Bruno, please do not identify what - *I - * "need" for an (my!) *unidentified* consciousness.
As for 'my' agnosticism: Mine is based on *believed* lots of things *beyond*our knowable mental inventory (that YET may have impact on our thinking/life/existence). I wonder about the *DISCOVERY(?) *of the universal machine. Thinking about it is in my vocabilary much less then discover it. I would be careful to apply the verb "we know" after the term. Question: in what terms is 'it's' inventory UNDERSTANDABLE? for us, agnostics (my term), or for the complexity unlimited? Again: we can TALK about the latter in OUR *present* terms only. Agnostically yours John M On Sun, May 11, 2014 at 4:41 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 10 May 2014, at 22:56, John Mikes wrote: > > Stathis and Esteemed Savants of this brilliant back-and-forth tackle: > Using words is easy. Did we agree in applied meanings at all? > Computation may refer (?) to tackling finite and known items. > Consciousness may refer (?) to inclusion of complexity (= infinite etc. > included) > Conscious has not much to do with consciousness as we speak recently. > System is composed of known inventory - no infinites and complexities in > it. > Organism may include complexity and requirements. > The YES DOC may reroduce the systemic part of your brain only. > Liz may think only of the non-complex part of physics, the one computable. > I don't go with Bruno into 'machines like ourselves' reaching into > infinite complexities. > > > For consciousness you need only the sigma_1 complete (Turing universality) > complexity, which is rather simple, compared to the whole of arithmetic. > The threshold of complexity needed for consciousness is very low, but not > trivial. But from the first person perspective, the machine will be > confronted to many thing more complex than herself, and sometimes not at > all computable. Keep in mind that Arithmetical truth is *far* beyond the > computable. > > > > > Using the term 'compute' means an understandable inventory to be used. > > > But after the discovery of the universal machine, we know that a very > simple set of simple rules (the understandable inventory) can lead to non > predictable behavior, and to *correct* discourse about non justifiable or > non-provable truth, still inferable, or even "directly" knowable. > > Are you saying that you are no more agnostic with respect to > computationalism? > > Bruno > > > > Brent would have to answer how 'his' consciousness is embedded into the > (what kind of) world? same as mine? a different one? Like a > retro-causation? with what selection? > We ALL gather personalized and dissimilar contents into our image of the > world - so there is a problem in unifying the images. > I agree intelligence is more involved than consciousness: the former > 'understands' not verbatim explained connectivities only, the latter > registers (respondes to?) relations. > And then there lurks the unidirectional effect of t i m e . . . . . > > John M > > > > On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 11:56 AM, Stathis Papaioannou > <[email protected]>wrote: > >> >> >> On Saturday, May 10, 2014, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 1:30 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] >>> > wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 10 May 2014 20:12, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 8:30 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 10 May 2014 17:30, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Saturday, May 10, 2014, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I guess one could start from "is physics computable?" (As Max >>>>>>>> Tegmark discusses in his book, but I haven't yet read what his >>>>>>>> conclusions >>>>>>>> are, if any). If physics is computable and consciousness arises >>>>>>>> somehow in >>>>>>>> a "materialist-type way" from the operation of the brain, then >>>>>>>> consciousness will be computable by definition. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Is that trivially obvious to you? The anti-comp crowd claim that >>>>>>> even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a computer >>>>>>> could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, and >>>>>>> not >>>>>>> just a simulation, to generate the consciousness. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If physics is computable, and consciousness arises from physics with >>>>>> nothing extra (supernatural or whatever) then yes. Am I missing something >>>>>> obvious? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> You're missing the step where you explain how doing the computations >>>> generates consciousness. >>>> >>> >>> No, that was the initial assumption. >>> >>> You said: "The anti-comp crowd claim that even if brain behaviour is >>> computable that does not mean that a computer could be conscious, since it >>> may require the actual brain matter" >>> >>> So it is implied that some none-computable part of the brain generates >>> consciousness, which immediately contradicts the assumption that brain >>> behaviour is computable. >>> >> >> It could be that some system the behaviour of which is entirely >> computable gives rise to consciousness. But consciousness is not a >> behaviour. >> >> >> >>> That is what I understand "consciousness is computable" to mean. >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yeah, I always feel the same about this sort of argument. It seems so >>>>> trivial to disprove: >>>>> >>>>> "even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a >>>>> computer could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, >>>>> and not just a simulation, to generate the consciousness." >>>>> >>>>> 1. If brain behaviour is computable and (let's say comp) >>>>> >>>> >>>> Not "and let's say comp", since that is what you are setting out to >>>> prove >>>> >>>> >>>>> 2. brain generates consciousness but >>>>> 3. it requires actual brain matter to do so then >>>>> 4. brain behaviour is not computable (~comp) >>>>> >>>> >>>> No, that doesn't follow. That brain behaviour is computable means that >>>> we are able to compute such things as the sequence in which neurons will >>>> fire and the effect neuronal activity will have on muscle. >>>> >>>> >>>>> so comp = ~comp >>>>> >>>>> I also wonder if I'm missing something, since I hear this one a lot. >>>>> >>>> >>>> A computer model of a thunderstorm will predict the behaviour of a real >>>> thunderstorm but it won't be wet. In contrast, I believe that a computer >>>> model of a brain will not only predict the behaviour of a real brain but >>>> will also be conscious. However, I don't think this is trivially obvious. >>>> >>> >>> A computer model and computability are different things. We have to be >>> precise about what the initial assumptions mean. >>> >> >> Computability is an abstract concept. I understand the idea that a >> physical system is "computable" as meaning that there is an algorithm that >> allows us to predict its behaviour. I don't see how this could be applied >> to consciousness being computable in the same way, since consciousness is >> not a behaviour. The only sense I can make of consciousness being >> computable is that by doing the computations, consciousness is generated. >> >> >> -- >> Stathis Papaioannou >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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