On Sunday, May 11, 2014 1:54:21 AM UTC+1, telmo_menezes wrote: > > > > > On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 5:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou > <[email protected]<javascript:> > > wrote: > >> >> >> On Saturday, May 10, 2014, Telmo Menezes >> <[email protected]<javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 1:30 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] >>> > wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 10 May 2014 20:12, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 8:30 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 10 May 2014 17:30, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Saturday, May 10, 2014, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I guess one could start from "is physics computable?" (As Max >>>>>>>> Tegmark discusses in his book, but I haven't yet read what his >>>>>>>> conclusions >>>>>>>> are, if any). If physics is computable and consciousness arises >>>>>>>> somehow in >>>>>>>> a "materialist-type way" from the operation of the brain, then >>>>>>>> consciousness will be computable by definition. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Is that trivially obvious to you? The anti-comp crowd claim that >>>>>>> even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a >>>>>>> computer >>>>>>> could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, and >>>>>>> not >>>>>>> just a simulation, to generate the consciousness. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If physics is computable, and consciousness arises from physics with >>>>>> nothing extra (supernatural or whatever) then yes. Am I missing >>>>>> something >>>>>> obvious? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> You're missing the step where you explain how doing the computations >>>> generates consciousness. >>>> >>> >>> No, that was the initial assumption. >>> >>> You said: "The anti-comp crowd claim that even if brain behaviour is >>> computable that does not mean that a computer could be conscious, since it >>> may require the actual brain matter" >>> >>> So it is implied that some none-computable part of the brain generates >>> consciousness, which immediately contradicts the assumption that brain >>> behaviour is computable. >>> >> >> It could be that some system the behaviour of which is entirely >> computable gives rise to consciousness. But consciousness is not a >> behaviour. > > > If physics is computable, then there is not part of reality that cannot be > replaced by a computation. Your brain can be replaced by an equivalent > computation and the world where you live can be replaced by a computation. > In this case, the computation will be able to generate "wet", "hot", > "blue", etc.. > on the face of it, if physics is computable...and so on...then consciousness is computable. But then everything goes to the details - of what these words are supposed to mean...because in the end that's all we're talking about. The structure of traits and behaviours and practical instantiations of a word. Which may or may not be short on knowledge. From my perspective there's very little hard knowledge in play, in these sort of conjectures. Which is ok so long as everybody is realistic about the limitations on what any conclusions can usefully be deployed for. The risk is people wont be, and small and large theories will start showing up derived from assuming the "if physics is..." thesis is true. But no one is looking too hard because that isn't where the action is anymore. So it becomes a critical link on one of the key arterial threads of hard science. And later on, down the line, predictions, new technology and major advances dry up.
> > But if some part of reality is not computable, and this is the part that > originates consciousness, and the brain contains this part, then the brain > is not computable. No? > > >> >> >> >>> That is what I understand "consciousness is computable" to mean. >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yeah, I always feel the same about this sort of argument. It seems so >>>>> trivial to disprove: >>>>> >>>>> "even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a >>>>> computer could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain >>>>> matter, >>>>> and not just a simulation, to generate the consciousness." >>>>> >>>>> 1. If brain behaviour is computable and (let's say comp) >>>>> >>>> >>>> Not "and let's say comp", since that is what you are setting out to >>>> prove >>>> >>>> >>>>> 2. brain generates consciousness but >>>>> 3. it requires actual brain matter to do so then >>>>> 4. brain behaviour is not computable (~comp) >>>>> >>>> >>>> No, that doesn't follow. That brain behaviour is computable means that >>>> we are able to compute such things as the sequence in which neurons will >>>> fire and the effect neuronal activity will have on muscle. >>>> >>>> >>>>> so comp = ~comp >>>>> >>>>> I also wonder if I'm missing something, since I hear this one a lot. >>>>> >>>> >>>> A computer model of a thunderstorm will predict the behaviour of a real >>>> thunderstorm but it won't be wet. In contrast, I believe that a computer >>>> model of a brain will not only predict the behaviour of a real brain but >>>> will also be conscious. However, I don't think this is trivially obvious. >>>> >>> >>> A computer model and computability are different things. We have to be >>> precise about what the initial assumptions mean. >>> >> >> Computability is an abstract concept. I understand the idea that a >> physical system is "computable" as meaning that there is an algorithm that >> allows us to predict its behaviour. >> > > But if the algorithm can predict it's behaviour perfectly, then the system > can be replaced by the algorithm. Of course, when you tell the computer to > print a document, it sends instructions to the printer, a device that then > interacts with the physical world. But if this part is also computable, > then it could inject directly into your brain the feeling of being able to > hold a paper that you can read, then tear apart and throw in the > algorithmic trash bin. If all these things are possible, there is not basis > to claim any difference between one version of the paper or the other. If > you compute the entire universe fully and can live inside this computation > (as per comp), then I see no basis to claim that there are two universes. > They are interchangeable in the same sense that two hydrogen atoms are > interchangeable. > ok well how would we visualize what a computation that accomplishes this would look like. Are we talking about something familiar, or something unimagined, in which case is it imaginable? You or someone said computability of the brain is about e.g. cell fires signal So, in code is this familiar or unfamiliar? Like...is it reasonable to proxy in some code ideas, like, we have an object cell, containing a method Fire (object Signal) which raises an event Signal.Fire() which gets picked up by Neuron. Is this what we are thinking about? Because....at what point would something like this, become like the cell and the signal and the neuron. It wouldn't look that. It would look like thousands of lines of black code on a white screen. At what point could we live inside it? If compiling then executing the code generates consciousness, where is the consciousness? Is it in the processor, the memory, the disk? What is the consciousness aware of....does it automatically understand the physical architecture of the computer....such that it is able to think the next thought freely....which presumably has to happen somewhere...has to secure processor time in which the thought is thought. Does the conscious compile the thought, then execute it? Write it directly as machine code,. address the processor directly? Or...perhaps the code, and the hardware...we're assuming shares some principle with what is familiar now, but we're assuming it's like, totally unimaginably different. In which case, what is really being added by the exercise. If the word 'computation' is a proxy for something unimagined and unimaginable. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
