>>You might quote mùe, but I make clear and insist, at each step of the UDA,
>>that the question is addressed before the duplication.
You insist but you do not make clear. Even in this reply you state: "On the
contrary, it is very simple. After the duplication ...."
>> The confirmation or refutation of the prediction is asked after. So the guy
>> which predicted "W and M" is refuted by its own seeing (After, both will see
>> only one city, and the question was about that seeing, and not the body
Bruno, it would be the same ... for you ... if it was about the body
localization the bodys end up in different places too. In anycase, as far as
the seeing goes, if I make the prediction that I will see moscow and I will see
washington, in this situation, I am not committed to the statement there will
be a future me that will be seeing washington and moscow. And therefore, my
prediction simply is not refuted by the fact that each future me sees only one
Can't you see that? Its very simple.
>> It might not help you to betray that you are searching a confusion, as this
>> betrays you want the result to be false, before understanding. But OK. let
>> us see.
Im not searching for one, Bruno. It sticks out like a sore thumb. I disagree
with you, I have no intention of being coy about it.
>> [Me] Strictly speaking one can not have a first person view on a first
>> person view.
>> [Bruno] On the contrary, it is very simple. After the duplication you can
>> say I am in both place, so in both place there are two 1-views, as I do
>> attribute consciousness to my doppelganger. This is a third person view, but
>> which attribute 1-view to both people.
First you say it is simple to have a 1-p view of a 1-p view, and then you admit
the example you give of such a view is actually a third person view on a 1 -p
view. You're not even trying to make sense instead you're just contradicting
[Me] The viewing is 1 - p and whatever is viewed, however hard you try to fool
yourself that it is also a 1 - p view is, in fact, 3 - p. It is the object of
[Bruno] Which is inferred, and of course not viewed (I might be dreaming, or
The object of the 1 - p.
That is ambiguous.
What more ambiguous than a 1 - p view on a 1 - p view that is infact 3 -p?
I can predict that I will view W or M, but you cannot view "M v W", or that can
mean too many things.
I think I've hit a nerve because you're being deliberately obtuse.
>> "Feel" just emphasizes that the probability has to bear on the 1p.
Thats right. What he feels he will see in the future. Assuming comp and that he
believes comp : Moscow and Washington.
>>By assuming comp we know in advance that after the duplication, the guy will
>>feel (or write in his diary) "I feel to be in W", or "I feel to be in M".
By assuming comp, and thus the 'yes doctor' thing, the guy will write 'I feel
to be in W' and 'I feel to be M' in his diary. Though, ofcourse, there will be
no diary with both entries.
>> Knowledge is typically 1p, but belief are sharable and more typically 3p.
No, beliefs are 1-p. There has never been a belief held 3 - p. The idea is
>> It is a very simple idea. I am not sure what you are missing.
Its a very simple rebuttle. Im not sure what you are missing.
>> I fail to see if you have grasped the 1p-indeterminacy.
I have grasped its rebuttle. I have understood why you are wrong.
>> You certainly failed to provide a flaw, in case you think there is one. may
>> be you can elaborate.
I've provided the same flaw other people have and I have elaborated at length.
There is no point in elaborating much further with you. You are not capable of
seeing flaws in your own reasoning. I have seen you at work protecting other
ideas of yours, inventing spurious reasons as to why people might find them
difficult to accept, all the while side stepping the possibility that the ideas
are just wrong. All you have done in this post is deflect, obfuscate and deny
the bleeding obvious.
>> A child recently saw by himself that even God cannot predict to you (in
>> Helsinki) the outcome felt after such duplication.
I can imagine a child being fooled by the idea. Obviously I would disagree with
> From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
> To: firstname.lastname@example.org
> Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
> Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2013 14:42:46 +0200
> On 30 Sep 2013, at 22:40, John Clark wrote:
> > Personal identity has nothing to do with prediction, and there is a
> > 100% probability the the Washington man and the Moscow man remember
> > being the Helsinki man, and that is all you need to know to say that
> > the Helsinki man had more than one future.
> Exact. But this made the FPI point.
> Every one know that if we assume that if the Helsinki man can survive
> digital teleportation, in each of those futures he will feel to be
> unique, and living in only one city, and the question asked in
> Helsinki was bearing about the expectation on which city he will feel
> to see when opening the door.
> Your reasoning would show that in Everett QM, where we have also many
> different futures, there is no indeterminacy, but as Everett
> explained, the indeterminacy remains, it just become first person
> (Everett uses "subjective" instead).
> Just give us an algorithm refuting that first person indeterminacy.
> The last one you gave was directly refuted by both copies after the
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