On Saturday, February 2, 2013 8:55:18 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
>
>  Hi Stephen,
>  
> A state with more than one governor is perhaps best described
> as a civil war. And you can only have one pilot on a boat.
> In short, any living entity can only have one pilot or decision maker.
>

...one decision maker *at a time*. 

If monads can all make decisions and follow decisions within the fullness 
of time. Monads are experiences through time.

Craig


>  
>
> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
> *From:* Telmo Menezes <javascript:> 
> *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:> 
> *Time:* 2013-02-02, 06:19:12
> *Subject:* Re: Big Bang is the simplest possible state?
>
>   
>
>
> On Mon, Jan 28, 2013 at 2:13 AM, Stephen P. King 
> <step...@charter.net<javascript:>
> > wrote:
>
>>  On 1/27/2013 6:54 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Jan 28, 2013 at 12:40 AM, Stephen P. King 
>> <step...@charter.net<javascript:>
>> > wrote:
>>
>>>  On 1/27/2013 6:07 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
>>> Dear Bruno and Stephen,
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, Jan 27, 2013 at 6:27 PM, Stephen P. King 
>>> <step...@charter.net<javascript:>
>>> > wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 1/27/2013 7:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> The big bang remains awkward with computationalism. It suggest a long 
>>>>> and deep computations is going through our state, but comp suggest that 
>>>>> the 
>>>>> big bang is not the beginning. 
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Dear Bruno,
>>>>
>>>> � � I think that comp plus some finite limit on resources = Big Bang 
>>>> per observer.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Couldn't the Big Bang just be the simplest possible state? 
>>>
>>>
>>> Hi Telmo,
>>>
>>> �� Yes, if I can add "...that a collection of observers can agree upon" 
>>> but that this simplest possible state is uniquely in the past for all 
>>> observers (that can communicate with each other) should not be just 
>>> postulated to be the case. It demands an explanation.
>>>
>>
>> It's uniquely in the past for all complex observers
>>
>> Hi Telmo,
>>
>> � I would partition up "all possible observers" into mutually 
>> communicating sets. Not all observers can communicate with each other and 
>> it is mutual communication that, I believe, contains the complexity of 
>> one's universe.
>>
>
> That makes sense to me.
> �
>
>> Basically my reasoning forllows Wheeler's *It from Bit* idea. 
>>
>>
>>   because:
>>
>> - It cannot contain a complex observer
>>
>>
>> �� How do we know this? We are, after all, speculating about what we can 
>> only infer about given what we observe now.
>>
>
> Isn't it just a tautology? I don't know how to justify it any further. 
> It's like saying that an empty glass does not contain water.
> �
>
>>  
>>
>>   - It is so simple that it is coherent with any history
>>
>>
>> �� Simplicity alone does not induce consistency, AFAIK...
>>
>
> I'm thinking in the following terms: imagine a CA which has an initial 
> state where a single cell is on. For any super-complex state that you find 
> down the line, the initial simple step is always a consistent predecessor.
> �
>
>>  
>>
>>   �
>>
>>   That doesn't mean it's the beginning, just that it's a likely 
>> predecessor to any other state. 
>>
>>
>> �� > The word "predecessor' worries me, it assumes some way to determine 
>> causality even when measurements are impossible. Sure, we can just 
>> stipulate monotonicity of states, but what 
>>
>>
>>   > would be the gain?
>>
>> I mean predecessor in the sense that there are plausible sequences of 
>> transformations that it's at the root of. These transformations include 
>> world branching, of course.
>>
>>
>> �� I am playing around with the possibility that monotonicity should not 
>> be assumed. After all, observables in QM are complex valued and the real 
>> numbers that QM predicts (as probabilities of outcomes) only obtain when a 
>> basis is chosen and a squaring operation is performed. Basically, that *is* 
>> is not something that has any particular ordering to it. Here I am going 
>> against the arguments of many people, including Julian Barbour.
>>
>
> Ok, this also makes sense to me. But can you accept that there is 
> quantifiable similarity between states? In this case we can still build a 
> state graph from which we can extract timelines without requiring ordering.
> �
>
>>  
>>
>>   �
>>
>>>
>>>   The more complex a state is, the smaller the number of states that it 
>>> is likely to be a predecessor of.
>>>
>>>
>>> �� Sure, what measure of complexity do you like? There are many and if 
>>> we allow physical laws to vary, infinitely so... I like the Blum and 
>>> Kolmogorov measures, but they are still weak...
>>>
>>
>> I had Kolmogorv in mind and it's the best I can offer. I agree, it's 
>> still week and that's a bummer.
>>
>>
>> �� Maybe we should drop the desiderata of a measure and focus on the 
>> locality of observers and its requirements.
>>
>
> I don't think I understand what you mean here.
> �
>
>>
>>
>>
>> -- 
>> Onward!
>>
>> Stephen
>>
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