On 13 Oct 2013, at 18:58, John Clark wrote:




On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 4:26 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

if you agree that each copy (the W-man, and the M-man) get one bit of information,

I agree that if that one bit of information that they both see is not identical then the 2 men are no longer identical either and it becomes justified to give them different names.

But you agreed that both are the H-man, and what you say confirms that both the W-man and the M-man will assess that they were unable to predict the result of opening the door (the city they see) after having pushed on the button.




> then you agree with the first person indeterminacy.

I agree that life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what you're going to see next. Forrest Gump had that figured out a long time ago.

That applies to all indeterminacies. You would have said to the founders of QM that we know about indeterminacy since Pascal or Boltzman. What is new with the FPI in this setting is that everything is deterministic in the 3p-view, yet indetermistic in the 1-view, and not based on any physical assumptions (unlike QM). But the originlaity is not the point. If you agree with that particular form of FPI (First person indeterminacy), then you can move to the step 4.





>> As far as personal identity or consciousness or a continuous feeling of self is concerned it it totally irrelevant if that prediction, or any other prediction for that matter, is confirmed or refuted, nor does it matter if the prediction was probabilistic or absolute.

> ? (as far as I can make sense of this sentence, it looks like it makes my point)

I'm very glad to hear that. But what was your point?

The existence of the FPI. (and then its consequences).

Bruno




  John K Clark



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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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