On Friday, April 11, 2014 12:16:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 10 Apr 2014, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > > On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Craig, > > > > I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get > > closer to a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument > > against comp is not valid, you vindicate being illogical, > > > > I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical > > about factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper > > aspects of nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume > > to rely on logic alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which > > logic seems to arise. > > > > so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help. > > > > > > I will just sum up: > > > > 1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You > > defending ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I > > am nowhere defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on > > this. > > > > I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as > > much on occasion, but that's ok with me either way. > > > > I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is > > the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. > > > > Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a > > realistic expectation of any argument about consciousness. My > > argument is that it can only ever be about how much sense it makes > > relatively speaking, and that the comp argument unfairly rules out > > immeasurable aesthetic qualities from the start. > > > It does not. *you* rule it out. You make less sense. >
If it doesn't rule it out, then comp is circular. For the statement that comp makes "consciousness is generated by computation" we have to assume first that comp is not already consciousness itself, otherwise we aren't saying anything. > > > > > > > My argument predicts the bias of comp in predicting the bias of non- > > comp, so in that aspect we are symmetric. > > > Not at all, because I don't conclude in either comp or not-comp from > that. You do an error in logic. That's all. > The "error" in logic is necessary to locate consciousness. Your calling it an error *is* the conclusion that makes comp seem possible. > > > > > > > > 2) you confuse truth and first person sense, all the time. > > > > I'm not confused, I'm flat out denying that truth can ever be > > anything other than sense, > > Then truth = sense, as I said. It isn't though. Blue isn't truth or non-truth. Truth is a quality of cognitive experience, but cognitive experience is not generated by truth. > But is is a cosmic or universal form of > sense, and you have to related it to the brain and flesh in some ways, > even making them delusion. > I'm not relating it to the brain or flesh at all. You have to stop thinking of sense as implying physical matter. I compare logically that 1+1=2 either makes sense because there is an unconscious property of truth which we can detect consciously, or that 1+1=2 makes sense because it re-acquaints us with a quality of coherence that we are compelled to accept. I think if it was the former, then it would be impossible to ever get a math problem wrong, and people would come out of the womb doing calculus instead of sucking their thumb. The latter makes more sense to me, because it does not take concepts like "1" and "=" for granted, but sees them as generalized stereotypes which are common in certain kinds of perception (especially visual and tactile). > > > > > > and I'm denying that sense has to be first person. It's an explicit > > part of my conjecture. > > truth = first person is just an open problem in comp theology. > Not sure what you mean by that, or how it relates. > > > > > > > > I can be OK with this, for some theory which assumes non-comp, but > > not for an argument, which should be independent of any theory, > > against ~comp. If you use your theory to refute comp, you beg the > > question. > > > > By constraining the terms of the argument to disallow aesthetic > > sense to transcend logical truth, > > There is no logical truth. It is always arithmetical truth. > Either way my point is the same. You are only allowing arguments that begin with a truth that is square when my argument requires that we admit that the square is sitting in a larger circle. > > > > > > you beg the question. We are symmetric here too. > > No, I make assumption, where you are the one pretending having a proof > those assumption is inconsistent. > I'm saying proof is likely impossible and irrelevant. It's about what makes more sense. > > I am OK with both ~[]comp and ~[]~comp. > > You are the one saying that comp is false. > I am not the one saying that ~comp is false. > If ~comp is true, then comp is false. > > You seem to have difficulties here. With respect to comp I am > agnostic, and you are "atheist". You pretend to know that my sun in > law is a doll. > I don't know, but I have no reason to give him the benefit of the doubt and a long list of reasons and examples why I should presume that he is a doll. (a completely new and amazing kind of doll, certainly, but a non-person nonetheless). If we made a speech synthesizer program that sounded very realistic, would comp tell us whether that program felt like it had lips or not when it said words with a B or P sound? > > > > > > > 3) You confuse levels in theories. You seem to infer that a theory > > can only talk about syntax and formal objects, because a theory is > > itself a formal object, but that is a confusion between a theory, > > and what the theory