On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:34, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 7:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
However, on reflection, this is not what one should deduce from the
logic as set out. The logical structure of each subjective moment is
defined as encoding its relative past and anticipated future states
(an assumption that seems consistent with our understanding of brain
function, for example).
But then it seems one needs the physical, or at least the
subconscious. If one conceives a "subjective moment" as just what
one is conscious of in "a moment" it doesn't encode very much of the
past. And in the digital simulation paradigm the computational
state doesn't encode any of it. So I think each conscious "moment"
must have considerable extent in (physical) time so as to overlap
and provide continuity.
But then comp is false, OK? As with comp the present first person
moment can be encoded, and indeed sent on Mars, etc.
Of course physical time need not correspond in any simple way to
OK. With this remark, comp remains consistent, indeed. That last
remark is quite interesting, and a key to grasp comp and its relation
to physics. I think.
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