On Saturday, February 2, 2013 8:55:18 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote: > > Hi Stephen, > > A state with more than one governor is perhaps best described > as a civil war. And you can only have one pilot on a boat. > In short, any living entity can only have one pilot or decision maker. >
...one decision maker *at a time*. If monads can all make decisions and follow decisions within the fullness of time. Monads are experiences through time. Craig > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > *From:* Telmo Menezes <javascript:> > *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:> > *Time:* 2013-02-02, 06:19:12 > *Subject:* Re: Big Bang is the simplest possible state? > > > > > On Mon, Jan 28, 2013 at 2:13 AM, Stephen P. King > <[email protected]<javascript:> > > wrote: > >> On 1/27/2013 6:54 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Jan 28, 2013 at 12:40 AM, Stephen P. King >> <[email protected]<javascript:> >> > wrote: >> >>> On 1/27/2013 6:07 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>> >>> Dear Bruno and Stephen, >>> >>> >>> On Sun, Jan 27, 2013 at 6:27 PM, Stephen P. King >>> <[email protected]<javascript:> >>> > wrote: >>> >>>> On 1/27/2013 7:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> The big bang remains awkward with computationalism. It suggest a long >>>>> and deep computations is going through our state, but comp suggest that >>>>> the >>>>> big bang is not the beginning. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Dear Bruno, >>>> >>>> � � I think that comp plus some finite limit on resources = Big Bang >>>> per observer. >>>> >>> >>> Couldn't the Big Bang just be the simplest possible state? >>> >>> >>> Hi Telmo, >>> >>> �� Yes, if I can add "...that a collection of observers can agree upon" >>> but that this simplest possible state is uniquely in the past for all >>> observers (that can communicate with each other) should not be just >>> postulated to be the case. It demands an explanation. >>> >> >> It's uniquely in the past for all complex observers >> >> Hi Telmo, >> >> � I would partition up "all possible observers" into mutually >> communicating sets. Not all observers can communicate with each other and >> it is mutual communication that, I believe, contains the complexity of >> one's universe. >> > > That makes sense to me. > � > >> Basically my reasoning forllows Wheeler's *It from Bit* idea. >> >> >> because: >> >> - It cannot contain a complex observer >> >> >> �� How do we know this? We are, after all, speculating about what we can >> only infer about given what we observe now. >> > > Isn't it just a tautology? I don't know how to justify it any further. > It's like saying that an empty glass does not contain water. > � > >> >> >> - It is so simple that it is coherent with any history >> >> >> �� Simplicity alone does not induce consistency, AFAIK... >> > > I'm thinking in the following terms: imagine a CA which has an initial > state where a single cell is on. For any super-complex state that you find > down the line, the initial simple step is always a consistent predecessor. > � > >> >> >> � >> >> That doesn't mean it's the beginning, just that it's a likely >> predecessor to any other state. >> >> >> �� > The word "predecessor' worries me, it assumes some way to determine >> causality even when measurements are impossible. Sure, we can just >> stipulate monotonicity of states, but what >> >> >> > would be the gain? >> >> I mean predecessor in the sense that there are plausible sequences of >> transformations that it's at the root of. These transformations include >> world branching, of course. >> >> >> �� I am playing around with the possibility that monotonicity should not >> be assumed. After all, observables in QM are complex valued and the real >> numbers that QM predicts (as probabilities of outcomes) only obtain when a >> basis is chosen and a squaring operation is performed. Basically, that *is* >> is not something that has any particular ordering to it. Here I am going >> against the arguments of many people, including Julian Barbour. >> > > Ok, this also makes sense to me. But can you accept that there is > quantifiable similarity between states? In this case we can still build a > state graph from which we can extract timelines without requiring ordering. > � > >> >> >> � >> >>> >>> The more complex a state is, the smaller the number of states that it >>> is likely to be a predecessor of. >>> >>> >>> �� Sure, what measure of complexity do you like? There are many and if >>> we allow physical laws to vary, infinitely so... I like the Blum and >>> Kolmogorov measures, but they are still weak... >>> >> >> I had Kolmogorv in mind and it's the best I can offer. I agree, it's >> still week and that's a bummer. >> >> >> �� Maybe we should drop the desiderata of a measure and focus on the >> locality of observers and its requirements. >> > > I don't think I understand what you mean here. > � > >> >> >> >> -- >> Onward! >> >> Stephen >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected] <javascript:>. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> � >> � >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > __________________________________________________________ > *DreamMail* - Enjoy good email software www.dreammail.org > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
