On 1 October 2013 13:47, chris peck <chris_peck...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>>> You certainly failed to provide a flaw, in case you think there is one. >>> may be you can elaborate. > > I've provided the same flaw other people have and I have elaborated at > length. There is no point in elaborating much further with you. You are not > capable of seeing flaws in your own reasoning. I have seen you at work > protecting other ideas of yours, inventing spurious reasons as to why people > might find them difficult to accept, all the while side stepping the > possibility that the ideas are just wrong. All you have done in this post is > deflect, obfuscate and deny the bleeding obvious. Chris, can you entertain the idea that you are simply rebutting a straw man? What Bruno is demonstrating, in step 3, corresponds to the logic Everett set out in his relative state interpretation of QM (aka MWI): i.e that an "objectively" deterministic process can result in "subjectively" indeterminate outcomes. Like you, after reading Everett's thesis, Bryce deWitt initially thought he had an obvious rebuttal, saying "But I don't feel myself split". However, when Everett pointed out in reply that one should expect precisely this outcome according to the logic as set out - he was able to concede the point and change his position. None of this, of course, means that either the UDA or MWI is correct; just that, starting from their respective assumptions, if you follow the logic correctly you should arrive at their respective conclusions. Of course, it is true that in a certain sense, after duplication there are two of you and hence that you will experience both outcomes; but *not at the same time*. It is this latter stipulation that brings in the subjective, or first-person consideration. As Liz has suggested, it might be particularly apposite today to recall Fred Hoyle's metaphor, or heuristic, for the difference between objective and subjective views, as described in his novel "October the First is Too Late". Like Everett, Hoyle proposed something that, at first blush, seems logically absurd and easily rebutted: i.e. that our subjective states could simply be the consequence of a random sequence drawn from the momentary experiences of the entire class of sentient beings. My own first reaction - somewhat like de Witt's - was "That's obviously crazy - my life isn't a random blizzard of the momentary experiences of every Tom, Dick and Harry". However, on reflection, this is not what one should deduce from the logic as set out. The logical structure of each subjective moment is defined as encoding its relative past and anticipated future states (an assumption that seems consistent with our understanding of brain function, for example). Consequently whatever "individual person" is implicated in that structure can have no means of knowing what comes "before" or "after" the present moment other than on the basis of information already encoded within it. Looked at in this way it becomes possible to understand how relative states could be duplicated (or multiplied without limit, for that matter) and yet there could be but a single subjective experience, linked to a specific identity, situation, and history, at any one time. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.