is about. > > > > No, you're projecting that confusion on me because my results > > disagree with yours. > > The results as such does not disagree, given that your theory is close > to the machine first person phenomenology. > I just patiently try to make you understand a mistake, that's all. > You are too patient. I understand the mistake that you think I'm making and just as you do to me, I ascribe your mistake about my mistake to the starting point of logic as the square alone rather than the square inside the circle. > > > > > > I understand that the number 4 or the expression x are not intended > > to relate literally to the figures 4 or x, and I understand that > > your view of arithmetic assumes a correspondence to Platonic entities. > > It does not. You need only to agree that 0+x = x, etc. > But what is 0? What is x and + and =? > > > > > My view though is that no such entities can arise from anything > > other than the capacity to detect, feel, compare, control, etc. > > To just define "capacity", "detect", "compare" ... you need to assume > things like 0+x=x. > Comparison and detection exists on every level, but nothing needs to assume 'x' to be a part of the universe. Detection does not need to be defined, it is self evident. Comparison is another kind of meta-detection. > > > > > > > To give arithmetic entities experiential potentials makes comp beg > > the question from the start. How is arithmetic truth not conscious > > from the start, in order to produce machines that find themselves to > > be conscious? > > Arithmetical truth can be said conscious, except that it is not a > person, and it is more the container and limiter of the consciousness > differentiating flux of of the universal numbers. > If arithmetic truth is conscious, then comp is circular. It has no meaning to say 'consciousness comes from arithmetic' if arithmetic is already conscious. Calling something a universal number precludes it from being a non-number like a color, flavor, or feeling. If you give numbers feelings from the start, then it isn't very impressive that machines made of numbers have feelings. > > > > > 4) You take "sense" for granted, and you object to elementary > > arithmetic. Again, why not, in your theory, but again, that beg the > > question as an argument refuting comp. Here I can only suggest you > > to study a bit more computer science and logic. > > > > We can just turn that around and say you take "arithmetic" for > > granted, and you object to elementary sense. > > But all scientist take arithmetic for granted, nine take sense for > granted in the 3p sense of scientific theories (but cognitive > scientists can take it a important data ... in need to be explained. > Not sure what you're saying but it sounds like a naturalistic fallacy with a dash of argument from authority. > > > > > > > You are saying that the assumptions of comp cannot be challenged > > I have never said that. You symmetrize again. > By aligning the defense of comp with conventions of logic, science, and arithmetic, I think that you are saying that comp cannot be challenged. The idea of primordial sense is put on the defensive from the start, but the idea of primordial arithmetic cannot be questioned. > > > > > > unless we first agree not to challenge the assumptions of comp with > > new assumptions. > > > > 5) Your assumption are unclear. It is still not clear if you assume > > or not a physical reality, > > > > I assume sensory-motive interaction. > > Words are not theories. You ned to provides 3p intelligible laws, or > you do pseudo-religion only. > No, I don't think that I do. That's the whole point. I'm saying that 3p anything is subject to perceptual framing, it is not primitive. I need only show that sensory-motive interaction has no plausible parts to it, and that there are no counter-factuals of phenomena which can exist outside of sense. If I apply the same standard against comp or physics, they fail, as both are certainly known to us through sensation and sense-making and both can be described in terms of sensory-motive parts. > > > > > > Physicality and realism are a set of qualities which potentially > > arise through modulations of sensitive/insensitive interaction. > > > > or how are handled the subject's references to the physical Cf David > > Nyman. It is not clear how you address the mind/body problem. > > > > I address it by putting the entire universe in the gap between mind > > and body. > > Like comp, thus? But just more fuzzy so that you feel free to insult > my sun-in-law? > I don't see that its fuzzy. The body is a representation across space of a nested sense experience. The mind is a representation through time of a nested sense experience. Your sun-in-law is produced backwards, from the outside in, so that his presence *is* a body which represents nothing else. His mind is reverse engineered from mind-like circuits that again represent nothing else. The mind *is* the circuit. For a natural person, the mind is a vehicle for personal attention - a glove of cognitive transformations. I don't insult your sun-in-law lightly or out of prejudice, I only explain why he is likely only a shadow of human intelligence cast in mechanical clothing. > > > > > Perceptual relativity creates mind-like and body-like qualities to > > represent distance between categories of experience. > > Well, nice, but that is already what the machine does, and it makes > this testable. > I don't think that the machine creates any qualities or appreciates them, it only quantifies some common aspects of theoretical/generic experience. > > > > > > > 6) Stathis' point: what in the brain/body