On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 8:31 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 14 May 2014, at 09:36, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > > > > On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 10:29 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 12 May 2014, at 16:12, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >> >> >> >> On Sun, May 11, 2014 at 9:46 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 10 May 2014, at 12:12, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 8:30 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On 10 May 2014 17:30, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Saturday, May 10, 2014, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I guess one could start from "is physics computable?" (As Max >>>>>> Tegmark discusses in his book, but I haven't yet read what his >>>>>> conclusions >>>>>> are, if any). If physics is computable and consciousness arises somehow >>>>>> in >>>>>> a "materialist-type way" from the operation of the brain, then >>>>>> consciousness will be computable by definition. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Is that trivially obvious to you? The anti-comp crowd claim that even >>>>> if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a computer >>>>> could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, and not >>>>> just a simulation, to generate the consciousness. >>>>> >>>>> If physics is computable, and consciousness arises from physics with >>>> nothing extra (supernatural or whatever) then yes. Am I missing something >>>> obvious? >>>> >>> >>> Yeah, I always feel the same about this sort of argument. It seems so >>> trivial to disprove: >>> >>> "even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a >>> computer could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, >>> and not just a simulation, to generate the consciousness." >>> >>> 1. If brain behaviour is computable and (let's say comp) >>> 2. brain generates consciousness but >>> 3. it requires actual brain matter to do so then >>> 4. brain behaviour is not computable (~comp) >>> >>> so comp = ~comp >>> >>> I also wonder if I'm missing something, since I hear this one a lot. >>> >>> >>> I guess other might have answer this, but as it is important I am not >>> afraid of repetition. O lost again the connection yesterday so apology for >>> participating to the discussion with a shift. >>> >>> What you miss is, I think, Peter Jones (1Z) argument. He is OK with comp >>> (say "yes" to the doctor), but only because he attributes consciousness to >>> a computer implemented in a primitive physical reality. Physics might be >>> computable, in the sense that we can predict the physical behavior, but IF >>> primitive matter is necessary for consciousness, then, although a virtual >>> emulation would do (with different matter), an abstract or arithmetical >>> computation would not do, by the lack of the primitive matter. >>> I agree that such an argument is weak, as it does not explain what is >>> the role of primitive matter, except as a criteria of existence, which >>> seems here to have a magical role. (Then the movie-graph argument, or >>> Maudlin's argument, give an idea that how much a primitive matter use here >>> becomes magical: almost like saying that a computation is conscious if >>> there is primitive matter and if God is willing to make it so. We can >>> always reify some "mystery" to block an application of a theory to reality. >>> >> >> Ok, I tried to think about this for a while. It appears that it also >> connects with the issue "can there be computation without a substrate?". >> >> Please see what you think of my thoughts, sorry if they are a bit rough >> and confusing: >> >> In a purely mathematical sense, it seems to me that computation is simply >> a mapping from one value to another. >> >> >> >> Well, it is a special sort of mapping. There are 2^aleph_0 mapping in >> general, but only aleph_0 computational mapping. So it is a bit more than a >> mapping. >> >> >> >> >> >> Any computer program p can be represented as a value under some syntax. >> >> >> Any program + some data, >> > > Why "+ some data"? Any additional data can be made part of the program, no? > > > Sure. But it helps to think in both ways. > Yes, especially if one actually has to write computer programs :) I am not trying to be pedantic, I am just trying to remove the incidental to examine the "matter is fundamental" claim. I'm aware that you're kind of playing devil's advocate here, which is part of the serious scientific stance, of course. > > > > > > >> and don't forget that the universality requirements makes obligatory that >> some programs will not stop, without us knowing this in advance. Non >> termination entails a lack of value, here. yet, a non stopping programs >> might access computational states not met by terminating programs. >> > > This doesn't seem true to me. Trivially, whatever computational state a > non stopping program accesses can also be accessed by a variation of that > program that simply stops at iteration n. What am I missing? > > > You are right, for the relative asteroids reason. But the FPI forces us to > consider the universal winner(s) whose measure might depend on infinite > histories. We have to reason on all computations, and the infinite one just > exists and play a role, even if the infinite sequence of finite > approximations plays the same role. That is what make universal dovetailing > possible, and it dovetails on N^omega_1^CK. > Ok, I think I understand this part of your work. But if we are exploring the hypothesis that computations have to be realised in matter to generate consciousness, then I would say that we have to reject infinities. Otherwise infinite matter is necessary to make us conscious, with all the paradoxes that this leads to. > > > > > > > >> So the notion of "value" is a bit too much extensional, and miss >> intensional reality (related to code and means of computation). >> > > Because of my objections above, I'm still unconvinced of that... > > > > Which objection? > I was objecting to the idea that computations cannot be ultimately seen as mappings between integers (with the possibility of undefined values). > With the arithmetical FPI we are in all computations. It makes sense that > the infinite one are the winners, as the finite one are of measure zero. > I agree that it makes sense, but not if the computations are realised in mater. I think this only makes sense if we do the psychology->physics reversal that you propose. Under Peter Jones' assumption, I don't think we can accept infinities. Do you disagree? > > A computation is a sequence of mapping done by or in a universal machine. > > The starting one is not important, and it happens that elementary > arithmetic is already sigma_1 complete, and thus Turing universal. > > But once I started from the combinators, K, S, (K, K), (K, S), ... ((S, K) > (K K)), etc. Then basically we can do the all thing with some equality > rules and ((K, x) y) = x and (((S x) y) z) = ((x z) (y z)). > > That's Turing universal too. You get Löbianity when you add an induction > principle on the combinators. > No problem. > > > > > >> >> >> So, taking Lisp as an