On 02 Oct 2013, at 03:51, chris peck wrote:

Hi David

Thanks for the response. It was by far the best response Ive had and a pleasure to read.

Lets distinguish between conclusions and arguments.


I can entertain many bizarre conclusions. I often wonder about an 'infinite plenitude of numbers' or my favorite, an infinite pattern of binary state because maybe that's ontologically simpler, and what would be represented therein. You'ld have pac-man, space invaders and doom. You'ld have microsoft windows and microsoft windows implementing linux VMs. Goodness, you'ld have Windows implementing Linux VMs implementing Windows VMs. An infinite amount of this. You'ld have represented every photo-realistic CGI dinosaur in every CGI dinosaur movie ever made. All these things ended up as a finite pattern of binary states and therefore get represented in my infinite plenitude of binary patterns.

Assuming 'comp', then we'ld have every subjective moment experienced by every creature that has existed all represented in there somewhere. Forgetting for the moment whether any of these states would be 'active', or how they would ever get realized or distinguished from noise, or for that matter what could ever interpret them; but assuming 'comp' they would at least be represented. I can entertain all this and far more besides. Ok. so the point Im trying to labor is it is not the bizzaro nature of any conclusion that troubles me.

Its Bruno's 'logic' in his informal proof at step 3. If I were God, and Bruno had sussed me out and was absolutely right in his conclusions, I'ld still be whinging about step 3. 'He got there' I would grumble, 'but illegitimately!'

I also don't think he should ride on the back of Everett. It seems that there is an argument now that Brunos' conclusions are similar to Everett's, therefore lets be forgiving about his informal proof. Lets not.

Everett's theory is that we don't need the collapse axiom in QM. This idea solves the measurement problem.

My result is that if comp is right, then we don't need (and even cannot use) the wave axiom itself. It has to be recovered from arithmetic. This either solves the problem of the origin of consciousness and matter, or leads to a testable refutation of comp.

Bruno




As for Everett and MWI I posted a remark on Quantum Immortality wherein the person in front of the gun can be certain of 2 things, she will survive and she will die and given she believes MWI (assumes comp) she will expect to survive (and die) certainly. And she will experience both certainly. This seems to me the essence of MWI. So if asked, prior to the suicide attempt what she expects to experience, she should say that she expects to experience not being shot and being shot. See, I analyze MWI in the same fashion.

Now I see an argument brewing that all this is a trivial matter consequent on how Bruno has phrased step 3. Maybe it is trivial. But is Bruno trivially right or trivially wrong in step 3? To what extent are people giving Bruno the benefit of the doubt because its a bit like Everett?

All the best

> From: stath...@gmail.com
> Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2013 09:40:47 +1000
> Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
> On 1 October 2013 22:47, chris peck <chris_peck...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> >>> A child recently saw by himself that even God cannot predict to you (in
> >>> Helsinki) the outcome felt after such duplication.
> >
> > I can imagine a child being fooled by the idea. Obviously I would disagree
> > with this child.
>
> I tend to agree with Bruno that the idea is trivially obvious, and yet > you and others such as John Clark disagree. In these cases I think the
> problem must be that the two disagreeing parties have different
> notions in mind. The same occurs in discussions about free will.
>
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
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