On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 3:43 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:34, meekerdb wrote: > > On 10/1/2013 7:13 AM, David Nyman wrote: > > However, on reflection, this is not what one should deduce from the > logic as set out. The logical structure of each subjective moment is > defined as encoding its relative past and anticipated future states > (an assumption that seems consistent with our understanding of brain > function, for example). > > > But then it seems one needs the physical, or at least the subconscious. If > one conceives a "subjective moment" as just what one is conscious of in "a > moment" it doesn't encode very much of the past. And in the digital > simulation paradigm the computational state doesn't encode any of it. So I > think each conscious "moment" must have considerable extent in (physical) > time so as to overlap and provide continuity. > > > But then comp is false, OK? As with comp the present first person moment can > be encoded, and indeed sent on Mars, etc. > > > > Of course physical time need not correspond in any simple way to > computational steps. > > > OK. With this remark, comp remains consistent, indeed. That last remark is > quite interesting, and a key to grasp comp and its relation to physics. I > think.
Could time arise from recursivity? A very caricatural example: f(x) = x :: f(x + 1) So f(0) would go through the steps: (0) (0 1) (0 1 2) ... If (in a caricatural way) we associated each step with a moment, each step would contain a memory of the past, although the function I wrote is just some static mathematical object I dug up from Platonia. Furthermore, these moments would appear to be relates in a causality sequence: (0) -> (0 1) -> (0 1 2) and so on. What do you think? Telmo. > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