example, there is a function L such that: >> >> L( (+ 1 1) ) = 2 >> >> By doing the computation, we in the 1p can know the value of L(p) for a >> certain p. If p is: >> >> (fact 472834723947) >> >> Then we cannot do it in our heads. We have to have some powerful >> computer, spend a lot of energy and so on. >> >> Of course, due to the halting problem, the mapping is not guaranteed to >> exist, and so on. >> >> >> OK. >> >> >> >> >> These mappings already exist in Platonia. Why do we have to spend so much >> energy and effort to obtain some of them? This only seems to make sense if >> we are embedded in the computation ourselves and, somehow, we have to >> attain a position in the multiverse where the mapping is known. Once the >> mapping is known, I can communicate it to you without any further >> computational effort or energy spending. >> >> >> I am not sure you are taking into account the FPI. "we" are embedded in >> infinities of computations, and we cannot know which one. We cannot use a >> god or a matter to select a reality, without betraying the comp assumption. >> > > But empirically, I can use my laptop to select a subset of realities where > I know the outcome of some computation. I cannot be sure that I will be > successful because I might be assassinated by ninjas while waiting, but it > seems possible to steer things a certain way. > > > Sure! I mean you are lucky. I don't even know if you will get this post! > I believe I did, but I'm not sure if I'm the same person you sent it to. > > But it is that lawful normality that we have to justify on some measure on > the sigma_1 closed sentences. > > Of course, I bet there is a stable physical reality. But comp explains > that reality in term of measure on computations which somehow try to > satisfy you. It is a continuum. > No problem with that. I make the same bet, of course. > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> So according to Peter Jones, consciousness is generated by the effort of >> moving from one observer position to another. (even rejecting the MWI, even >> in the classical world, the thing can be seen as a tree of possible future >> states). >> >> >> But Peter Jones point is that there must be primitive matter for both the >> computation and consciousness existing "really". >> >> >> >> The result of the computation does not change depending on when I started >> it, who started it and so on. >> >> >> Peter Jones would say that it does matter. There are diophantine >> equation which emulate you in our galaxy, but this will count for zero in >> the measure because they are immaterial and not really existing, according >> to Jones. >> > > I understand that distinction, but it still seems to me that it increases > the explanation gap without adding anything. > > > I agree. It is basically equivalent to "don't try to search an > explanation". But that is a normal reaction for those taken Aristotle for > granted. > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> This seems, as you say, as an appeal to magic. The main questions that >> occur to me are: how can such an hypothesis be falsified, and if it is >> true, where is the ontological difference? >> >> >> >> By comparing the measure of computation going through my state in >> arithmetic, and the measure of computations going through my states >> according to the theory infered from observation. >> >> Unfortunatelmy we cannot compute such measure, as we cannot know which >> machine we are. but we can compare the logic obeyed by such measure, and >> the math shows or suggests that the comp measure obeys a quantum >> probability calculus, like nature seems to confirm. This makes the quantum >> explained by digitalness + internalization of the views. >> >> >> >> >> If you accept comp but then make such a move, you are proposing something >> that is fundamentally untestable and that leads to the exact same >> consequences of its opposite. >> >> >> See above. >> > > So in fact you're saying that Peter Jones' hypothesis is already falsified > if you assume comp? > > > > Not falsified. But naked. It is an act of introducing something unclear > and unseen (primitive matter) to freeze a conception of reality. > Ok. > > > > > >> >> >> >> It feels to me a bit like the "free will" discussion which, in my view, >> is solved by the simple realisation that the question does not make sense >> in the first place (here I agree with John Clark). >> >> >> >> I have no problem with free-will. With Clark's definition, it does not >> exist, but with a slight weakening of that definition, it makes sense. Not >> sure free-will is related to this topics, though. >> > > I just gave it as an example of an open question that I consider > non-sensical to begin with. My view is not that we have free will or don't > have free will, it's that the question doesn't actually mean anything. > > > > I believe in responsibility, and in my theory of responsibility there is a > need for a theory of free will, and a simple one, even mentioned by John > Clark, is that free-will is the ability to be ignorant on cluster on > alternatives and aware we have partial local control on this. > Sorry if this is going off topic but I don't understand the above sentence. Could you expand? > > > > > >> >> Tell me if my short explanation did work. My hole point is that the >> immaterial consequences of comp are testable, by the indirect impact on the >> structure of physical reality when the laws of physics emerge from >> arithmetic. Roughly speaking, we can use the arithmetical hypostases to >> measure experimentally our degree of computationalism. >> > > I believe I understand you, but "unfortunately we cannot compute such > measure" still makes me suspicious. I have a Popperian view of science, and > this still smells of an unfalsifiable claim because we cannot compute such > measures. > > > The theory is eminently testable, and not yet refuted, despite its simple > propositional forms. > > I am Popperian in that way too. But the whole point of Platonism is that > reality is not what you wish, but the truth, which what you know + what you > don't know. Then assuming comp, we can use mathematical logic to measure > the gap between both, it has mathematical structures. > > The measure is not computable, like the knower is not definable, but the > logic of the measure one can be known, and it is a decidable quantum like > logic, and the logic of the knower can be derived, it is S4Grz, and provide > an arithmetical interpretation of an intuitionist knower. S4Grz1, that is > S4Grz but where the arithmetical interpretation is restricted on the > sigma_1 sentences, gives already a quantization. If we follow literally the > arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus, this means that the physics of > heaven is also quantum. > Ok, this requires more study on my part. Cheers Telmo. > > If we believe in the Peano Arithmetic theorems, and if we say yes to the > doctor, I think this concerns us. > > Best, > > Bruno > > > > > > > > Best, > Telmo. > > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Best, >> Telmo. >> >> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Telmo. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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