On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> Every one know that if we assume that if the Helsinki man can survive
> digital teleportation, in each of those futures he will feel to be unique,
> and living in only one city,
Digital teleportation is not necessary, with existing technology I can make
a real experiment, not just a thought experiment, that incorporates all the
philosophical implications, such as they are, as your hi-tech version. In
Helsinki I put you into a soundproof box, I then flip a fair coin and put
you and the box on a jet headed to either Washington of Moscow. Several
hours later you push a button, the box opens and you find out what city
your eyes are receiving signals from. Do you find anything about this
surprising or philosophically interesting? I don't.
> > and the question asked in Helsinki was bearing about the expectation on
> which city he will feel to see when opening the door.
Who cares? Expectations have NOTHING to do with a feeling of self, and
that's what we're talking about.
John K Clark
> Your reasoning would show that in Everett QM, where we have also many
> different futures, there is no indeterminacy, but as Everett explained,
> the indeterminacy remains, it just become first person (Everett uses
> "subjective" instead).
> Just give us an algorithm refuting that first person indeterminacy. The
> last one you gave was directly refuted by both copies after the duplication.
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/>
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