On Tuesday, March 12, 2013 9:20:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 11 Mar 2013, at 18:48, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Monday, March 11, 2013 1:27:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 11 Mar 2013, at 14:30, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, March 11, 2013 8:43:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 10 Mar 2013, at 15:14, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, March 10, 2013 4:33:43 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 10 Mar 2013, at 01:48, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Saturday, March 9, 2013 7:26:25 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On 3/9/2013 4:06 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Saturday, March 9, 2013 6:30:53 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, Mar 10, 2013 at 9:23 AM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >> They are not powerless to stop them since if someone yells, "Hey, >>>>>> stop!" >>>>>> >> they may stop. This is the case even though the process is still >>>>>> >> deterministic or probabilistic. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > In a deterministic universe, a person who is determined to steal a >>>>>> car will >>>>>> > steal it regardless of whether someone yells at them. If someone >>>>>> yelling at >>>>>> > the thief creates an opportunity for the them to exercise free will >>>>>> over >>>>>> > their own actions, then it is not a deterministic universe. You can >>>>>> yell at >>>>>> > a stone rolling down a hill as much as you want and there will be >>>>>> no change >>>>>> > in where the stone rolls. >>>>>> >>>>>> In a deterministic universe it is determined whether the thief will >>>>>> stop if someone yells at him. However, neither the person yelling nor >>>>>> the thief knows for sure whether he will stop or not. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> What difference would it make to them if neither the person yelling >>>>> nor the thief can control whether or not they are yelling or stealing? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> It will make exactly whatever difference is determined (or random). >>>>> >>>> >>>> You're not getting my point. If you say that the boat doesn't exist, >>>> why would it matter if it has a hole in it or not? >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> I don't know whether or not a puddle in the gutter will dry out or >>>>> not overnight, but why would that generate some sort of interest to me? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Furthermore, it >>>>>> is not possible to know for sure if the thief will stop or not even >>>>>> with a perfect model of his brain, due to the nature of classical >>>>>> chaotic systems. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> It doesn't matter because in a deterministic universe it would be >>>>> impossible to care whether the thief would stop or not. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Unless it was determined that you would care, in which case it would >>>>> impossible not to care. That's what deterministic means, things are >>>>> *determined*. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Why would there be a such thing as "care" in a deterministic universe? >>>> I don't think it is defensible that it could. If *all things are >>>> determined* then there can be no "care". >>>> >>>> >>>> Everything is determined does not entail that *you* can determine >>>> everything. >>>> >>> >>> But it does entail that we cannot determine anything. That's my point, >>> is that care can only arise out of the possibility of determining something >>> ourselves, just as the idea of a game can only arise out of the possibility >>> of participation. Without that possibility of direct participation, the >>> whole ontological basis of "care" is nullified as "clouds" would be >>> nullified in the absence of the possibility of atmosphere. >>> >>> >>> OK, but then you agree that the "universe" can be entirely >>> deterministic, and determined (perhaps only in God eyes), and yet we have >>> still free will, due to the fact that "we" cannot determine everything. >>> this will be in general the case when we are confronted with machine as >>> complex, or more complex than ourselves. >>> >> >> No, it doesn't make sense to me that there would be a highly valued >> qualia of free will (and highly charged qualia of responsibility) if our >> participation did not actually contribute causally in determining the >> universe. >> >> >> But our participation do actually contribute, causally indeed, in >> determining the universe. It is real genuine high level causation, capable >> of reflecting our values and our deepest beliefs. >> > > What does it mean to contribute causally to a deterministic process > though? What contribution does the stone make to its rolling down hill? > > > I have no evidence that a stone support a will relatively to its > environment. I was not talking about stones, but about computers. >
Computers are fuzzy though, because we can always point to an open ended future of possibility. Stones are a better example to work with because of the absurd simplicity. Any understanding about determinism should be clearer there. A computer is informed by human will, so it is really a bad example of determinism. > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> A free spectator in a deterministic machine can feel no responsibility or >> presence. >> >> >> Not only a machine (the person supervening on a machine) can feel >> responsibility, but that person can be responsible. >> > > Why should there be any such feeling even possible in the universe as > 'responsibility' under determinism? Who feels responsible for the rolling > stone? > > >> >> >> I was watching a CGI cartoon this morning and was noticing that the >> sterility of the medium must be fought every step of the way by the >> animators to inject some warmth and character. The digital medium is not >> neutral, it is anesthetically biased. Because computation is devoid both of >> the gravity of realism >> >> >> You betray a naive conception of computations. >> >> I would say that my analysis is more rooted