On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:44:37 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > > On Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:24:03 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > On 11 Apr 2014, at 20:30, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > > > On Friday, April 11, 2014 12:16:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > On 10 Apr 2014, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > Craig, > > > > > > I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get > > > closer to a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument > > > against comp is not valid, you vindicate being illogical, > > > > > > I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical > > > about factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper > > > aspects of nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume > > > to rely on logic alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which > > > logic seems to arise. > > > > > > so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help. > > > > > > > > > I will just sum up: > > > > > > 1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You > > > defending ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I > > > am nowhere defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on > > > this. > > > > > > I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as > > > much on occasion, but that's ok with me either way. > > > > > > I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is > > > the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. > > > > > > Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a > > > realistic expectation of any argument about consciousness. My > > > argument is that it can only ever be about how much sense it makes > > > relatively speaking, and that the comp argument unfairly rules out > > > immeasurable aesthetic qualities from the start. > > > > > > It does not. *you* rule it out. You make less sense. > > > > If it doesn't rule it out, then comp is circular. > > > > Proof? > > > > Reasoning. Comp has to begin without consciousness to explain > > anything. If comp begins with consciousness then you are saying that > > consciousness creates itself...which is fine, but it doesn't need > > computation then. > > You will not convince me that my sun in law *has to be* a zombie or a > doll with argument like that, which mocks completely what I have done. >
That rebuttal doesn't convince me that I should doubt my reasoning. It sounds like you're just saying that my argument offends you. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > For the statement that comp makes "consciousness is generated by > > computation" > > > > Comp does not say "consciousness is generated by computation". I > > have insisted on this many times. > > > > "In philosophy, a computational theory of mind names a view that the > > human mind or the human brain (or both) is an information processing > > system and that thinking is a form of computing. " - > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind > > > > The Wikipedia definition agrees with me. If you are not saying that > > consciousness is a form of computation or product of computation, > > then it seems to me you have made comp too weak of an assertion. > > What do you say that comp asserts? > > That my sun in law might not be a zombie/doll. Comp assumes that the > brain is Turing emulable at some level of description. > What does the brain being Turing emulable mean in this context other than that "consciousness is generated by computation"? If sun in law is not a doll, and if he has a brain that is being emulated by a Turing machine, then that means that the computation of the machine is generating his consciousness. In my work, comp is an assumption, but usually comp is seen as a > consequence of other theories, and is usually an implicit theory of > all materialist (and that is a problem for them, as UDA shows that > comp does not marry well with materialism). > > By materialism, as usual I mean the weak sense: the doctrine which > asserts the primitive existence of matter (or time, space, energy, ...). > > UDA assumes consciousness as subject matter of the inquiry, and > assumes that it is invariant for digital functional substitution done > at some level, and it explains from that assumption that both > consciousness and matter emerges from arithmetic. If you assume rather than prove digital functional substitution for consciousness, then how can the conclusion that consciousness emerges from arithmetic be something other than tautology? > Then AUDA (the > arithmetical UDA) shows, by applying an idea of Theaetetus on Gödel's > predicate of probability, how to make the derivation, and derives the > propositional physics, (the logic of the observable) making comp + > Theaetetus is testable. > It doesn't surprise me very much, as I would expect that formal, linguistically based interactions could be automated to an impressive degree. It has nothing to do with qualia though. The presence of aesthetic phenomena, including intention and care, has no place in AUDA as far as I can tell, which would run monotonously regardless of the consequences. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > we have to assume first that comp is not already consciousness itself, > > > > > > Comp is a theory. There are no reason to say comp is consciousness, > > no more than to say that F=GmM/r^2 has some mass. category error. > > > > Comp is a theory, but it is a theory that computation is what > > produces consciousness. > > > Not at all. I always says that a machine can instantiate > consciousness, or make a first person able to manifest its > consciousness, but avoid an expression like computation of brain > produces consciousness. Those expression confuses implicitlky the > machine []p and the non-machine (except in God's eye) []p & p. > It sounds like you're just avoiding any definitive statement about consciousness being generated, but implicitly defining consciousness as a branch of nothing but computation in every meaningful sense. > > > > > Like in the hunting of the snark, you want the sentence first, and > > the trial after. Well, that is still better than the NDAA, which > > evacuates the trial completely ... > > > > The trial can only be started if we have sufficient technology to > > trade brains and trade back. As far as I can tell, all other testing > > would rely only on measuring whether the imposter can fool a judge - > > which is irrelevant as far as actually authenticating sentience. > > ? > If comp is true, we will never ever know it. > We can test it only if it is false, by finding a physical phenomenon > which violates the comp consequences in physics. > We could know if comp is true by having someone be uploaded to a new brain and then uploaded back into their old brain. