On 2/2/2013 6:19 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

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On Mon, Jan 28, 2013 at 2:13 AM, Stephen P. King<stephe...@charter.net <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:On 1/27/2013 6:54 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:On Mon, Jan 28, 2013 at 12:40 AM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote: On 1/27/2013 6:07 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:Dear Bruno and Stephen, On Sun, Jan 27, 2013 at 6:27 PM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote: On 1/27/2013 7:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The big bang remains awkward with computationalism. It suggest a long and deep computations is going through our state, but comp suggest that the big bang is not the beginning. Dear Bruno, I think that comp plus some finite limit on resources = Big Bang per observer. Couldn't the Big Bang just be the simplest possible state?Hi Telmo, Yes, if I can add "...that a collection of observers can agree upon" but that this simplest possible state is uniquely in the past for all observers (that can communicate with each other) should not be just postulated to be the case. It demands an explanation. It's uniquely in the past for all complex observersHi Telmo, I would partition up "all possible observers" into mutually communicating sets. Not all observers can communicate with each other and it is mutual communication that, I believe, contains the complexity of one's universe. That makes sense to me.

Hi Telmo,

`Can you see that this requirement even works if there are an`

`infinite number of 'observers'?`

Basically my reasoning follows Wheeler's /It from Bit/ idea.because: - It cannot contain a complex observerHow do we know this? We are, after all, speculating about what we can only infer about given what we observe now.Isn't it just a tautology? I don't know how to justify it any further.It's like saying that an empty glass does not contain water.

`Yes, it is a bit tautological but non-negligible because it sets up`

`the contra-factual basis for what is. That *is* is the complement of`

`what *is not*. Since the number of things that 'didn't happen' is,`

`generally infinite, we can see how events are somehow sieved or selected`

`from many. This leads to the idea that an observation is a selective`

`action, a map from many to one. Classical physics seems to claim that`

`only one event follows from a previous single event, but this kind of`

`reasoning fails when we try to make sense of QM. I am working out a`

`logical strategy...`

- It is so simple that it is coherent with any historySimplicity alone does not induce consistency, AFAIK...I'm thinking in the following terms: imagine a CA which has an initialstate where a single cell is on. For any super-complex state that youfind down the line, the initial simple step is always a consistentpredecessor.

`I generally do not like CA models as they presuppose a fixed set of`

`possible outcomes or rule - which then requires an explanation as to how`

`that rule is selected, and it assumes an absolute time or, equivalently,`

`global synchrony of the transition events. I start with a pair of`

`physical events and their duals (propositional algebras) and work out`

`the mappings between them as Vaughan Pratt describes in his /Rational`

`Mechanics and Natural Mathematics/ paper. One can then set up chains of`

`such and more complex lattices to obtain space-time toy models.`

That doesn't mean it's the beginning, just that it's a likely predecessor to any other state.> The word "predecessor' worries me, it assumes some way to determine causality even when measurements are impossible. Sure, we can just stipulate monotonicity of states, but what> would be the gain? I mean predecessor in the sense that there are plausible sequences of transformations that it's at the root of. These transformations include world branching, of course.I am playing around with the possibility that monotonicity should not be assumed. After all, observables in QM are complex valued and the real numbers that QM predicts (as probabilities of outcomes) only obtain when a basis is chosen and a squaring operation is performed. Basically, that *is* is not something that has any particular ordering to it. Here I am going against the arguments of many people, including Julian Barbour.Ok, this also makes sense to me. But can you accept that there isquantifiable similarity between states?

`Sure, there must be to have any thing like continuity and`

`transitions of event to event and state to state. My point is that we`

`should never assume a measure of similarity that cannot be physically`

`implemented. It one's idea of a measure requires an infinite task to be`

`performed, one should have a pretty good reason why it is being`

`promoted! If it is impossible to measure some quantity, then it cannot`

`be taken to be knowable. We can cheat a bit and use equivalence classes`

`and so form to reason abstractly about things, but all of the results`

`are mere concepts and should not be promoted to being 'real' in the same`

`sense that a physical object is 'real'.`

In this case we can still build a state graph from which we canextract timelines without requiring ordering.

`Sure, but there must be some relation between events that is`

`equivalent to a greater than or equal to (or less than of equal to, of`

`the logical equivalent such as A implies B, or A necessitates B, ...)`

`for the state graph to be relatable to timelines unambiguously.`

The more complex a state is, the smaller the number of states that it is likely to be a predecessor of.Sure, what measure of complexity do you like? There are many and if we allow physical laws to vary, infinitely so... I like the Blum and Kolmogorov measures, but they are still weak... I had Kolmogorv in mind and it's the best I can offer. I agree, it's still week and that's a bummer.Maybe we should drop the desiderata of a measure and focus on the locality of observers and its requirements. I don't think I understand what you mean here.

`Why start off with statistics? Why not start of with a simple`

`relation between a pair of objects and then work out a combinatorial`

`model. We can work out the statistics after we have figured out a model`

`of the system.`

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