this gives the "inner God" (the universal soul, the knower). I do have some evidence that either the ONE is a person, but I have also evidence that such a ONE might not be the real ONE, but still more particular instantiations. All this is quite complex. Leibniz would not make such a strong statement, however. He would say that matter is not illusory at all, it is both an idea (a perception, a dream), which to us appears as a phenomenon, but to God appears as it really is. I am not sure I can translate that in the machine's language today. Too much complex. It is for the future generations. Keep in mind that the ideally correct machines remains mute all around the notion of God. To progress we will have to perturb her a little bit, and make her less correct, but then there is the risk of making her soul fall, and she has all the cognitive ability to develop her own wishful thinking. Bruno ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-22, 12:11:04 Subject: Re: Robot reading vs human reading On 22 Jan 2013, at 12:54, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I'm having trouble understanding you today. You say: "Truth is not epistemological. Only matter, and the other internal modalities, some of which are not communicable/justifiable, yet guessable by machines." Wikipedia says: "Epistemology (i/ p st m l d i/ from Greek p?st ΔΎ? - episteme, meaning "knowledge, understanding", and ? ?? - logos, meaning "study of") is the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge.[1][2] It questions what knowledge is, how it is acquired, and the possible extent a given subject or entity can be known." How can matter be epistemological ? Because matter is only dreamed. It is an appearance. there is no stuff. Weal materialism is false (if comp is true, that is if we are machine). It's just nondescriptive stuff. That does not exist. That is a myth, even if it is a very old one. It is the result of billions years of simplification done by nature. Our brains has been programmed to surivive, not to contemplate the possible ultimate truth. It cannot be knowledge, for knowledge can be defined as a true belief. But there's nothing to believe. It's just nondescriptive stuff. It is indeed not true belief, but it is still belief. "false belief" if you want. Illusion. Dream. As to truth not being epistemological, consider this. If knowledge is a true belief, and epistemology provides you with knowledge, then that knowledge must be true by definition. I agree with knowledge = true belief (cf Bp & p), but this makes truth primary with respect to knowledge. To have a knowledge you need two things: a belief, and a reality in which that belief is true. 'and of course you need a link to that reality, like "being present there"). You seem to not having yet realize that with comp, not only materialism is wrong, but also weak materialism, that is, the doctrine asserting the primary existence of matter, or the existence of primary matter. We are, well, not in the matrix, but in infinities of purely arithmetical matrices. matter is an appearance from inside. My point is not that this is true, but that it follows from comp, and that computer science makes this enough precise so that we can test it. Bruno ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-21, 09:38:01 Subject: Re: Robot reading vs human reading On 20 Jan 2013, at 21:03, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal The triads are based on epistemology. Without Secondness everything is impersonal. Without Secondness you cannot understand how the final expression was obtained (what it means to YOU, and how it was affected by the interprent. It's just wham bam ! that's a cat I see ! Van Quine made this criticism of conventional epistemology and gave it up to examine instead how we know something that is perceived through physiological explanations. And all epistemoblogy would be robot reading, with no account to the personality, memory, training, or linguistic knowledge of the reader. Truth is not epistemological. Only matter, and the other internal modalities, some of which are not communicable/justifiable, yet guessable by machines. Bruno ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-20, 07:01:56 Subject: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland On 18 Jan 2013, at 13:29, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Russell Standish > > Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, > positively and without reference to anything else. This can make sense. We can relate this with the common notion of subjectivity. > Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with > respect to a second but regardless of any third. Hmm... Why not, but I don't see this as fundamental. It can be distracting. > Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in > bringing a second and third into relation to each other." OK. Then with comp "thirdness" is arithmetic (and physics is, counter- intuitively, still 1p, hopefully plural). The physical is a mode of being which is *not* such as it is. Bruno > > I believe 1p is Firstness (raw experience of cat) + Secondness > (identification of the image "cat" with the word "cast" to oneself) > and 3p = Thirdness (expression of "cat" to others) > > > [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] > > > > Peirce > Peirce, being a pragmatist, described perception according to what > happened > at each stage,1/18/2013 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Russell Standish > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2013-01-17, 17:17:11 > Subject: Re: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland > > > Hi John, > > My suspicion is that Roger is so keen to impose a Piercean triadic > view on things that he has omitted to make the necessary connection > with the normal meaning of 1p/3p as standing for subjective/objective. > > Cheers > > On Tue, Jan 15, 2013 at 04:55:17PM -0500, John Mikes wrote: >> Russell, >> I reflect after a long-long time to your post. I had a war on my >> hand about >> objective and subjective, fighting for the latter, since we are >> 'us' and >> cannot be 'them'. I never elevated to the mindset of Lady Welby >> 1904, who - >> maybe? - got it what 2p was. >> My vocabulary allows me to consider what "I consider" (=1p) and I may >> communicat it (still 1p) to anybody else, who receives it as a 3p >> communication and acknowledges it into HIS 1p way adjusted and >> reformed >> into it. There is no other situation I can figure. Whatever I >> 'read' or >> 'hear' is 3p for me and I do the above to it to get it into my 1p >> mindset. >> No 2p to my knowledge. Could you improve upon my ignorance? >> John Mikes >> >> On Sat, Dec 29, 2012 at 1:21 AM, Russell Standish wrote: >> >>> On Fri, Dec 28, 2012 at 08:29:52AM -0500, Roger Clough wrote: >>>> Hi Russell Standish >>>> >>>> 2p should be a necessary part of comp, espcially if it uses >>>> synthetic >>> logic. >>>> It doesn't seem to be needed for deductive logic, however. >>>> >>>> The following equivalences should hold between comp >>>> and Peirce's logical categories: >>>> >>>> 3p = Thirdness or III >>>> 2p = Secondness or II >>>> 1p = Firstness or I. >>>> >>>> Comp seems to only use analytic or deductive logic, >>>> while Peirce's categories are epistemological (synthetic >>>> logic) categories, in which secondness is an integral part. >>>> So . >>>> >>>> Here's what Peirce has to say about his categorioes: >>>> >>>> http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/secondness.html >>>> >>>> >>>> "Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, >>>> positively and without reference to anything else. >>>> >>>> Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, >>>> with respect to a second but regardless of any third. >>>> >>>> Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, >>>> in bringing a second and third into relation to each other." >>>> (A Letter to Lady Welby, CP 8.328, 1904)" >>>> >>> >>> Thanks for the definition, but how does that relate to 1p and 3p? I >>> cannot see anything in the definitions of firstness and thirdness >>> that >>> relate to subjectivity and objectivity. >>> >>> As I said before, I do not even know what 2p could be. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> >>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) >>> Principal, High Performance Coders >>> Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au >>> University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au >>> >>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com >>> . >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything- >> l...@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> . >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >> . >> > > -- > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Principal, High Performance Coders > Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au > University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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