On 11 May 2014 10:54, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 5:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou > <[email protected]>wrote: > >> >> >> On Saturday, May 10, 2014, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 1:30 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] >>> > wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 10 May 2014 20:12, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 8:30 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 10 May 2014 17:30, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Saturday, May 10, 2014, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I guess one could start from "is physics computable?" (As Max >>>>>>>> Tegmark discusses in his book, but I haven't yet read what his >>>>>>>> conclusions >>>>>>>> are, if any). If physics is computable and consciousness arises >>>>>>>> somehow in >>>>>>>> a "materialist-type way" from the operation of the brain, then >>>>>>>> consciousness will be computable by definition. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Is that trivially obvious to you? The anti-comp crowd claim that >>>>>>> even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a computer >>>>>>> could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, and >>>>>>> not >>>>>>> just a simulation, to generate the consciousness. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If physics is computable, and consciousness arises from physics with >>>>>> nothing extra (supernatural or whatever) then yes. Am I missing something >>>>>> obvious? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> You're missing the step where you explain how doing the computations >>>> generates consciousness. >>>> >>> >>> No, that was the initial assumption. >>> >>> You said: "The anti-comp crowd claim that even if brain behaviour is >>> computable that does not mean that a computer could be conscious, since it >>> may require the actual brain matter" >>> >>> So it is implied that some none-computable part of the brain generates >>> consciousness, which immediately contradicts the assumption that brain >>> behaviour is computable. >>> >> >> It could be that some system the behaviour of which is entirely >> computable gives rise to consciousness. But consciousness is not a >> behaviour. > > > If physics is computable, then there is not part of reality that cannot be > replaced by a computation. Your brain can be replaced by an equivalent > computation and the world where you live can be replaced by a computation. > In this case, the computation will be able to generate "wet", "hot", > "blue", etc.. > > But if some part of reality is not computable, and this is the part that > originates consciousness, and the brain contains this part, then the brain > is not computable. No? >
No. I don't think it is obvious that a simulation of a thunderstorm is necessarily wet, and I don't think that this fact means that a thunderstorm is not computable. Maybe you have some other idea of the meaning of "computable". > That is what I understand "consciousness is computable" to mean. >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yeah, I always feel the same about this sort of argument. It seems so >>>>> trivial to disprove: >>>>> >>>>> "even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a >>>>> computer could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, >>>>> and not just a simulation, to generate the consciousness." >>>>> >>>>> 1. If brain behaviour is computable and (let's say comp) >>>>> >>>> >>>> Not "and let's say comp", since that is what you are setting out to >>>> prove >>>> >>>> >>>>> 2. brain generates consciousness but >>>>> 3. it requires actual brain matter to do so then >>>>> 4. brain behaviour is not computable (~comp) >>>>> >>>> >>>> No, that doesn't follow. That brain behaviour is computable means that >>>> we are able to compute such things as the sequence in which neurons will >>>> fire and the effect neuronal activity will have on muscle. >>>> >>>> >>>>> so comp = ~comp >>>>> >>>>> I also wonder if I'm missing something, since I hear this one a lot. >>>>> >>>> >>>> A computer model of a thunderstorm will predict the behaviour of a real >>>> thunderstorm but it won't be wet. In contrast, I believe that a computer >>>> model of a brain will not only predict the behaviour of a real brain but >>>> will also be conscious. However, I don't think this is trivially obvious. >>>> >>> >>> A computer model and computability are different things. We have to be >>> precise about what the initial assumptions mean. >>> >> >> Computability is an abstract concept. I understand the idea that a >> physical system is "computable" as meaning that there is an algorithm that >> allows us to predict its behaviour. >> > > But if the algorithm can predict it's behaviour perfectly, then the system > can be replaced by the algorithm. Of course, when you tell the computer to > print a document, it sends instructions to the printer, a device that then > interacts with the physical world. But if this part is also computable, > then it could inject directly into your brain the feeling of being able to > hold a paper that you can read, then tear apart and throw in the > algorithmic trash bin. If all these things are possible, there is not basis > to claim any difference between one version of the paper or the other. If > you compute the entire universe fully and can live inside this computation > (as per comp), then I see no basis to claim that there are two universes. > They are interchangeable in the same sense that two hydrogen atoms are > interchangeable. > > Maybe I'm wrong, but my impression is that if you accept comp you have to > accept the hole shebang. There is no dualist middle-ground that doesn't > logically contradict comp. > You can accept that the brain is computable in the sense that there is an algorithm describing its behaviour but not accept comp. I actually believe it can be shown that IF the brain behaviour is computable THEN comp is true, but the point I am trying to make is that it is not trivially obvious. > I don't see how this could be applied to consciousness being computable >> in the same way, since consciousness is not a behaviour. >> > > I'm not sure what that means. What is a behaviour? > > >> The only sense I can make of consciousness being computable is that by >> doing the computations, consciousness is generated. >> > > I agree, although I am more comfortable with "consciousness is > instantiated". > > Telmo. > > >> >> >> -- >> Stathis Papaioannou >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
