On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 5:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>wrote:
> > > On Saturday, May 10, 2014, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> >> On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 1:30 PM, Stathis Papaioannou >> <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 10 May 2014 20:12, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 8:30 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 10 May 2014 17:30, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Saturday, May 10, 2014, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I guess one could start from "is physics computable?" (As Max >>>>>>> Tegmark discusses in his book, but I haven't yet read what his >>>>>>> conclusions >>>>>>> are, if any). If physics is computable and consciousness arises somehow >>>>>>> in >>>>>>> a "materialist-type way" from the operation of the brain, then >>>>>>> consciousness will be computable by definition. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Is that trivially obvious to you? The anti-comp crowd claim that even >>>>>> if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a computer >>>>>> could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, and not >>>>>> just a simulation, to generate the consciousness. >>>>>> >>>>>> If physics is computable, and consciousness arises from physics with >>>>> nothing extra (supernatural or whatever) then yes. Am I missing something >>>>> obvious? >>>>> >>>> >>> You're missing the step where you explain how doing the computations >>> generates consciousness. >>> >> >> No, that was the initial assumption. >> >> You said: "The anti-comp crowd claim that even if brain behaviour is >> computable that does not mean that a computer could be conscious, since it >> may require the actual brain matter" >> >> So it is implied that some none-computable part of the brain generates >> consciousness, which immediately contradicts the assumption that brain >> behaviour is computable. >> > > It could be that some system the behaviour of which is entirely > computable gives rise to consciousness. But consciousness is not a > behaviour. If physics is computable, then there is not part of reality that cannot be replaced by a computation. Your brain can be replaced by an equivalent computation and the world where you live can be replaced by a computation. In this case, the computation will be able to generate "wet", "hot", "blue", etc.. But if some part of reality is not computable, and this is the part that originates consciousness, and the brain contains this part, then the brain is not computable. No? > > > >> That is what I understand "consciousness is computable" to mean. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Yeah, I always feel the same about this sort of argument. It seems so >>>> trivial to disprove: >>>> >>>> "even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a >>>> computer could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, >>>> and not just a simulation, to generate the consciousness." >>>> >>>> 1. If brain behaviour is computable and (let's say comp) >>>> >>> >>> Not "and let's say comp", since that is what you are setting out to prove >>> >>> >>>> 2. brain generates consciousness but >>>> 3. it requires actual brain matter to do so then >>>> 4. brain behaviour is not computable (~comp) >>>> >>> >>> No, that doesn't follow. That brain behaviour is computable means that >>> we are able to compute such things as the sequence in which neurons will >>> fire and the effect neuronal activity will have on muscle. >>> >>> >>>> so comp = ~comp >>>> >>>> I also wonder if I'm missing something, since I hear this one a lot. >>>> >>> >>> A computer model of a thunderstorm will predict the behaviour of a real >>> thunderstorm but it won't be wet. In contrast, I believe that a computer >>> model of a brain will not only predict the behaviour of a real brain but >>> will also be conscious. However, I don't think this is trivially obvious. >>> >> >> A computer model and computability are different things. We have to be >> precise about what the initial assumptions mean. >> > > Computability is an abstract concept. I understand the idea that a > physical system is "computable" as meaning that there is an algorithm that > allows us to predict its behaviour. > But if the algorithm can predict it's behaviour perfectly, then the system can be replaced by the algorithm. Of course, when you tell the computer to print a document, it sends instructions to the printer, a device that then interacts with the physical world. But if this part is also computable, then it could inject directly into your brain the feeling of being able to hold a paper that you can read, then tear apart and throw in the algorithmic trash bin. If all these things are possible, there is not basis to claim any difference between one version of the paper or the other. If you compute the entire universe fully and can live inside this computation (as per comp), then I see no basis to claim that there are two universes. They are interchangeable in the same sense that two hydrogen atoms are interchangeable. Maybe I'm wrong, but my impression is that if you accept comp you have to accept the hole shebang. There is no dualist middle-ground that doesn't logically contradict comp. > I don't see how this could be applied to consciousness being computable in > the same way, since consciousness is not a behaviour. > I'm not sure what that means. What is a behaviour? > The only sense I can make of consciousness being computable is that by > doing the computations, consciousness is generated. > I agree, although I am more comfortable with "consciousness is instantiated". Telmo. > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
