On 15 Oct 2013, at 17:18, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 3:59 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> what you say confirms that both the W-man and the M-man will assess that they were unable to predict the result of opening the door

Bruno I really didn't need your help on that, I already knew that I can't always successfully predict what I will see after I open a door.

The point is that with the step 3 protocol, you (the H-guy) can never predict among {W, M}, if the result will be "I feel being the W-man", or "I feel being the M-man".

If you are OK with this, please proceed.

>> I agree that life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what you're going to see next. Forrest Gump had that figured out a long time ago.

> That applies to all indeterminacies. You would have said to the founders of QM that we know about indeterminacy since Pascal or Boltzman.

No, the founders of Quantum Mechanics were saying 2 things that neither Pascal or Boltzman were:

1) Some events have no cause.

Only those believing in the collapse (that Feynman called a collective hallucination). You confuse QM and one of his most nonsensical interpretation.

2) Probability is a property of the thing itself and not just a measure of our lack of information.

In QM-withoit collapse, the probability comes, like in comp, from the ignorance about which computation we belong too.

The sort of indeterminacy you're talking about was first discovered by Professor Og of Caveman University who didn't write in the journal Paleolithic Times because Professor Og didn't know how to write.


> What is new with the FPI in this setting is that everything is deterministic in the 3p-view, yet indetermistic in the 1-view,

The trouble is that Bruno Marchal is unable to say who exactly is that is experiencing this "1-view".

I don't need this. This should be made utterly clear in the iterated self-duplication, where I multiply you 24 times per second (24) during 1h30 (60 * 90), into as many copies that can be sent in front of one of the 2^(16180 * 10000) possible images on a screen with 16180 * 10000 pixels, which can be black or white each.

All you need to understand is that almost all among the 2^(16180 * 10000) * (60 * 90) * 24 see white noise, independently of who they are. The predictions bears on the relative experiences.

I do not need more about identity than "your definition". Anyone capable of remembering having been X, has the right to be recognized as X.

Without using pronouns please explain who the hell Mr. 1 is and then maybe I can answer your questions.

Without using pronouns, I lost my job.

The whole approach is indexical, and the third person "I" is eventually defined in the Gödel-Kleene manner (the Dx = "xx" trick, that I promised to Liz to redo in the terms of the phi_i and the w_i).

Then the first person I is defined, in UDA, as being only the content of the memory (= "your definition").

The only difference between first person and third person, used here, is that the first person memories (the content of the diaries), are annihilated and reconstituted together with the person's body.

In the arithmetical version, the first person is proved to be not directly amenable to the use of the dx = "xx" algorithm (an obvious cousin of the famous Mocking Bird combinators, btw), but, by a sort of miracle, thanks to Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, (using the Dx = "xx" algorithm at another level!), we can recover it with the Theaetetus definition of the knower, which recovers in the only way possible (a result proved by Artemov) a knower from the Gödel's notion of self-reference.

So, asking me to not use pronouns, in what is in great part a theory of pronouns, is like asking me to square the circle. The eight arithmetical hypostases are eight precise mathematics of eight simple and deep machine's self-referential points of view, that is pronouns, like 1-I, 3-I, singular, plural, etc.

But in UDA, you don't need Gödel-Kleene, as the first person histories are defined in simple third person terms (sequences of W and M written in the personal diaries), and it is rather obvious that, with the protocols, all are 1-self non predictable, although some statistical distribution can be predicted.

Step 4 asks if those statistical distribution [of those first person experiences (diary content of the one who actually do the self multiplications)] have to change if we introduce reconstitution delays in some branches of the self-multiplication changes ).

That's just step 2 + step 3. So it should be easy.



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