On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 4:30 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 10/19/2013 10:15 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > > On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 11:11 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 10/19/2013 12:30 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> Amnesia = gap in the chain. >>> >> >> >> Memories are not a necessary requirement for experience and thus are >> not a requirement for subjective continuation and survival. You survive >> despite forgetting things, or being in a meditative state not drawing on >> any past memories. >> >> >> You're talking about long term memories. If you lost ALL memories I >> don't think you would be the same person. >> > > You woke up this morning as Brent Meeker, emerging from the null > conscious state to a barely awake one, and eventually a fully awake Brent > Meeker. Someone with no memories may not be the same person by our normal > definitions of personhood, > > > And why should be adopt non-normal definitions of personhood? > Because the conventional views are probably logically inconsistent. Most attach significance to either physiological or psychological continuity, but you can construct convincing arguments of continuity in situations where one is held constant and the other is entirely replaced. Neither one of these conventional views appears to be correct. > and what would those be? > > Ones that address and answer problems in the area of personal identity. Candidates I am aware of that seem consistent and able to answer questions include no-self theory, and universalism. > > but they may become any person (who emerges in a similar way as a human > does awaking from sleep, or developing in an embryo). > > > >> Having experiences is not necessarily the same as being Jason Resch. >> > > > Jason Resch is a label that can be applied to some experiences, but when > you try to find the borderline where you can no longer apply this label you > will find only confusion. > > > And the border between Mexico and Texas is indefinite at the atomic > level. That doesn't mean there's no Mexico and no Texas. > > Across the many worlds you will find a nearly continuous spectrum of persons from those just like you to those like someone else, and everything in between. Any suggestion of a discrete border that defines where Brent ends and someone else begins would be completely arbitrary. Jason > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> branching, etc. Any state eventually leads to every other state. >>> >>> >>> Sounds like wishful thinking. >>> >>> >> I will accept that when you can point to a computational state not >> reachable from some other arbitrary computational state. >> >> >> Anartica is reachable from California, but that doesn't mean I'm going >> there. >> > > > But such a path that exists, and in the case that all paths are explored > > > All things follow from a false premise. > > Brent > > (comp/mwi), then in all your travels through the > many-worlds/many-dreams, some fraction of the time, you will get to > Antarctica from California. > > Jason > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > No virus found in this message. > > Checked by AVG - www.avg.com > Version: 2014.0.4158 / Virus Database: 3614/6756 - Release Date: 10/16/13 > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
