On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 11:11 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:

>  On 10/19/2013 12:30 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>  Amnesia = gap in the chain.
>>
>
>
>  Memories are not a necessary requirement for experience and thus are not
> a requirement for subjective continuation and survival. You survive despite
> forgetting things, or being in a meditative state not drawing on any past
> memories.
>
>
> You're talking about long term memories.  If you lost ALL memories I don't
> think you would be the same person.
>

You woke up this morning as Brent Meeker, emerging from the null conscious
state to a barely awake one, and eventually a fully awake Brent Meeker.
Someone with no memories may not be the same person by our normal
definitions of personhood, but they may become any person (who emerges in a
similar way as a human does awaking from sleep, or developing in an embryo).



> Having experiences is not necessarily the same as being Jason Resch.
>


Jason Resch is a label that can be applied to some experiences, but when
you try to find the borderline where you can no longer apply this label you
will find only confusion.


>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>   branching, etc. Any state eventually leads to every other state.
>>
>>
>>  Sounds like wishful thinking.
>>
>>
>  I will accept that when you can point to a computational state not
> reachable from some other arbitrary computational state.
>
>
> Anartica is reachable from California, but that doesn't mean I'm going
> there.
>


But such a path that exists, and in the case that all paths are explored
(comp/mwi), then in all your travels through the many-worlds/many-dreams,
some fraction of the time, you will get to Antarctica from California.

Jason

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