On Wed, Oct 02, 2013 at 05:25:32AM +0000, chris peck wrote: > Hi Russell > > >> Not at all. The UDA does not depend on the MWI at all. > > And I didn't suggest it did. This is exquisite chaos. Assuming none of us are > correct then we're rebutting rebuttles we misrepresent of arguments that have > been misrepresented. > > I'll paraphrase my point. I think people here that are familiar with the > territory do not scrutinize the 'proof' as closely as those who are not. And > being familiar with the things being implied by the proof, miss the flaws. > They 'leap' over to the pasture without strictly following the path. > > A case in point: > > >> Step 3 simply implies that an omnisicent third party (ie God) cannot > know which outcome the duplicated person experiences, because one > person has become two. > > Some people on the list will nod their heads at that comment and go, 'yep > that's correct, that's what step 3 does'. But what you have written contains > an obvious flaw. People like me, unfamiliar with the territory, will > scrutinize what you've written closely and go 'If that third party is > omniscient then there's nothing he shouldn't know'. They'll smell something > fishy and go in for a closer look. Of course, you're probably just being > slack with language, but nevertheless, the 'doesn't follow' antennae of > newbys like me will be buzzing.
Of course. The language is deliberate, and demonstrates that omniscience is incompatible with comp. It is also incompatible with the MWI. > > There is a step in Bruno's argument where we say 'yes, Doctor'. It is > axiomatic and commits us to the view that I would survive duplication. > > There's another axiom which commits us to assume 'comp' which is to say that > I can be digitized at a sufficient 'grain' to retain all aspects of me-ness. > These are both the one axiom. "Yes doctor" is the axiom that I can be replaced by a digital facsimile, and survive the result, and is one of three axioms (but the most important) making up COMP. > So, we look at what you written and go, > > 1) if only one of the duplications is me, then how can I have survived > duplication in the other copy? (violates 'yes, doctor') If the other > duplication is not me, why isn't it me? There is nothing really to > distinguish either. (violates comp) > The other copy is presumably conscious, and is another "me", but is not me. The only thing distinguishing the two copies is the indexical - I am me, the other copy is not. > 2) If neither of the duplications is me, then clearly I have not survived > duplication. (violates 'yes, doctor') > Yes. > 3) If both of the duplications are me, then why can't an omniscient observer > infer that I have experienced both outcomes? ( => false conclusion) > Only one is me. I don't experience both outcomes. The omniscient observer, of course, cannot know which one. > In short, either the conclusion is wrong, or one or both axioms get violated. > > Perhaps what I do wrong here is paying Bruno the respect of taking him at his > word? > -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected] University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
