On 11 May 2014, at 01:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2014-05-11 0:58 GMT+02:00 LizR <[email protected]>:
On 10 May 2014 23:30, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote:
On 10 May 2014 20:12, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote:
On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 8:30 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
On 10 May 2014 17:30, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote:
On Saturday, May 10, 2014, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
I guess one could start from "is physics computable?" (As Max
Tegmark discusses in his book, but I haven't yet read what his
conclusions are, if any). If physics is computable and consciousness
arises somehow in a "materialist-type way" from the operation of the
brain, then consciousness will be computable by definition.
Is that trivially obvious to you? The anti-comp crowd claim that
even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a
computer could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain
matter, and not just a simulation, to generate the consciousness.
If physics is computable, and consciousness arises from physics with
nothing extra (supernatural or whatever) then yes. Am I missing
something obvious?
You're missing the step where you explain how doing the computations
generates consciousness. That is what I understand "consciousness is
computable" to mean.
My point is that I don't need to. If physics is computable and if
consciousness arises from physics, consciousness must be computable
(even if it's only computable at the level of the fundamental
particles and hence a somewhat long computation).
The point of my argument was to side-step worrying about exactly how
consciousness is computable. It may be a lot easier to dsicover is
fundamental physics is.
Now where's my platonist hat got to?
But that's digital physics.. and as Bruno showed, if physics is
computable, consciousness is, and if it is, by FPI, physics isn't...
contradiction.
I think this answer Liz, but probably not Peter Jones' argument, where
a notion of primitive reality is required to define (and reify) a
notion of (primitive) existence. The step 8 (MGA) does not refute
logically that point, but it shows it equivalent with the "bad" use of
God.
Physics can be both computable and having non computable primitive
element, like some primitive particles. We might simulate what those
particles do, but not what they are, and the physicalist might say
that consciousness relies on the existence of some of that primitive
matter.
They might say that we can simulate physics and consciousness in our
physical universe, but only in our physical universe. A mathematical
simulation of a physical computation would not make something neither
physical nor conscious, just because it has not the primitive material
playing its (magical and non understandable) role.
This is weak and poorly convincing, but it is logically conceivable
(but of course the need of God or Santa Klaus, in place of primitive
matter, would be logically conceivable also, and can be used with the
same purpose. They will say that we have more evidence for primitive
matter than for Santa Klaus, but they are confusing matter and
primitive matter (there are no more evidences for *primitive* matter
than for Santa Klaus).
Best,
Bruno
Regards,
Quentin
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