in aesthetic and experiential > qualities rather than conceptual evaluations of computation. I look at what > all CGI has in common, and how that differs from what other forms of > animation, or film, or reality have in common. > > > You can rely only on 3p behavior. Once a machine is allowed to look > inward, his behavior can become very complex, and involve non communicable > truth. Nobody says that all computations support consciousness, but that > some might. > How do you know the machine looks inward at all? If I watch a movie, it might look like characters are being introspective, but that has nothing to do with the video screen or DVD player. > > > > > > >> >> >> >> and the vitality of animation, the CGI animator must compensate with low >> level visual distractions at all times - plugging the holes in the >> audience's experience with lots of clever details. >> >> >> I am not talking about today's machine, but about what is Turing emulable >> in principle. >> > > Emulation is a theory or an assumption. I don't think that it holds up. > Emulation is always limited to observations of observations, not realities. > > > You might be right. The point is that you might be false, also. > OK. Another possibility is that how true or false it seems depends on the intentions and awareness of the person asking. > > > > > > >> >> What is not Turing emulable in your theory. >> > > The only thing that is Turing emulable is public positions in space. > Nothing private is emulable. > > > > But here you are provably false. Self-referential machines have private > life, in the sense that they too can refer to sense and uncommunicable true > knowledge. > How do you know that though? How can you demonstrate that the movie, even an interactive movie, has some kind of private life when you can see how easy it is for us to fall into the pathetic fallacy? > You just decide that they have not the right shape, and that looks like a > form of racism. > It's not shape that I think makes the difference, it's experience. Not racism, but natural elitism. > > > > > >> Don't answer with "sense", because the simplest theory of machine's sense >> makes them also non Turing emulable. The non Turing emulability of sense is >> not an argument against comp, it is a correct intuition that machine can >> have about themselves, when looking inward. >> >> If you study computer science, you can understand that most attribute of >> machine are more complex notion than computation and Turing emulability. >> Machines are such that the whole can be far more complex and rich than >> any of the parts, or the disjoint union of the parts. >> > > Complexity and richness aren't enough to suggest any kind of participation > or perception. > > > > The modal logics, invented to study qualities, suggest the contrary. > Would they suggest that were we not expecting to find them? > > > > >> >> Negative assertions seems premature to me, here. >> > > What would it take to make it not seem that way? > > > I don't know. > OK Craig > > Bruno > > > > > > Craig > > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> Craig >> >> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Craig >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >> A court would not let you off if you got an expert witness in to >>>>>> say that >>>>>> >> you were not responsible for your crime due to the way your brain >>>>>> works. >>>>>> >> This is not because the judge does not believe the expert witness, >>>>>> it is >>>>>> >> because brain physics is not relevant to the question of >>>>>> responsibility for >>>>>> >> a crime. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > When a suspect pleads insanity, they are saying precisely that the >>>>>> brain >>>>>> > physics is relevant to the question of responsibility for a crime. >>>>>> An expert >>>>>> > witness who can establish that you have a tumor in an area of your >>>>>> brain >>>>>> > which is associated with impulse control will have a very good >>>>>> chance of >>>>>> > convincing a judge that brain physics is indeed relevant. >>>>>> >>>>>> Mentally ill people don't have different brain *physics*. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Splitting hairs. Using English words in a nonsense order may >>>>> technically be *English* but it is still a language problem. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> If the brain >>>>>> is deterministic in a well person it is deterministic in a mentally >>>>>> ill person as well. The difference is that the mentally ill person >>>>>> may >>>>>> not be able to (deterministically) respond to certain situations in >>>>>> the way a well person will (deterministically) respond to them. >>>>>> Judges >>>>>> are usually quite intelligent people and I expect that most of them >>>>>> are aware that everything in the world must be either determined or >>>>>> random, but they still make their judgements despite this. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> No judge could make any judgment against a person if they really >>>>> believed that everything must be determined or random. That would mean >>>>> that >>>>> their judgments would also be deterministic or random, so that they would >>>>> not be a judge at all, but rather a pawn of "inevitable and necessary >>>>> consequences of antecedent states of affairs." >>>>> >>>>> Judgment is impossible under determinism. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Unless it's determined, in which case non-judgement is impossible. >>>>> >>>> >>>> You are confusing determinism with omnipotent magic. >>>> >>>> Craig >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Brent >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Craig >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Stathis Papaioannou >>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> Visit this group at >>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> No virus found in this message. >>>>> Checked by AVG - www.avg.com >>>>> Version: 2013.0.2904 / Virus Database: 2641/6156 - Release Date: >>>>> 03/08/13 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>> Visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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