On 16 Dec 2013, at 19:30, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Dec 15, 2013 at 3:53 PM, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> As I said you confuse "indeterminacy" (the general vague
concept) with the many different sort of indeterminacy:
1) by ignorance on initial conditions (example: the coin), that is
a 3p indeterminacy.
2) Turing form of indeterminacy (example: the halting problem),
that is again a 3p indeterminacy.
3) quantum indeterminacy in copenhague (3p indeterminacy, if that
exists)
4) quantum indeterminacy in Everett (1p indeterminacy, which needs
the quantum SWE assumption)
5) computationalist 1p-indeterminacy (similar to Everett, except
that it does not need to assume the SWE or Everett-QM). It is the
one we get in step 3, and it is part of the derivation of physics
from comp.
>> Only the first 3 make any sense, and even there all those peas
are unnecessary.
> What doesn't make sense about number 4 (the MWI explanation of
indeterminacy) ?
It adds nothing to number 3,
It adds a lot. No need of collapse, no need of 3p indeterminacy (which
is bad magic), and QM can be applied to cosmology, including physicists.
If you say that 4 does not add to 3, you reject Everett, and confirms
that your critics against the 1p comp-indeterminacy applies to Everett
(something you deny in preview post).
and if there were a explanation of indeterminate changes, if there
were a reason they did what they did, then they wouldn't be
indeterminate.
You confuse explanation of where an apparent indeterminacy comes from,
and an explanation of why this or that event occur.
Even in the case "1)" (the coin), we can explain that there is no
indeterminacy (cf Laplace), but still an appearance of indeterminacy
due to a lack of knowledge.
In case "5)" the indeterminism is stronger as even a God cannot
predict the result, and it is not a question of lacking information
before the experience.
And # 5 is the same as number # 2.
This is just completely ridiculous.
#5 concern the immediate result of an 1p-experience (pushing on a
button and opening a door), and #2 concerns the long run of a program,
without involving explicitly the concept of 1p.
All you can say is that #4 is a *particular* case of #5.
Bruno
John K Clark
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