>> Not at all. The UDA does not depend on the MWI at all.
And I didn't suggest it did. This is exquisite chaos. Assuming none of us are
correct then we're rebutting rebuttles we misrepresent of arguments that have
I'll paraphrase my point. I think people here that are familiar with the
territory do not scrutinize the 'proof' as closely as those who are not. And
being familiar with the things being implied by the proof, miss the flaws. They
'leap' over to the pasture without strictly following the path.
A case in point:
>> Step 3 simply implies that an omnisicent third party (ie God) cannot
know which outcome the duplicated person experiences, because one
person has become two.
Some people on the list will nod their heads at that comment and go, 'yep
that's correct, that's what step 3 does'. But what you have written contains an
obvious flaw. People like me, unfamiliar with the territory, will scrutinize
what you've written closely and go 'If that third party is omniscient then
there's nothing he shouldn't know'. They'll smell something fishy and go in for
a closer look. Of course, you're probably just being slack with language, but
nevertheless, the 'doesn't follow' antennae of newbys like me will be buzzing.
There is a step in Bruno's argument where we say 'yes, Doctor'. It is axiomatic
and commits us to the view that I would survive duplication.
There's another axiom which commits us to assume 'comp' which is to say that I
can be digitized at a sufficient 'grain' to retain all aspects of me-ness.
So, we look at what you written and go,
1) if only one of the duplications is me, then how can I have survived
duplication in the other copy? (violates 'yes, doctor') If the other
duplication is not me, why isn't it me? There is nothing really to distinguish
either. (violates comp)
2) If neither of the duplications is me, then clearly I have not survived
duplication. (violates 'yes, doctor')
3) If both of the duplications are me, then why can't an omniscient observer
infer that I have experienced both outcomes? ( => false conclusion)
In short, either the conclusion is wrong, or one or both axioms get violated.
Perhaps what I do wrong here is paying Bruno the respect of taking him at his
> Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2013 12:32:25 +1000
> From: li...@hpcoders.com.au
> To: firstname.lastname@example.org
> Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
> On Wed, Oct 02, 2013 at 01:51:01AM +0000, chris peck wrote:
> > Hi David
> > Thanks for the response. It was by far the best response Ive had and a
> > pleasure to read.
> > Lets distinguish between conclusions and arguments.
> > I can entertain many bizarre conclusions. I often wonder about an 'infinite
> > plenitude of numbers' or my favorite, an infinite pattern of binary state
> > because maybe that's ontologically simpler, and what would be represented
> > therein. You'ld have pac-man, space invaders and doom. You'ld have
> > microsoft windows and microsoft windows implementing linux VMs. Goodness,
> > you'ld have Windows implementing Linux VMs implementing Windows VMs. An
> > infinite amount of this. You'ld have represented every photo-realistic CGI
> > dinosaur in every CGI dinosaur movie ever made. All these things ended up
> > as a finite pattern of binary states and therefore get represented in my
> > infinite plenitude of binary patterns.
> > Assuming 'comp', then we'ld have every subjective moment experienced by
> > every creature that has existed all represented in there somewhere.
> > Forgetting for the moment whether any of these states would be 'active', or
> > how they would ever get realized or distinguished from noise, or for that
> > matter what could ever interpret them; but assuming 'comp' they would at
> > least be represented. I can entertain all this and far more besides. Ok. so
> > the point Im trying to labor is it is not the bizzaro nature of any
> > conclusion that troubles me.
> > Its Bruno's 'logic' in his informal proof at step 3. If I were God, and
> > Bruno had sussed me out and was absolutely right in his conclusions, I'ld
> > still be whinging about step 3. 'He got there' I would grumble, 'but
> > illegitimately!'
> > I also don't think he should ride on the back of Everett. It seems that
> > there is an argument now that Brunos' conclusions are similar to Everett's,
> > therefore lets be forgiving about his informal proof. Lets not.
> > As for Everett and MWI I posted a remark on Quantum Immortality wherein the
> > person in front of the gun can be certain of 2 things, she will survive and
> > she will die and given she believes MWI (assumes comp) she will expect to
> > survive (and die) certainly. And she will experience both certainly. This
> > seems to me the essence of MWI. So if asked, prior to the suicide attempt
> > what she expects to experience, she should say that she expects to
> > experience not being shot and being shot. See, I analyze MWI in the same
> > fashion.
> > Now I see an argument brewing that all this is a trivial matter consequent
> > on how Bruno has phrased step 3. Maybe it is trivial. But is Bruno
> > trivially right or trivially wrong in step 3? To what extent are people
> > giving Bruno the benefit of the doubt because its a bit like Everett?
> Not at all. The UDA does not depend on the MWI at all.
> Step 3 simply implies that an omnisicent third party (ie God) cannot
> know which outcome the duplicated person experiences, because one
> person has become two.
> If I were God, the first thing I'd do is rule out the validity of
> COMP. Those pesky computer programs are not allowed to be conscious,
> otherwise they'd call into question my very omniscience :).
> The situation is analagous to the observation of the spin of an
> electron in MWI - an omniscient observer cannot know whether the
> observer experiences spin up or spin down, since both observations are
> equally real. This is by contrast to a single world interpretation, eg
> Copenhagen where only one of spin-up or spin-down is factually
> But step 3 is not analogous to quantum immortality - there's a related
> comp-imortality theorem for that.
> Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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