On 30 Oct 2013, at 18:21, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2013/10/30 John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com>
On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 2:05 PM, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> Bruno asked me "Do you think that you die in a self-duplication experience?" and I said that depends on what the meaning of "you" is. Bruno responded with "We have already agree that "you" concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki", and that was fine with me because that is the meaning of the personal pronoun "you" that I like best. So I answered Bruno's question in a clear no nonsense way, I said "no, I don't think you die in a self- duplication experience". In those circumstances and given Bruno's definition of the pronoun what answer would you give?

> That I don't die.

Then we agree.

>>Then Bruno started putting all sorts of additional caveats and restrictions on the meaning of "you" that were very unclear.

> He did not...

>> So apparently we HAVEN'T already agree that "you" concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki.

> That has *always* been the definition.

If that is the definition of "you" then why in hell doesn't Bruno agree that "you" will see BOTH Moscow AND Washington?


Ah! Quentin, you miss that lie by Clark. I do agree that "you" will see both Moscow AND Washington, in the third person sense. You can apply the 3-view on the two copies, and keeping comp, they both are genuine survivor of the experiencer. I say this explicitly very often, like "you can join me in W and M".

Of course, this distracts from the question asked, which concerns the first person pov, from the first person pov. That is the first person experience. That is, the city-content of the personal diary. In non case at all, will any diary contains: "Oh I see M and I see W". P("I will see only one city") = 1.

This shows also that the personal identity concerns is a red herring. Comp accepts that both copies are equivalent (with respect to identity) continuations of the original, but the prediction bears on the first person experience. Comp predicts that the first person experience will feel to be unique, trivially. It is the classical equivalent of Everett's remark that the quantum observer can't feel the split/superposition.







>> It was at this point that I said Bruno was backpedaling and you started screaming personal insults.

> He never did.

Given Bruno's previous definition to now insist that you only sees one city is very vigorous backpedaling. And it's true Bruno never screamed personal insults, but you did.

>>> same thing in MWI. In MWI, you'll see from 1st POV *one* definite result,

>> No. If MWI is correct then there are TWO 1st POV and you sees *two* definite results,

> No *each you* sees only *one* result.

Correct, *each you* sees only *one* result, and that is precisely HALF the amount of information that would be needed to disprove the proposition that "you" will see BOTH Moscow AND Washington, and in the MWI it is precisely HALF the amount of information that would be needed to disprove the proposition that "you" will see BOTH spin up and spin down. And don't blame me if the language seems convoluted, English was developed long before Everett was born, and we still don't have duplicating chambers; when we do the English language will need major revisions.


There is the 1-p and 3-p, but we can have a 3-view on 1-views = 3-1, and 1-view on 3-views, or 1-3.

We can have a 1-3-3-1-1-1-1-3-1 view on p, and in the math part if B = Gödel predicate, and []p = Bp & p.

It will be given by a (multi) modal formula []-B-B-[]-[]-[]-[]-B-[] p, which is an arithmetical formula, at the propositional level, for specific arithmetical propositions p. (But it cannot be a predicate, like B, due to the presence of "& p").






> The only question ask is the probability you see moscow

Will the Moscow Man be one of the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki? Yes. Therefore according to Bruno's definition of the pronoun (and mine too incidentally) you sees Moscow.

> (resp. washington)

Will the Washington Man be one of the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki? Yes. Therefore according to Bruno's definition of the pronoun you sees Washington. And although that sounds ungrammatical it is logically correct, its just that the English language was never made with this sort of thing in mind.

> Answering 100% is simply false

No it isn't.

It is from 1st POV... each individual sees one and only one city (resp. each individual under MWI sees one and only one result, ie: spin up or down).


It is a mystery that Clark does not remember that the question concerns what will be written in the personal diary.

If 100% was true, for P(W), we would have, in the iterated version, the history WWWWWWW... having a 100% probability, yet, all diaries but one, will contradict that prediction.

P("I will see one city") = 1. And P("I will see W") = P("I will see M"). And the (fist person) event "I will see M" is incompatible (as survivor of the experience described in the step 3 protocol) with "I will see W". So such proba = 1/2, and the diaries "confirms"!

If later, we follow Chris Peck's idea and recombine the two persons, if this is done reasonably, if possible, the new person will still remind having been unable to predict its many previous experiences, previously. The diaries will not be blurred. Something similar happens when we do two dreams simultaneously, as described by Jouvet, which explains them by the sleepy state of the corpus callosum when both hemispheres are in the REM state (that he discovered). the subject report two dreams, not one blurred dream.

The proba concerns the first person experience that you will live, and recall in the next instants, by writing it in the diary.

Note that if we ever decide to do that experience in "reality", we can be sure that P(W) = P(M) < 1/2, due to the fact that in Helsinki, the annihilation probability is not 1n by UD*, so that P(W) = 1/2 minus some epsilon, determined by the measure on UD* (and the substitution level, and the "energy" of the eraser). The same with the WM classical duplication is done in a QM reality (without collapse).

Bruno







> from 1st POV

It isn't unless you start backpedaling away

The only backpedaling here is from you.

from Bruno's original definition of the pronoun "you".

I think this entire matter could be clarified if you could reformulate the following question in such a way that a simple yes or no answer can be given:

"Do you die if two exact copies of Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki are made, one in Moscow and one in Washington and then the Helsinki body instantly destroyed?"


This is not what is asked... what is asked is the probability to see moscow, likewise when you measure the spin of the electron, the question is the probability you measure spin up... both question are *valid* and have simple answer which is 0.5.

For the time being lets not argue about what the answer is, all I want is the question expressed so clearly The question is as clear as it can be both for the duplication thought experiment and the measurement of the spin, both have valid answer.

that one doesn't have to ask follow up questions about points of view

It is linked with POV, in MWI and in duplication experiment.

or probabilities to give a simple yes or no answer. I'd really like to know how you'd rephrase it. I'll go first:

No need to.


Does the fellow who remembers being in Helsinki die if two exact copies of the fellow in Helsinki are made, one in Moscow and one in Washington, and then the Helsinki body instantly destroyed?

I would answer the question with a simple "no" without the need for further explanations or caveats,

That is still not the question asked. The question is about probability. The easiest way to rephrase it, is simply to look at the diary, and simply by repeating the experience and looking at the result of the diary you can infer the frequency of 0.5 and the correct probability.

Quentin

but right now I'm more interested in how you would phrase the question such that it was clear and unambiguous rather than what your answer would be.

  John K Clark








as can be seen by lookint at the diary.

True you see only spin up but if MWI is correct you has been duplicated and we haven't heard what that other fellow saw yet.

We don't care, if you accept probability with MWI so should you in the self-duplication thought experiment, and that's the only of step 3 and always have been.

Quentin

  John K Clark


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