On 15 Dec 2013, at 17:04, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Dec 15, 2013 at 4:04 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>>> you know in Helsinki that you will survive and feel to be in
only one city with probability one
>> That depends, Is "You" the Helsinki Man or the Moscow Man or the
Washington Man or John K Clark?
> They are the same man, we have already discussed this
If they are all the same man then the Washington Man is the Helsinki
Man, thus the report from the Moscow Man that he sees Moscow and
only Moscow is insufficient information
Exactly. As I said, we can only have a 3p confirmation of the comp 1p-
indeterminacy by tracking and interviewing all copies (or some
reasonable sample).
to judge the quality of the prediction about which cities the
Helsinki Man will see, you've got to hear what the Washington Man
has to say too if you want to know if the prediction was correct;
Yes. And in the step 3 case, both confirms they see only one city, and
that gives the complete information each of them have access too in
the first person way. They both confirms that they were unable to
predict the city with certainty.
not that the accuracy of predictions has anything to do endowing us
with a sense of self. And they are NOT all the same man, they are
all John K Clark but the Moscow Man is not the Washington Man.
Exact. That is the root of the indeterminacy. They are the same man,
but their history have irreversibly differentiated.
We agree on all this, but this explains the 1-indeterminacy.
> As I said you confuse "indeterminacy" (the general vague concept)
with the many different sort of indeterminacy:
1) by ignorance on initial conditions (example: the coin), that is
a 3p indeterminacy.
2) Turing form of indeterminacy (example: the halting problem),
that is again a 3p indeterminacy.
3) quantum indeterminacy in copenhague (3p indeterminacy, if that
exists)
4) quantum indeterminacy in Everett (1p indeterminacy, which needs
the quantum SWE assumption)
5) computationalist 1p-indeterminacy (similar to Everett, except
that it does not need to assume the SWE or Everett-QM). It is the
one we get in step 3, and it is part of the derivation of physics
from comp.
Only the first 3 make any sense, and even there all those peas are
unnecessary.
OK. But here, contrary to what you answered many times to Quentin, you
seem to agree that if your argument is valid again the comp-
indeterminacy, it is valid against Everett formulation of QM.
I recall you that, like Einstein and many others, I believe that "3)"
is "insanity". You might be right that it is logically conceivable
(perhaps---I am not even sure about that), but once we accept events
without cause, we fall in the "don't ask" type of theories. As
explanation, it is as bad as the God-of-the-gap. On the contrary, self-
duplication explains the appearance of such indeterminacy, without
adding any further assumptions. Occam favors it. Your belief in "3)"
substitutes a very simple explanation by a call to a form of built-in-
non-explainable magic.
Bruno
John K Clark
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