On Wed, Oct 02, 2013 at 05:25:32AM +0000, chris peck wrote: > Hi Russell > > >> Not at all. The UDA does not depend on the MWI at all. > > And I didn't suggest it did. This is exquisite chaos. Assuming none of us are > correct then we're rebutting rebuttles we misrepresent of arguments that have > been misrepresented. > > I'll paraphrase my point. I think people here that are familiar with the > territory do not scrutinize the 'proof' as closely as those who are not. And > being familiar with the things being implied by the proof, miss the flaws. > They 'leap' over to the pasture without strictly following the path. > > A case in point: > > >> Step 3 simply implies that an omnisicent third party (ie God) cannot > know which outcome the duplicated person experiences, because one > person has become two. > > Some people on the list will nod their heads at that comment and go, 'yep > that's correct, that's what step 3 does'. But what you have written contains > an obvious flaw. People like me, unfamiliar with the territory, will > scrutinize what you've written closely and go 'If that third party is > omniscient then there's nothing he shouldn't know'. They'll smell something > fishy and go in for a closer look. Of course, you're probably just being > slack with language, but nevertheless, the 'doesn't follow' antennae of > newbys like me will be buzzing.
Of course. The language is deliberate, and demonstrates that omniscience is incompatible with comp. It is also incompatible with the MWI. > > There is a step in Bruno's argument where we say 'yes, Doctor'. It is > axiomatic and commits us to the view that I would survive duplication. > > There's another axiom which commits us to assume 'comp' which is to say that > I can be digitized at a sufficient 'grain' to retain all aspects of me-ness. > These are both the one axiom. "Yes doctor" is the axiom that I can be replaced by a digital facsimile, and survive the result, and is one of three axioms (but the most important) making up COMP. > So, we look at what you written and go, > > 1) if only one of the duplications is me, then how can I have survived > duplication in the other copy? (violates 'yes, doctor') If the other > duplication is not me, why isn't it me? There is nothing really to > distinguish either. (violates comp) > The other copy is presumably conscious, and is another "me", but is not me. The only thing distinguishing the two copies is the indexical - I am me, the other copy is not. > 2) If neither of the duplications is me, then clearly I have not survived > duplication. (violates 'yes, doctor') > Yes. > 3) If both of the duplications are me, then why can't an omniscient observer > infer that I have experienced both outcomes? ( => false conclusion) > Only one is me. I don't experience both outcomes. The omniscient observer, of course, cannot know which one. > In short, either the conclusion is wrong, or one or both axioms get violated. > > Perhaps what I do wrong here is paying Bruno the respect of taking him at his > word? > -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
