On 10 May 2014, at 17:56, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On Saturday, May 10, 2014, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote:



On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 1:30 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] > wrote:



On 10 May 2014 20:12, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote:



On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 8:30 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
On 10 May 2014 17:30, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote:


On Saturday, May 10, 2014, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
I guess one could start from "is physics computable?" (As Max Tegmark discusses in his book, but I haven't yet read what his conclusions are, if any). If physics is computable and consciousness arises somehow in a "materialist-type way" from the operation of the brain, then consciousness will be computable by definition.

Is that trivially obvious to you? The anti-comp crowd claim that even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a computer could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, and not just a simulation, to generate the consciousness.

If physics is computable, and consciousness arises from physics with nothing extra (supernatural or whatever) then yes. Am I missing something obvious?

You're missing the step where you explain how doing the computations generates consciousness.

No, that was the initial assumption.

You said: "The anti-comp crowd claim that even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a computer could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter"

So it is implied that some none-computable part of the brain generates consciousness, which immediately contradicts the assumption that brain behaviour is computable.

It could be that some system the behaviour of which is entirely computable gives rise to consciousness. But consciousness is not a behaviour.

Right. Consciousness is not a behavior. It is more a knowledge state of mind, that is a type of belief which happens to be true. But it can affect the behavior in an indirect way, a bit like fear can affect a behavior, although you can't see fear.





That is what I understand "consciousness is computable" to mean.


Yeah, I always feel the same about this sort of argument. It seems so trivial to disprove:

"even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a computer could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, and not just a simulation, to generate the consciousness."

1. If brain behaviour is computable and (let's say comp)

Not "and let's say comp", since that is what you are setting out to prove

2. brain generates consciousness but
3. it requires actual brain matter to do so then
4. brain behaviour is not computable (~comp)

No, that doesn't follow. That brain behaviour is computable means that we are able to compute such things as the sequence in which neurons will fire and the effect neuronal activity will have on muscle.

so comp = ~comp

I also wonder if I'm missing something, since I hear this one a lot.

A computer model of a thunderstorm will predict the behaviour of a real thunderstorm but it won't be wet. In contrast, I believe that a computer model of a brain will not only predict the behaviour of a real brain but will also be conscious. However, I don't think this is trivially obvious.

A computer model and computability are different things. We have to be precise about what the initial assumptions mean.

Computability is an abstract concept. I understand the idea that a physical system is "computable" as meaning that there is an algorithm that allows us to predict its behaviour. I don't see how this could be applied to consciousness being computable in the same way, since consciousness is not a behaviour. The only sense I can make of consciousness being computable is that by doing the computations, consciousness is generated.

OK. Locally. Doing physically the computation only instantiates the computation and the consciousness relatively to you, but at this stage, the notion of implementation is relative and does not need to be made into an absolute, unless you buy Peter Jones "primitive matter" criterium of existence. But this eventually leads matter to have a magical role, with presence or absence of inactive part of a machine playing a real time role in the brain (cf maudlin, MGA, ...). It is really a use of a metaphysical notion (primitive matter) to block a reasoning. It is like the god of the creationist.

Bruno





--
Stathis Papaioannou

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to