On Friday, February 8, 2013 12:02:57 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 07 Feb 2013, at 19:43, meekerdb wrote: 
>
> > On 2/7/2013 8:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >> 
> >> 
> >>> Beyond our view of matter, I would guess that both of them would   
> >>> agree that matter is a function of quantum functions, which to me   
> >>> is the same thing as an image of the mind made impersonal. 
> >> 
> >> But that is not what people means by quantum, which need to refer   
> >> to the *assumed* (not derived like in comp) physics. 
> > 
> > Comp is derived from an assumption.  Physics is derived from   
> > observation. 
>
> Comp is the assumption. 
> Physics is partially derived from observation, but makes many   
> assumptions, inclduing comp most of the time, and it becomes pseudo- 
> science when it hides the assumption (like when forgetting to relate   
> the assumption about  the existence of a (primary) physical universe. 
>
> Then both comp laws and physical laws rely on observation to be refuted. 
>

Observing, assuming, refuting are all aspects of sense.

Sense cannot be refuted or assumed or observed without using sense.

Sense cannot be understood as a logical expectation from comp or an 
observable mechanism in physics, and in fact both physics and comp owe 
their epistemology to sense.

Craig


>
>
>
> > 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> Dennett made clear that he is physicalist, naturalist, and weak   
> >>> materialist. 
> >>> 
> >>> I don't know any scientist being idealist, and even in philosophy   
> >>> of mind, most dictionaries describe it as being abandoned. 
> >>> 
> >>> I agree in the sense that you intend, but I think that   
> >>> functionalism is the same thing as impersonal idealism. 
> >> 
> >> You can't provide new meaning to terms having standard definition. 
> > 
> > That's pretty funny from a guy who redefines "God", "theology", and   
> > "mechanism". :-) 
>
> I use the original and general definition of God by those who created   
> the subject, as I use "theology" in the general sense used by even   
> contemporaries philosophers.  And the use of mechanism for digital   
> mechanism is the standard term, for example used by Judson Webb,   
> Dennett & Hofstadter, etc. Then what I derived might astonished those   
> who have prejudices in the field, but we hardly change a definition   
> due to logical consequences of them. 
>
> Why does atheists defends so much the over-precision brought by the   
> Romans in the subject can only confirm my (perhaps shocking for some)   
> statement that atheism is but a variant of christianism, except that   
> atheists are far more dogmatic on the definitions. 
>
> I recommend you stringly the reading of Brian Hines: "Return to the   
> One: Plotinus' guide to God-realization", which illustrates well the   
> big similarities between Christian metaphysics and the great   
> differences too. It illustrates well the complete similarities on the   
> question and the notions, and the complete difference in the answers. 
>
> Bruno 
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
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>
>

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