On 01 Oct 2013, at 14:47, chris peck wrote:

Hi Bruno

>>You might quote mùe, but I make clear and insist, at each step of the UDA, that the question is addressed before the duplication.

You insist but you do not make clear. Even in this reply you state: "On the contrary, it is very simple. After the duplication ...."

You can say, before the duplication, that, after the duplication you will be in both place, but that will be a third person description of you, and the question is about your first person experience. In that case, you know in advance, before the duplication, that you will feel to be in only one place after the duplication (unless telepathy, non- comp, etc.).

>> The confirmation or refutation of the prediction is asked after. So the guy which predicted "W and M" is refuted by its own seeing (After, both will see only one city, and the question was about that seeing, and not the body localization).

Bruno, it would be the same ... for you ... if it was about the body localization the bodys end up in different places too. In anycase, as far as the seeing goes, if I make the prediction that I will see moscow and I will see washington, in this situation, I am not committed to the statement there will be a future me that will be seeing washington and moscow. And therefore, my prediction simply is not refuted by the fact that each future me sees only one city.

Because you are just changing the question. I make precise the question is about your future experience, not about the localization of the body. Bioh experience will be lived, like in Everett QM, but they cannot be lived simultaneously. Both copies will agree having been unable to predict their present seeing in Helsinki.

Can't you see that? Its very simple.

Indeed. But that was an answer to another question.

>> It might not help you to betray that you are searching a confusion, as this betrays you want the result to be false, before understanding. But OK. let us see.

Im not searching for one, Bruno. It sticks out like a sore thumb. I disagree with you, I have no intention of being coy about it.

OK, fine. Do you see the point now?

>> [Me] Strictly speaking one can not have a first person view on a first person view.

Of course you can. It is what you feel about what you feel.

>> [Bruno] On the contrary, it is very simple. After the duplication you can say I am in both place, so in both place there are two 1- views, as I do attribute consciousness to my doppelganger. This is a third person view, but which attribute 1-view to both people.

First you say it is simple to have a 1-p view of a 1-p view, and then you admit the example you give of such a view is actually a third person view on a 1 -p view.

I give both so that you see the difference. This 1-view on 1-view was used in a precise context to attempt some help for John Clark.

You're not even trying to make sense instead you're just contradicting yourself.

The 3-view on 1-views appears when you talk about the two copies of you, and attribute consciousness or first person experience to both of them. It is mainly empathy. The 1-views, and the 1-view on the 1-view are the content of such experience. But don't mind this too much, as the original question is simpler.

I can predict that I will view W or M, but you cannot view "M v W", or that can mean too many things.

I think I've hit a nerve because you're being deliberately obtuse.

I was just saying that I did not undersand what you mean by viewing "M or W".

>> "Feel" just emphasizes that the probability has to bear on the 1p.

Thats right. What he feels he will see in the future. Assuming comp and that he believes comp : Moscow and Washington.

So he pushes the button, and after, one copy sees only Moscow, and the other copy sees only washington, so, both copies understand that the prediction "Moscow and Washington" is refuted.

>>By assuming comp we know in advance that after the duplication, the guy will feel (or write in his diary) "I feel to be in W", or "I feel to be in M".

By assuming comp, and thus the 'yes doctor' thing, the guy will write


'I feel to be in W' and 'I feel to be M' in his diary. Though, ofcourse, there will be no diary with both entries.

Exactly, and that is why both will feel like some random selection has been done. Of course the computationalist knows that no random 3p event ever occurred, and that is why it is only a first person indeterminacy occurred.

Do you see the point? Do you want me to give you the iterated duplication experiment? Some people grasped the 1p-indeterminacy more easily in that case.



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