On 30 Oct 2013, at 18:21, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2013/10/30 John Clark <[email protected]>
On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 2:05 PM, Quentin Anciaux
<[email protected]> wrote:
>> Bruno asked me "Do you think that you die in a self-duplication
experience?" and I said that depends on what the meaning of "you"
is. Bruno responded with "We have already agree that "you" concerns
the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki", and that was
fine with me because that is the meaning of the personal pronoun
"you" that I like best. So I answered Bruno's question in a clear
no nonsense way, I said "no, I don't think you die in a self-
duplication experience". In those circumstances and given Bruno's
definition of the pronoun what answer would you give?
> That I don't die.
Then we agree.
>>Then Bruno started putting all sorts of additional caveats and
restrictions on the meaning of "you" that were very unclear.
> He did not...
>> So apparently we HAVEN'T already agree that "you" concerns the
guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki.
> That has *always* been the definition.
If that is the definition of "you" then why in hell doesn't Bruno
agree that "you" will see BOTH Moscow AND Washington?
Ah! Quentin, you miss that lie by Clark. I do agree that "you" will
see both Moscow AND Washington, in the third person sense. You can
apply the 3-view on the two copies, and keeping comp, they both are
genuine survivor of the experiencer. I say this explicitly very often,
like "you can join me in W and M".
Of course, this distracts from the question asked, which concerns the
first person pov, from the first person pov. That is the first person
experience. That is, the city-content of the personal diary. In non
case at all, will any diary contains: "Oh I see M and I see W". P("I
will see only one city") = 1.
This shows also that the personal identity concerns is a red herring.
Comp accepts that both copies are equivalent (with respect to
identity) continuations of the original, but the prediction bears on
the first person experience. Comp predicts that the first person
experience will feel to be unique, trivially. It is the classical
equivalent of Everett's remark that the quantum observer can't feel
the split/superposition.
>> It was at this point that I said Bruno was backpedaling and you
started screaming personal insults.
> He never did.
Given Bruno's previous definition to now insist that you only sees
one city is very vigorous backpedaling. And it's true Bruno never
screamed personal insults, but you did.
>>> same thing in MWI. In MWI, you'll see from 1st POV *one*
definite result,
>> No. If MWI is correct then there are TWO 1st POV and you sees
*two* definite results,
> No *each you* sees only *one* result.
Correct, *each you* sees only *one* result, and that is precisely
HALF the amount of information that would be needed to disprove the
proposition that "you" will see BOTH Moscow AND Washington, and in
the MWI it is precisely HALF the amount of information that would be
needed to disprove the proposition that "you" will see BOTH spin up
and spin down. And don't blame me if the language seems convoluted,
English was developed long before Everett was born, and we still
don't have duplicating chambers; when we do the English language
will need major revisions.
There is the 1-p and 3-p, but we can have a 3-view on 1-views = 3-1,
and 1-view on 3-views, or 1-3.
We can have a 1-3-3-1-1-1-1-3-1 view on p, and in the math part if B =
Gödel predicate, and []p = Bp & p.
It will be given by a (multi) modal formula []-B-B-[]-[]-[]-[]-B-[] p,
which is an arithmetical formula, at the propositional level, for
specific arithmetical propositions p. (But it cannot be a predicate,
like B, due to the presence of "& p").
> The only question ask is the probability you see moscow
Will the Moscow Man be one of the guy(s) who will remember having
been in Helsinki? Yes. Therefore according to Bruno's definition of
the pronoun (and mine too incidentally) you sees Moscow.
> (resp. washington)
Will the Washington Man be one of the guy(s) who will remember
having been in Helsinki? Yes. Therefore according to Bruno's
definition of the pronoun you sees Washington. And although that
sounds ungrammatical it is logically correct, its just that the
English language was never made with this sort of thing in mind.
> Answering 100% is simply false
No it isn't.
It is from 1st POV... each individual sees one and only one city
(resp. each individual under MWI sees one and only one result, ie:
spin up or down).
It is a mystery that Clark does not remember that the question
concerns what will be written in the personal diary.
If 100% was true, for P(W), we would have, in the iterated version,
the history WWWWWWW... having a 100% probability, yet, all diaries but
one, will contradict that prediction.
P("I will see one city") = 1. And P("I will see W") = P("I will see
M"). And the (fist person) event "I will see M" is incompatible (as
survivor of the experience described in the step 3 protocol) with "I
will see W". So such proba = 1/2, and the diaries "confirms"!
If later, we follow Chris Peck's idea and recombine the two persons,
if this is done reasonably, if possible, the new person will still
remind having been unable to predict its many previous experiences,
previously. The diaries will not be blurred. Something similar happens
when we do two dreams simultaneously, as described by Jouvet, which
explains them by the sleepy state of the corpus callosum when both
hemispheres are in the REM state (that he discovered). the subject
report two dreams, not one blurred dream.
The proba concerns the first person experience that you will live, and
recall in the next instants, by writing it in the diary.
Note that if we ever decide to do that experience in "reality", we can
be sure that P(W) = P(M) < 1/2, due to the fact that in Helsinki, the
annihilation probability is not 1n by UD*, so that P(W) = 1/2 minus
some epsilon, determined by the measure on UD* (and the substitution
level, and the "energy" of the eraser).
The same with the WM classical duplication is done in a QM reality
(without collapse).
Bruno
> from 1st POV
It isn't unless you start backpedaling away
The only backpedaling here is from you.
from Bruno's original definition of the pronoun "you".
I think this entire matter could be clarified if you could
reformulate the following question in such a way that a simple yes
or no answer can be given:
"Do you die if two exact copies of Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki are
made, one in Moscow and one in Washington and then the Helsinki body
instantly destroyed?"
This is not what is asked... what is asked is the probability to see
moscow, likewise when you measure the spin of the electron, the
question is the probability you measure spin up... both question are
*valid* and have simple answer which is 0.5.
For the time being lets not argue about what the answer is, all I
want is the question expressed so clearly
The question is as clear as it can be both for the duplication
thought experiment and the measurement of the spin, both have valid
answer.
that one doesn't have to ask follow up questions about points of view
It is linked with POV, in MWI and in duplication experiment.
or probabilities to give a simple yes or no answer. I'd really like
to know how you'd rephrase it. I'll go first:
No need to.
Does the fellow who remembers being in Helsinki die if two exact
copies of the fellow in Helsinki are made, one in Moscow and one in
Washington, and then the Helsinki body instantly destroyed?
I would answer the question with a simple "no" without the need for
further explanations or caveats,
That is still not the question asked. The question is about
probability. The easiest way to rephrase it, is simply to look at
the diary, and simply by repeating the experience and looking at the
result of the diary you can infer the frequency of 0.5 and the
correct probability.
Quentin
but right now I'm more interested in how you would phrase the
question such that it was clear and unambiguous rather than what
your answer would be.
John K Clark
as can be seen by lookint at the diary.
True you see only spin up but if MWI is correct you has been
duplicated and we haven't heard what that other fellow saw yet.
We don't care, if you accept probability with MWI so should you in
the self-duplication thought experiment, and that's the only of step
3 and always have been.
Quentin
John K Clark
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