On Wed, Oct 02, 2013 at 01:51:01AM +0000, chris peck wrote:
> Hi David
> Thanks for the response. It was by far the best response Ive had and a 
> pleasure to read.
> Lets distinguish between conclusions and arguments.
> I can entertain many bizarre conclusions. I often wonder about an 'infinite 
> plenitude of numbers' or my favorite, an infinite pattern of binary state 
> because maybe that's ontologically simpler, and what would be represented 
> therein. You'ld have pac-man, space invaders and doom. You'ld have microsoft 
> windows and microsoft windows implementing linux VMs. Goodness, you'ld have 
> Windows implementing Linux VMs implementing Windows VMs. An infinite amount 
> of this. You'ld have represented every photo-realistic CGI dinosaur in every 
> CGI dinosaur movie ever made. All these things ended up as a finite pattern 
> of binary states and therefore get represented in my infinite plenitude of 
> binary patterns. 
> Assuming 'comp', then we'ld have every subjective moment experienced by every 
> creature that has existed all represented in there somewhere. Forgetting for 
> the moment whether any of these states would be 'active', or how they would 
> ever get realized or distinguished from noise, or for that matter what could 
> ever interpret them; but assuming 'comp' they would at least be represented. 
> I can entertain all this and far more besides. Ok. so the point Im trying to 
> labor is it is not the bizzaro nature of any conclusion that troubles me. 
> Its Bruno's 'logic' in his informal proof at step 3. If I were God, and Bruno 
> had sussed me out and was absolutely right in his conclusions, I'ld still be 
> whinging about step 3. 'He got there' I would grumble, 'but illegitimately!'
> I also don't think he should ride on the back of Everett. It seems that there 
> is an argument now that Brunos' conclusions are similar to Everett's, 
> therefore lets be forgiving about his informal proof. Lets not. 
> As for Everett and MWI I posted a remark on Quantum Immortality wherein the 
> person in front of the gun can be certain of 2 things, she will survive and 
> she will die and given she believes MWI (assumes comp) she will expect to 
> survive (and die) certainly. And she will experience both certainly. This 
> seems to me the essence of MWI. So if asked, prior to the suicide attempt 
> what she expects to experience, she should say that she expects to experience 
> not being shot and being shot. See, I analyze MWI in the same fashion.
> Now I see an argument brewing that all this is a trivial matter consequent on 
> how Bruno has phrased step 3. Maybe it is trivial. But is Bruno trivially 
> right or trivially wrong in step 3? To what extent are people giving Bruno 
> the benefit of the doubt because its a bit like Everett?

Not at all. The UDA does not depend on the MWI at all.

Step 3 simply implies that an omnisicent third party (ie God) cannot
know which outcome the duplicated person experiences, because one
person has become two.

If I were God, the first thing I'd do is rule out the validity of
COMP. Those pesky computer programs are not allowed to be conscious,
otherwise they'd call into question my very omniscience :).

The situation is analagous to the observation of the spin of an
electron in MWI - an omniscient observer cannot know whether the
observer experiences spin up or spin down, since both observations are
equally real. This is by contrast to a single world interpretation, eg
Copenhagen where only one of spin-up or spin-down is factually

But step 3 is not analogous to quantum immortality - there's a related
comp-imortality theorem for that.



Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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