On 1 October 2013 13:47, chris peck <chris_peck...@hotmail.com> wrote:

>>>  You certainly failed to provide a flaw, in case you think there is one.
>>> may be you can elaborate.
> I've provided the same flaw other people have and I have elaborated at
> length. There is no point in elaborating much further with you. You are not
> capable of seeing flaws in your own reasoning. I have seen you at work
> protecting other ideas of yours, inventing spurious reasons as to why people
> might find them difficult to accept, all the while side stepping the
> possibility that the ideas are just wrong. All you have done in this post is
> deflect, obfuscate and deny the bleeding obvious.

Chris, can you entertain the idea that you are simply rebutting a
straw man? What Bruno is demonstrating, in step 3, corresponds to the
logic Everett set out in his relative state interpretation of QM (aka
MWI): i.e that an "objectively" deterministic process can result in
"subjectively" indeterminate outcomes. Like you, after reading
Everett's thesis, Bryce deWitt initially thought he had an obvious
rebuttal, saying "But I don't feel myself split". However, when
Everett pointed out in reply that one should expect precisely this
outcome according to the logic as set out - he was able to concede the
point and change his position. None of this, of course, means that
either the UDA or MWI is correct; just that, starting from their
respective assumptions, if you follow the logic correctly you should
arrive at their respective conclusions.

Of course, it is true that in a certain sense, after duplication there
are two of you and hence that you will experience both outcomes; but
*not at the same time*. It is this latter stipulation that brings in
the subjective, or first-person consideration. As Liz has suggested,
it might be particularly apposite today to recall Fred Hoyle's
metaphor, or heuristic, for the difference between objective and
subjective views, as described in his novel "October the First is Too
Late". Like Everett, Hoyle proposed something that, at first blush,
seems logically absurd and easily rebutted: i.e. that our subjective
states could simply be the consequence of a random sequence drawn from
the momentary experiences of the entire class of sentient beings. My
own first reaction - somewhat like de Witt's - was "That's obviously
crazy - my life isn't a random blizzard of the momentary experiences
of every Tom, Dick and Harry".

However, on reflection, this is not what one should deduce from the
logic as set out. The logical structure of each subjective moment is
defined as encoding its relative past and anticipated future states
(an assumption that seems consistent with our understanding of brain
function, for example). Consequently whatever "individual person" is
implicated in that structure can have no means of knowing what comes
"before" or "after" the present moment other than on the basis of
information already encoded within it. Looked at in this way it
becomes possible to understand how relative states could be duplicated
(or multiplied without limit, for that matter) and yet there could be
but a single subjective experience, linked to a specific identity,
situation, and history, at any one time.


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