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > and a long list of reasons and examples why I should presume that he > > is a doll. (a completely new and amazing kind of doll, certainly, > > but a non-person nonetheless). > > > > If we made a speech synthesizer program that sounded very realistic, > > would comp tell us whether that program felt like it had lips or not > > when it said words with a B or P sound? > > > > To give sense to your question, show me how you represent the > > program in a language that the program can understand. > > Comp does not need to attribute a consciousness to all program. Only > > to very special programs, a priori. > > > > That's fine, but given a very special conscious program, what logic > > would associate the B or P sound with feelings of lips, exhaling, > > engaging the voicebox, etc? Wouldn't the sound be the same with or > > without that feeling? How then can you say that your sun in law > > feels these things just because it sounds the same to us? > > You symmetrize again. I assume comp only, and is open to get a > contradiction from it. UDA is indeed very close, by showing it might > entails too much white rabbits, but AUDA refutes such use of UDA > against comp, as it shows that the observable obeys some quantum > probabilities, and it might still be the case that the white rabbit > phase random out, like in QM. > It seems like I just gave a perfectly legitimate, clear, and common sense challenge, to which your response has no relation. You're talking about remote and obscure technologies, but I'm using a simple example from ordinary human experience. > > So I simply do not provide any argument why my sun in law is > conscious. That is philosophy, and it is simply not my job. he is > conscious, by the comp assumption only. That is not a question > begging, that is hypothetical reasoning. > Ok, so you admit that there is no defense to my objections. It's just not your department. Fair enough. > > But *you*, on the contrary, pretends to have a general argument, not > based on your theory, that comp has to be false, or that my sun-law > has to be a doll. But I have not yet seen it. In each case you refer > implicitly or explicitly to your theory. > I just gave you the argument. Since a computer voice can say 'baby' without feeling like it has lips or a voicebox or lungs, then we should presume that a computer can output logical or human-like discourse without being conscious. > You say comp is wrong. > I have never said that your theory is wrong. > You're welcome to say that my theory is wrong, I would ask only what in particular doesn't make sense and why. > I said only that your argument that comp is wrong is circular. > It may be circular to say that a computer doesn't feel like it has lips when it says 'B', but if it is, I think it is only because it points toward self-evident truths. We need lips to say 'B' but obviously a computer does not. We can imagine, logically, that there could be invisible computer lips in Platonia saying 'B' whenever a particular waveform is produced from logic that drives a soundcard, but I don't find that to be a viable possibility in any realistic scenario. If that is your argument...that there might be invisible mouths in Platonia, then there is really nothing that anyone can say to that, you've just chosen to believe the unbelievable. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 3) You confuse levels in theories. You seem to infer that a theory > > > can only talk about syntax and formal objects, because a theory is > > > itself a formal object, but that is a confusion between a theory, > > > and what the theory is about. > > > > > > No, you're projecting that confusion on me because my results > > > disagree with yours. > > > > The results as such does not disagree, given that your theory is close > > to the machine first person phenomenology. > > I just patiently try to make you understand a mistake, that's all. > > > > You are too patient. > > > > I agree. It is my power and my weakness. > > > > > > > > > > I understand the mistake that you think I'm making and just as you > > do to me, I ascribe your mistake about my mistake to the starting > > point of logic as the square alone rather than the square inside the > > circle. > > > > > > > > > > > > > I understand that the number 4 or the expression x are not intended > > > to relate literally to the figures 4 or x, and I understand that > > > your view of arithmetic assumes a correspondence to Platonic > > entities. > > > > It does not. You need only to agree that 0+x = x, etc. > > > > But what is 0? What is x and + and =? > > > > Nobody knows, but the point is that we don't need to know this to do > > science. We only need to agree that 0+x = x. > > > > We don't need to know, to do science, but we need to know to do a > > science of consciousness. If we are attributing consciousness to > > these figures from the start, then comp is not a theory but a > > tautology of untestable axioms. > > Nobody has ever suggested that we attribute consciousness to these > figure, nor even to any figure or machine. We attribute consciousness > to person only. > You are suggesting it, but you don't acknowlege it. By taking all of the intrinsic sense that are required to sustain numerical relations for granted, you are taking credit for making potatoes out of potato salad. > > I think you have not read the papers, and you repeat simple mistakes > that are easy to avoid by reading the papers, or just my posts to you. > Nothing that you have said leads me to be curious to try to read the papers (again). My argument is not with the reasoning of comp, it is always with the opening premises. > > > > > > > It makes all the difference...if arithmetic is known *not* to be > > conscious, then comp can theoretically be true, but if we cannot > > know, then we should go by our experience in which arithmetic does > > not seem compatible with aesthetic participation > > Too much ambiguity. My experience is that we can never know if > anything has "aesthetic participation", I think that we can pretty well figure it out by the differences between automatic systems and human resources. Machines make perfect slaves, humans make terrible slaves. > so it does not distinguish a > silicon machine from a carbon machine in their ability to manifest a > genuine conscious person. > It begs the question to say that a carbon machine manifests a conscious person. My position is that the conscious person is manifested from primordial sense, smeared across a lifetime. A given slice of that smear will look like a carbon machine when viewed from the outside by a slice of another smear, but it is not the slice that produces the lifetime, it only localizes life into multiple phases of spacetime relation. ...tobecontinued... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
