On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 5:18 PM, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > From the point of view of Moscow man, say, it appears (retrospectively,
> at least) that he had a 50-50 chance of going to either place.
>

Retrospective probability? In Many worlds and in these duplicating chamber
thought experiments probability is not a part of the thing itself it is
just a measure of our lack of information. And after something actually
happened we have more information, so it's easy to calculate the
probability that a past event that actually happened actually happened, it
is always exactly 100%.

And the answer to Bruno's "profound" question the Moscow man asks himself
"why did I change from being the Helsinki Man to the Moscow Man?" is really
not profound at all, the answer is simply "because you saw Moscow". If the
Moscow Man had seen something else he would have turned into some other
sort of man, but he didn't so he's not.

> And for an experimenter it would appear that a photon has a 50-50 chance
> of being transmitted or reflected,
>

Yes but that has nothing to do with personal identity because regardless of
if the photon is reflected or transmitted the experimenter will still feel
like the experimenter due to the fact that the experimenter remembers being
the experimenter before the experiment was performed.


> > Bruno is showing in step 3 is that *if *consciousness is a computation,
> *then* in principle it could be treated as we already treat other digital
> processes


I didn't need Bruno or his "proof" to figure that out.

> "forking into two separate address spaces" is, I think, the computational
> parallel for the teleporter.
>

Yes, and what is indeterminate in that?

> if you imagine consciousness instantiated in a computer (as according to
> comp it could be) then it will perhap be clearer what's going on.
>

Yes things are clear, except for where all this "first person
indeterminacy" stuff is that Bruno keeps talking about.

> I certainly can't see why you couldn't teleport HAL9000 via radio waves
> to two separate spaceships.
>

I can't see why you couldn't do that either, but where is the "first person
indeterminacy" that Bruno keeps talking about?

  John K Clark

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