On 30 Sep 2013, at 22:40, John Clark wrote:

Personal identity has nothing to do with prediction, and there is a 100% probability the the Washington man and the Moscow man remember being the Helsinki man, and that is all you need to know to say that the Helsinki man had more than one future.

Exact. But this made the FPI point.

Every one know that if we assume that if the Helsinki man can survive digital teleportation, in each of those futures he will feel to be unique, and living in only one city, and the question asked in Helsinki was bearing about the expectation on which city he will feel to see when opening the door.

Your reasoning would show that in Everett QM, where we have also many different futures, there is no indeterminacy, but as Everett explained, the indeterminacy remains, it just become first person (Everett uses "subjective" instead).

Just give us an algorithm refuting that first person indeterminacy. The last one you gave was directly refuted by both copies after the duplication.



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