Stathis and Esteemed Savants of this brilliant back-and-forth tackle: Using words is easy. Did we agree in applied meanings at all? Computation may refer (?) to tackling finite and known items. Consciousness may refer (?) to inclusion of complexity (= infinite etc. included) Conscious has not much to do with consciousness as we speak recently. System is composed of known inventory - no infinites and complexities in it. Organism may include complexity and requirements. The YES DOC may reroduce the systemic part of your brain only. Liz may think only of the non-complex part of physics, the one computable. I don't go with Bruno into 'machines like ourselves' reaching into infinite complexities. Using the term 'compute' means an understandable inventory to be used. Brent would have to answer how 'his' consciousness is embedded into the (what kind of) world? same as mine? a different one? Like a retro-causation? with what selection? We ALL gather personalized and dissimilar contents into our image of the world - so there is a problem in unifying the images. I agree intelligence is more involved than consciousness: the former 'understands' not verbatim explained connectivities only, the latter registers (respondes to?) relations. And then there lurks the unidirectional effect of t i m e . . . . .
John M On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 11:56 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>wrote: > > > On Saturday, May 10, 2014, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> >> On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 1:30 PM, Stathis Papaioannou >> <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 10 May 2014 20:12, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 8:30 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 10 May 2014 17:30, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Saturday, May 10, 2014, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I guess one could start from "is physics computable?" (As Max >>>>>>> Tegmark discusses in his book, but I haven't yet read what his >>>>>>> conclusions >>>>>>> are, if any). If physics is computable and consciousness arises somehow >>>>>>> in >>>>>>> a "materialist-type way" from the operation of the brain, then >>>>>>> consciousness will be computable by definition. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Is that trivially obvious to you? The anti-comp crowd claim that even >>>>>> if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a computer >>>>>> could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, and not >>>>>> just a simulation, to generate the consciousness. >>>>>> >>>>>> If physics is computable, and consciousness arises from physics with >>>>> nothing extra (supernatural or whatever) then yes. Am I missing something >>>>> obvious? >>>>> >>>> >>> You're missing the step where you explain how doing the computations >>> generates consciousness. >>> >> >> No, that was the initial assumption. >> >> You said: "The anti-comp crowd claim that even if brain behaviour is >> computable that does not mean that a computer could be conscious, since it >> may require the actual brain matter" >> >> So it is implied that some none-computable part of the brain generates >> consciousness, which immediately contradicts the assumption that brain >> behaviour is computable. >> > > It could be that some system the behaviour of which is entirely > computable gives rise to consciousness. But consciousness is not a > behaviour. > > > >> That is what I understand "consciousness is computable" to mean. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Yeah, I always feel the same about this sort of argument. It seems so >>>> trivial to disprove: >>>> >>>> "even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a >>>> computer could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, >>>> and not just a simulation, to generate the consciousness." >>>> >>>> 1. If brain behaviour is computable and (let's say comp) >>>> >>> >>> Not "and let's say comp", since that is what you are setting out to prove >>> >>> >>>> 2. brain generates consciousness but >>>> 3. it requires actual brain matter to do so then >>>> 4. brain behaviour is not computable (~comp) >>>> >>> >>> No, that doesn't follow. That brain behaviour is computable means that >>> we are able to compute such things as the sequence in which neurons will >>> fire and the effect neuronal activity will have on muscle. >>> >>> >>>> so comp = ~comp >>>> >>>> I also wonder if I'm missing something, since I hear this one a lot. >>>> >>> >>> A computer model of a thunderstorm will predict the behaviour of a real >>> thunderstorm but it won't be wet. In contrast, I believe that a computer >>> model of a brain will not only predict the behaviour of a real brain but >>> will also be conscious. However, I don't think this is trivially obvious. >>> >> >> A computer model and computability are different things. We have to be >> precise about what the initial assumptions mean. >> > > Computability is an abstract concept. I understand the idea that a > physical system is "computable" as meaning that there is an algorithm that > allows us to predict its behaviour. I don't see how this could be applied > to consciousness being computable in the same way, since consciousness is > not a behaviour. The only sense I can make of consciousness being > computable is that by doing the computations, consciousness is generated. > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
