On 10 May 2014, at 22:56, John Mikes wrote:
Stathis and Esteemed Savants of this brilliant back-and-forth tackle:
Using words is easy. Did we agree in applied meanings at all?
Computation may refer (?) to tackling finite and known items.
Consciousness may refer (?) to inclusion of complexity (= infinite
etc. included)
Conscious has not much to do with consciousness as we speak recently.
System is composed of known inventory - no infinites and
complexities in it.
Organism may include complexity and requirements.
The YES DOC may reroduce the systemic part of your brain only.
Liz may think only of the non-complex part of physics, the one
computable.
I don't go with Bruno into 'machines like ourselves' reaching into
infinite complexities.
For consciousness you need only the sigma_1 complete (Turing
universality) complexity, which is rather simple, compared to the
whole of arithmetic. The threshold of complexity needed for
consciousness is very low, but not trivial. But from the first person
perspective, the machine will be confronted to many thing more complex
than herself, and sometimes not at all computable. Keep in mind that
Arithmetical truth is *far* beyond the computable.
Using the term 'compute' means an understandable inventory to be used.
But after the discovery of the universal machine, we know that a very
simple set of simple rules (the understandable inventory) can lead to
non predictable behavior, and to *correct* discourse about non
justifiable or non-provable truth, still inferable, or even "directly"
knowable.
Are you saying that you are no more agnostic with respect to
computationalism?
Bruno
Brent would have to answer how 'his' consciousness is embedded into
the (what kind of) world? same as mine? a different one? Like a
retro-causation? with what selection?
We ALL gather personalized and dissimilar contents into our image of
the world - so there is a problem in unifying the images.
I agree intelligence is more involved than consciousness: the former
'understands' not verbatim explained connectivities only, the latter
registers (respondes to?) relations.
And then there lurks the unidirectional effect of t i m
e . . . . .
John M
On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 11:56 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]
> wrote:
On Saturday, May 10, 2014, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]>
wrote:
On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 1:30 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]
> wrote:
On 10 May 2014 20:12, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote:
On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 8:30 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
On 10 May 2014 17:30, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote:
On Saturday, May 10, 2014, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
I guess one could start from "is physics computable?" (As Max
Tegmark discusses in his book, but I haven't yet read what his
conclusions are, if any). If physics is computable and consciousness
arises somehow in a "materialist-type way" from the operation of the
brain, then consciousness will be computable by definition.
Is that trivially obvious to you? The anti-comp crowd claim that
even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a
computer could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain
matter, and not just a simulation, to generate the consciousness.
If physics is computable, and consciousness arises from physics with
nothing extra (supernatural or whatever) then yes. Am I missing
something obvious?
You're missing the step where you explain how doing the computations
generates consciousness.
No, that was the initial assumption.
You said: "The anti-comp crowd claim that even if brain behaviour is
computable that does not mean that a computer could be conscious,
since it may require the actual brain matter"
So it is implied that some none-computable part of the brain
generates consciousness, which immediately contradicts the
assumption that brain behaviour is computable.
It could be that some system the behaviour of which is entirely
computable gives rise to consciousness. But consciousness is not a
behaviour.
That is what I understand "consciousness is computable" to mean.
Yeah, I always feel the same about this sort of argument. It seems
so trivial to disprove:
"even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a
computer could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain
matter, and not just a simulation, to generate the consciousness."
1. If brain behaviour is computable and (let's say comp)
Not "and let's say comp", since that is what you are setting out to
prove
2. brain generates consciousness but
3. it requires actual brain matter to do so then
4. brain behaviour is not computable (~comp)
No, that doesn't follow. That brain behaviour is computable means
that we are able to compute such things as the sequence in which
neurons will fire and the effect neuronal activity will have on
muscle.
so comp = ~comp
I also wonder if I'm missing something, since I hear this one a lot.
A computer model of a thunderstorm will predict the behaviour of a
real thunderstorm but it won't be wet. In contrast, I believe that a
computer model of a brain will not only predict the behaviour of a
real brain but will also be conscious. However, I don't think this
is trivially obvious.
A computer model and computability are different things. We have to
be precise about what the initial assumptions mean.
Computability is an abstract concept. I understand the idea that a
physical system is "computable" as meaning that there is an
algorithm that allows us to predict its behaviour. I don't see how
this could be applied to consciousness being computable in the same
way, since consciousness is not a behaviour. The only sense I can
make of consciousness being computable is that by doing the
computations, consciousness is generated.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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