On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 10:29 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 12 May 2014, at 16:12, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > > > > On Sun, May 11, 2014 at 9:46 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 10 May 2014, at 12:12, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >> >> >> >> On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 8:30 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 10 May 2014 17:30, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Saturday, May 10, 2014, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I guess one could start from "is physics computable?" (As Max Tegmark >>>>> discusses in his book, but I haven't yet read what his conclusions are, if >>>>> any). If physics is computable and consciousness arises somehow in a >>>>> "materialist-type way" from the operation of the brain, then consciousness >>>>> will be computable by definition. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Is that trivially obvious to you? The anti-comp crowd claim that even >>>> if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a computer >>>> could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, and not >>>> just a simulation, to generate the consciousness. >>>> >>>> If physics is computable, and consciousness arises from physics with >>> nothing extra (supernatural or whatever) then yes. Am I missing something >>> obvious? >>> >> >> Yeah, I always feel the same about this sort of argument. It seems so >> trivial to disprove: >> >> "even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a computer >> could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, and not >> just a simulation, to generate the consciousness." >> >> 1. If brain behaviour is computable and (let's say comp) >> 2. brain generates consciousness but >> 3. it requires actual brain matter to do so then >> 4. brain behaviour is not computable (~comp) >> >> so comp = ~comp >> >> I also wonder if I'm missing something, since I hear this one a lot. >> >> >> I guess other might have answer this, but as it is important I am not >> afraid of repetition. O lost again the connection yesterday so apology for >> participating to the discussion with a shift. >> >> What you miss is, I think, Peter Jones (1Z) argument. He is OK with comp >> (say "yes" to the doctor), but only because he attributes consciousness to >> a computer implemented in a primitive physical reality. Physics might be >> computable, in the sense that we can predict the physical behavior, but IF >> primitive matter is necessary for consciousness, then, although a virtual >> emulation would do (with different matter), an abstract or arithmetical >> computation would not do, by the lack of the primitive matter. >> I agree that such an argument is weak, as it does not explain what is the >> role of primitive matter, except as a criteria of existence, which seems >> here to have a magical role. (Then the movie-graph argument, or Maudlin's >> argument, give an idea that how much a primitive matter use here becomes >> magical: almost like saying that a computation is conscious if there is >> primitive matter and if God is willing to make it so. We can always reify >> some "mystery" to block an application of a theory to reality. >> > > Ok, I tried to think about this for a while. It appears that it also > connects with the issue "can there be computation without a substrate?". > > Please see what you think of my thoughts, sorry if they are a bit rough > and confusing: > > In a purely mathematical sense, it seems to me that computation is simply > a mapping from one value to another. > > > > Well, it is a special sort of mapping. There are 2^aleph_0 mapping in > general, but only aleph_0 computational mapping. So it is a bit more than a > mapping. > > > > > > Any computer program p can be represented as a value under some syntax. > > > Any program + some data, > Why "+ some data"? Any additional data can be made part of the program, no? > and don't forget that the universality requirements makes obligatory that > some programs will not stop, without us knowing this in advance. Non > termination entails a lack of value, here. yet, a non stopping programs > might access computational states not met by terminating programs. > This doesn't seem true to me. Trivially, whatever computational state a non stopping program accesses can also be accessed by a variation of that program that simply stops at iteration n. What am I missing? > So the notion of "value" is a bit too much extensional, and miss > intensional reality (related to code and means of computation). > Because of my objections above, I'm still unconvinced of that... > > > So, taking Lisp as an example, there is a function L such that: > > L( (+ 1 1) ) = 2 > > By doing the computation, we in the 1p can know the value of L(p) for a > certain p. If p is: > > (fact 472834723947) > > Then we cannot do it in our heads. We have to have some powerful computer, > spend a lot of energy and so on. > > Of course, due to the halting problem, the mapping is not guaranteed to > exist, and so on. > > > OK. > > > > > These mappings already exist in Platonia. Why do we have to spend so much > energy and effort to obtain some of them? This only seems to make sense if > we are embedded in the computation ourselves and, somehow, we have to > attain a position in the multiverse where the mapping is known. Once the > mapping is known, I can communicate it to you without any further > computational effort or energy spending. > > > I am not sure you are taking into account the FPI. "we" are embedded in > infinities of computations, and we cannot know which one. We cannot use a > god or a matter to select a reality, without betraying the comp assumption. > But empirically, I can use my laptop to select a subset of realities where I know the outcome of some computation. I cannot be sure that I will be successful because I might be assassinated by ninjas while waiting, but it seems possible to steer things a certain way. > > > > > So according to Peter Jones, consciousness is generated by the effort of > moving from one observer position to another. (even rejecting the MWI, even > in the classical world, the thing can be seen as a tree of possible future > states). > > > But Peter Jones point is that there must be primitive matter for both the > computation and consciousness existing "really". > > > > The result of the computation does not change depending on when I started > it, who started it and so on. > > > Peter Jones would say that it does matter. There are diophantine equation > which emulate you in our galaxy, but this will count for zero in the > measure because they are immaterial and not really existing, according to > Jones. > I understand that distinction, but it still seems to me that it increases the explanation gap without adding anything. > > > > > This seems, as you say, as an appeal to magic. The main questions that > occur to me are: how can such an hypothesis be falsified, and if it is > true, where is the ontological difference? > > > > By comparing the measure of computation going through my state in > arithmetic, and the measure of computations going through my states > according to the theory infered from observation. > > Unfortunatelmy we cannot compute such measure, as we cannot know which > machine we are. but we can compare the logic obeyed by such measure, and > the math shows or suggests that the comp measure obeys a quantum > probability calculus, like nature seems to confirm. This makes the quantum > explained by digitalness + internalization of the views. > > > > > If you accept comp but then make such a move, you are proposing something > that is fundamentally untestable and that leads to the exact same > consequences of its opposite. > > > See above. > So in fact you're saying that Peter Jones' hypothesis is already falsified if you assume comp? > > > > It feels to me a bit like the "free will" discussion which, in my view, is > solved by the simple realisation that the question does not make sense in > the first place (here I agree with John Clark). > > > > I have no problem with free-will. With Clark's definition, it does not > exist, but with a slight weakening of that definition, it makes sense. Not > sure free-will is related to this topics, though. > I just gave it as an example of an open question that I consider non-sensical to begin with. My view is not that we have free will or don't have free will, it's that the question doesn't actually mean anything. > > Tell me if my short explanation did work. My hole point is that the > immaterial consequences of comp are testable, by the indirect impact on the > structure of physical reality when the laws of physics emerge from > arithmetic. Roughly speaking, we can use the arithmetical hypostases to > measure experimentally our degree of computationalism. > I believe I understand you, but "unfortunately we cannot compute such measure" still makes me suspicious. I have a Popperian view of science, and this still smells of an unfalsifiable claim because we cannot compute such measures. Best, Telmo. > > Bruno > > > > > > > Best, > Telmo. > > >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Telmo. >> >> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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