On Sun, May 11, 2014 at 1:40 AM, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > > 2014-05-11 0:58 GMT+02:00 LizR <[email protected]>: > > On 10 May 2014 23:30, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 10 May 2014 20:12, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 8:30 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 10 May 2014 17:30, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Saturday, May 10, 2014, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I guess one could start from "is physics computable?" (As Max >>>>>>> Tegmark discusses in his book, but I haven't yet read what his >>>>>>> conclusions >>>>>>> are, if any). If physics is computable and consciousness arises somehow >>>>>>> in >>>>>>> a "materialist-type way" from the operation of the brain, then >>>>>>> consciousness will be computable by definition. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Is that trivially obvious to you? The anti-comp crowd claim that even >>>>>> if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a computer >>>>>> could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, and not >>>>>> just a simulation, to generate the consciousness. >>>>>> >>>>>> If physics is computable, and consciousness arises from physics with >>>>> nothing extra (supernatural or whatever) then yes. Am I missing something >>>>> obvious? >>>>> >>>> >>> You're missing the step where you explain how doing the computations >>> generates consciousness. That is what I understand "consciousness is >>> computable" to mean. >>> >> >> My point is that I don't need to. If physics is computable and >> *if*consciousness arises from physics, consciousness >> *must* be computable (even if it's only computable at the level of the >> fundamental particles and hence a somewhat long computation). >> >> The point of my argument was to side-step worrying about exactly how >> consciousness is computable. It may be a lot easier to dsicover is >> fundamental physics is. >> >> Now where's my platonist hat got to? >> >> > But that's digital physics.. and as Bruno showed, if physics is > computable, consciousness is, and if it is, by FPI, physics isn't... > contradiction. > So comp's "no" to computability of consciousness in human/Löbian rich kind of machine. Craig would be pleased if he could at least see this. Like he could drop 50% of his statements of "the greyness of numbers senseless blah, blah..." and get to the core of what he's trying to express with more agility/efficiency. The next thing, in my very limited scope of experience, that people ask about at this point is the relation of computation to consciousness at which point Gödel's proof springs to mind. Lately, I tiptoed in the astonishing (as if the whole thing were not astonishing...) Diophantine part, where the same incompleteness phenomenon unfolds again, where he proves the existence of a statement about solutions of a Diophantine equation, which is not decidable, except in a formal system of the next type and so on... When I read that stuff, I get this weird sense of what an exemplar of a person he was, and with it the semblance that someday perhaps among some rare branch we'll get our shit together and actually become civilized without deceptive self-serving ignorantly egoistic pretense. Just because you feel "whoa, this guy really cared. Not just about numbers and propositions but... really. I wish I could as well." PGC > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy > Batty/Rutger Hauer) > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
