On Mon, Jan 28, 2013 at 2:13 AM, Stephen P. King <[email protected]>wrote:
> On 1/27/2013 6:54 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > > > > On Mon, Jan 28, 2013 at 12:40 AM, Stephen P. King > <[email protected]>wrote: > >> On 1/27/2013 6:07 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >> Dear Bruno and Stephen, >> >> >> On Sun, Jan 27, 2013 at 6:27 PM, Stephen P. King >> <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> On 1/27/2013 7:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> The big bang remains awkward with computationalism. It suggest a long >>>> and deep computations is going through our state, but comp suggest that the >>>> big bang is not the beginning. >>>> >>> >>> Dear Bruno, >>> >>> I think that comp plus some finite limit on resources = Big Bang per >>> observer. >>> >> >> Couldn't the Big Bang just be the simplest possible state? >> >> >> Hi Telmo, >> >> Yes, if I can add "...that a collection of observers can agree upon" >> but that this simplest possible state is uniquely in the past for all >> observers (that can communicate with each other) should not be just >> postulated to be the case. It demands an explanation. >> > > It's uniquely in the past for all complex observers > > Hi Telmo, > > I would partition up "all possible observers" into mutually > communicating sets. Not all observers can communicate with each other and > it is mutual communication that, I believe, contains the complexity of > one's universe. > That makes sense to me. > Basically my reasoning forllows Wheeler's *It from Bit* idea. > > > because: > > - It cannot contain a complex observer > > > How do we know this? We are, after all, speculating about what we can > only infer about given what we observe now. > Isn't it just a tautology? I don't know how to justify it any further. It's like saying that an empty glass does not contain water. > > > - It is so simple that it is coherent with any history > > > Simplicity alone does not induce consistency, AFAIK... > I'm thinking in the following terms: imagine a CA which has an initial state where a single cell is on. For any super-complex state that you find down the line, the initial simple step is always a consistent predecessor. > > > > > That doesn't mean it's the beginning, just that it's a likely > predecessor to any other state. > > > > The word "predecessor' worries me, it assumes some way to determine > causality even when measurements are impossible. Sure, we can just > stipulate monotonicity of states, but what > > > > would be the gain? > > I mean predecessor in the sense that there are plausible sequences of > transformations that it's at the root of. These transformations include > world branching, of course. > > > I am playing around with the possibility that monotonicity should not > be assumed. After all, observables in QM are complex valued and the real > numbers that QM predicts (as probabilities of outcomes) only obtain when a > basis is chosen and a squaring operation is performed. Basically, that *is* > is not something that has any particular ordering to it. Here I am going > against the arguments of many people, including Julian Barbour. > Ok, this also makes sense to me. But can you accept that there is quantifiable similarity between states? In this case we can still build a state graph from which we can extract timelines without requiring ordering. > > > > >> >> The more complex a state is, the smaller the number of states that it >> is likely to be a predecessor of. >> >> >> Sure, what measure of complexity do you like? There are many and if >> we allow physical laws to vary, infinitely so... I like the Blum and >> Kolmogorov measures, but they are still weak... >> > > I had Kolmogorv in mind and it's the best I can offer. I agree, it's > still week and that's a bummer. > > > Maybe we should drop the desiderata of a measure and focus on the > locality of observers and its requirements. > I don't think I understand what you mean here. > > > > -- > Onward! > > Stephen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