would be responsible for > > its non Turing emulability. > > > > The same thing that is responsible for consciousness. In my view, it > > is backward to begin from a brain and say why won't a copy of this > > be conscious. Instead we must begin with a life experience and ask > > why we would assume it can be reduced to the functions of an object. > > It is only if we buy into our 1p sense of realism for 3p objects > > completely that we could make that assumption. > > You avoid the question. > I don't see how. You are assuming that the brain produces consciousness whereas my view is that the brain is a representation of human qualities of consciousness from the 3p body view. The 3p view may or may not be Turing emulable, as it is influenced by phenomena which is ~p immeasurable. > > > > > > > Saying that my sun-in-law is a zombie/doll is based on your non- > > comp, it is not an argument for non-comp. Begging question again. > > > > My non-comp leads to the conclusion that comp cannot be defeated by > > argument, > > But I proved it can. It is the main whole point. Comp can be defeated > by reason, and by experiments. You have still not study it. > No, I'm saying that is false falsifiability in this case. We cannot trust the square theory to judge its own completeness, as it will find that indeed it seems to be square. This is what Godel is all about. All I am doing is adapting it to consciousness so that the whole of arithmetic truth and logic constitutes a kind of formal system which cannot contain awareness itself. > > > > so it is circular to demand that it must be. Feeling cannot be > > proved, but that does not mean it is not more real than logic or > > theory. Feeling doesn't have to be correct in its content, but the > > fact of feeling is the only undeniable fact. > > yes. That's eaxctly what the machine says. Should I conclude that you > are a machine from this? > No, but I can conclude that this is not an argument. > > You would be concluding that based on preference for the modes of thought that you prefer though. > > > > > 7) your critics of logic is self-defeating, and unanswerable. > > > > If logic could be defeated with logic, then Godel would be wrong. > > OK, but that's a reason more to not criticize the use of logic in > argument. > Logic is fine in arguments, until you get to elements and axioms. Then we have only sense to go on...which is another clue that sense supersedes logic. > > > > > > > You can use it to pretend anything, and it looks like you are doing > > exactly that. You make my point, as I explained you. In fact that > > closes the discussion. Of course, by abandoning logic, you can still > > pretend to have refute comp, but you can pretend anything at this > > stage. > > > > I'm not pretending. I'm here in reality to defend sense, while comp > > is a theory that can only be defended theoretically. > > On the contrary, UDA illustrate its practice, nd you are the one doing > something quite theoretical to draw negative conclusion about the > possible consciousness of some entities. You defend Craig's sense > only, and defend no-sense for all machines. > I draw a negative conclusion not only on consciousness but on machine entities in general. I don't think that machines are 'things in themselves'. I don't see anything proprietary about the view that I defend. > > > > > > > > You seem to want to extend the lack of rigor of the human science > > and religion in science, where I want to encourage the same rigor in > > both human science (and religion) and exact science. I show that it > > is very easy to do, as it consists just in avoiding reference to 1p, > > in the argumentation (NOT in the subject matter of course), or to > > add "interrogation mark" and being clear on what is assumed and what > > is argued for. It consists also in the complete abandon of > > pretending any truth. > > > > Any truth except arithmetic truth...which is every truth. > > No, we just assume you agree with a small amount of math. Why would we assume that? > Assume is > different from pretending it is true. > The theorem convinces everyone patient enough, because everyone agrees > with 0+x=0, and similar. And it does not conclude anything on the > truth of comp or ~comp. It just provides a way to test comp + the > classical theory of knowledge. > > You have just no argument that comp is false, so stop pretending, I'm not pretending anything. I do have an argument, but it is that any argument to prove or disprove comp is biased from the start. The expectation of proof in an argument is a 3p expectation that screens out direct awareness from the start. We know that we cannot make our legs stand by arguing with them or proving that standing can occur, we must exercise direct sensory-motive participation and move our legs by ourselves. > and > just assume this if you want, but your phenomenology does not need > this. Comp mighty be false, but you need far better argument, You demand that the subtlest, most delicate truth in the universe kneel down to the vending machine of comp and bash it open with a brick. That's not the way that it works. The machine gets nothing from me. Not a single coin. I know that it has nothing without our patronage, and gives nothing back but its own mindless rules, empty images, plastic music, and rude interventions. > and for > this much more humility and study the worlds of many others and the > training in "scientific" argumentation. > There is little humility in comp. I see it as an ideology which feigns politeness but actually buries consciousness alive. Craig > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
