Thanks for the response. It was by far the best response Ive had and a pleasure
Lets distinguish between conclusions and arguments.
I can entertain many bizarre conclusions. I often wonder about an 'infinite
plenitude of numbers' or my favorite, an infinite pattern of binary state
because maybe that's ontologically simpler, and what would be represented
therein. You'ld have pac-man, space invaders and doom. You'ld have microsoft
windows and microsoft windows implementing linux VMs. Goodness, you'ld have
Windows implementing Linux VMs implementing Windows VMs. An infinite amount of
this. You'ld have represented every photo-realistic CGI dinosaur in every CGI
dinosaur movie ever made. All these things ended up as a finite pattern of
binary states and therefore get represented in my infinite plenitude of binary
Assuming 'comp', then we'ld have every subjective moment experienced by every
creature that has existed all represented in there somewhere. Forgetting for
the moment whether any of these states would be 'active', or how they would
ever get realized or distinguished from noise, or for that matter what could
ever interpret them; but assuming 'comp' they would at least be represented. I
can entertain all this and far more besides. Ok. so the point Im trying to
labor is it is not the bizzaro nature of any conclusion that troubles me.
Its Bruno's 'logic' in his informal proof at step 3. If I were God, and Bruno
had sussed me out and was absolutely right in his conclusions, I'ld still be
whinging about step 3. 'He got there' I would grumble, 'but illegitimately!'
I also don't think he should ride on the back of Everett. It seems that there
is an argument now that Brunos' conclusions are similar to Everett's, therefore
lets be forgiving about his informal proof. Lets not.
As for Everett and MWI I posted a remark on Quantum Immortality wherein the
person in front of the gun can be certain of 2 things, she will survive and she
will die and given she believes MWI (assumes comp) she will expect to survive
(and die) certainly. And she will experience both certainly. This seems to me
the essence of MWI. So if asked, prior to the suicide attempt what she expects
to experience, she should say that she expects to experience not being shot and
being shot. See, I analyze MWI in the same fashion.
Now I see an argument brewing that all this is a trivial matter consequent on
how Bruno has phrased step 3. Maybe it is trivial. But is Bruno trivially right
or trivially wrong in step 3? To what extent are people giving Bruno the
benefit of the doubt because its a bit like Everett?
All the best
> From: stath...@gmail.com
> Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2013 09:40:47 +1000
> Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
> To: firstname.lastname@example.org
> On 1 October 2013 22:47, chris peck <chris_peck...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> >>> A child recently saw by himself that even God cannot predict to you (in
> >>> Helsinki) the outcome felt after such duplication.
> > I can imagine a child being fooled by the idea. Obviously I would disagree
> > with this child.
> I tend to agree with Bruno that the idea is trivially obvious, and yet
> you and others such as John Clark disagree. In these cases I think the
> problem must be that the two disagreeing parties have different
> notions in mind. The same occurs in discussions about free will.
> Stathis Papaioannou
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