On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 3:43 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:34, meekerdb wrote: > > On 10/1/2013 7:13 AM, David Nyman wrote: > > However, on reflection, this is not what one should deduce from the > logic as set out. The logical structure of each subjective moment is > defined as encoding its relative past and anticipated future states > (an assumption that seems consistent with our understanding of brain > function, for example). > > > But then it seems one needs the physical, or at least the subconscious. If > one conceives a "subjective moment" as just what one is conscious of in "a > moment" it doesn't encode very much of the past. And in the digital > simulation paradigm the computational state doesn't encode any of it. So I > think each conscious "moment" must have considerable extent in (physical) > time so as to overlap and provide continuity. > > > But then comp is false, OK? As with comp the present first person moment can > be encoded, and indeed sent on Mars, etc. > > > > Of course physical time need not correspond in any simple way to > computational steps. > > > OK. With this remark, comp remains consistent, indeed. That last remark is > quite interesting, and a key to grasp comp and its relation to physics. I > think.
Could time arise from recursivity? A very caricatural example: f(x) = x :: f(x + 1) So f(0) would go through the steps: (0) (0 1) (0 1 2) ... If (in a caricatural way) we associated each step with a moment, each step would contain a memory of the past, although the function I wrote is just some static mathematical object I dug up from Platonia. Furthermore, these moments would appear to be relates in a causality sequence: (0) -> (0 1) -> (0 1 2) and so on. What do you think? Telmo. > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.