No. 2014-05-18 18:47 GMT+02:00, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]>: > On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 9:12 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 16 May 2014, at 16:52, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >> >> >> >> On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 8:05 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 15 May 2014, at 14:12, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 8:31 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 14 May 2014, at 09:36, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 10:29 AM, Bruno Marchal >>>> <[email protected]>wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 12 May 2014, at 16:12, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, May 11, 2014 at 9:46 AM, Bruno Marchal >>>>> <[email protected]>wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 10 May 2014, at 12:12, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 8:30 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 10 May 2014 17:30, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Saturday, May 10, 2014, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I guess one could start from "is physics computable?" (As Max >>>>>>>>> Tegmark discusses in his book, but I haven't yet read what his >>>>>>>>> conclusions >>>>>>>>> are, if any). If physics is computable and consciousness arises >>>>>>>>> somehow in >>>>>>>>> a "materialist-type way" from the operation of the brain, then >>>>>>>>> consciousness will be computable by definition. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Is that trivially obvious to you? The anti-comp crowd claim that >>>>>>>> even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a >>>>>>>> computer >>>>>>>> could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, >>>>>>>> and not >>>>>>>> just a simulation, to generate the consciousness. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> If physics is computable, and consciousness arises from physics >>>>>>>> with >>>>>>> nothing extra (supernatural or whatever) then yes. Am I missing >>>>>>> something >>>>>>> obvious? >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Yeah, I always feel the same about this sort of argument. It seems so >>>>>> trivial to disprove: >>>>>> >>>>>> "even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a >>>>>> computer could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain >>>>>> matter, >>>>>> and not just a simulation, to generate the consciousness." >>>>>> >>>>>> 1. If brain behaviour is computable and (let's say comp) >>>>>> 2. brain generates consciousness but >>>>>> 3. it requires actual brain matter to do so then >>>>>> 4. brain behaviour is not computable (~comp) >>>>>> >>>>>> so comp = ~comp >>>>>> >>>>>> I also wonder if I'm missing something, since I hear this one a lot. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I guess other might have answer this, but as it is important I am not >>>>>> afraid of repetition. O lost again the connection yesterday so apology >>>>>> for >>>>>> participating to the discussion with a shift. >>>>>> >>>>>> What you miss is, I think, Peter Jones (1Z) argument. He is OK with >>>>>> comp (say "yes" to the doctor), but only because he attributes >>>>>> consciousness to a computer implemented in a primitive physical >>>>>> reality. >>>>>> Physics might be computable, in the sense that we can predict the >>>>>> physical >>>>>> behavior, but IF primitive matter is necessary for consciousness, >>>>>> then, >>>>>> although a virtual emulation would do (with different matter), an >>>>>> abstract >>>>>> or arithmetical computation would not do, by the lack of the >>>>>> primitive >>>>>> matter. >>>>>> I agree that such an argument is weak, as it does not explain what is >>>>>> the role of primitive matter, except as a criteria of existence, >>>>>> which >>>>>> seems here to have a magical role. (Then the movie-graph argument, or >>>>>> Maudlin's argument, give an idea that how much a primitive matter use >>>>>> here >>>>>> becomes magical: almost like saying that a computation is conscious >>>>>> if >>>>>> there is primitive matter and if God is willing to make it so. We can >>>>>> always reify some "mystery" to block an application of a theory to >>>>>> reality. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Ok, I tried to think about this for a while. It appears that it also >>>>> connects with the issue "can there be computation without a >>>>> substrate?". >>>>> >>>>> Please see what you think of my thoughts, sorry if they are a bit >>>>> rough >>>>> and confusing: >>>>> >>>>> In a purely mathematical sense, it seems to me that computation is >>>>> simply a mapping from one value to another. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Well, it is a special sort of mapping. There are 2^aleph_0 mapping in >>>>> general, but only aleph_0 computational mapping. So it is a bit more >>>>> than a >>>>> mapping. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Any computer program p can be represented as a value under some >>>>> syntax. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Any program + some data, >>>>> >>>> >>>> Why "+ some data"? Any additional data can be made part of the program, >>>> no? >>>> >>>> >>>> Sure. But it helps to think in both ways. >>>> >>> >>> Yes, especially if one actually has to write computer programs :) >>> I am not trying to be pedantic, I am just trying to remove the >>> incidental >>> to examine the "matter is fundamental" claim. I'm aware that you're kind >>> of >>> playing devil's advocate here, which is part of the serious scientific >>> stance, of course. >>> >>> >>> And then what is matter? What obeys this or that equations? Known one >>> are >>> Turing emulable, and it is like saying it is this universal numbers and >>> no >>> other one, where comp asks "OK, shows it wins the computation of the >>> infinitely many computations of basically all universal machine to get >>> your >>> "here and now" computational states". >>> >>> It is a problem for comp. It has to justify the laws of stable >>> observation from the invariance for the universal machine. >>> >>> With UDA, at first sight physical can be approximated by []p, with p >>> sigma_1 (UD accessible), and "[]" sigma_complete or even Löbian (proves >>> p >>> -> []p for all sigma_1 sentences). >>> >>> But that does not work, nor even make sense, as you need at least a >>> reality <>t (by Gödel completeness, from outside, consistency is >>> equivalent with having a model/Interpretation/sense), and this >>> explicitly, >>> as required by incompleteness: thus matter (in the FPI sense by UDA) >>> becomes []p & <>t, or stronger []p & <><>t, or .... the strongest one: >>> []p >>> & p. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> and don't forget that the universality requirements makes obligatory >>>>> that some programs will not stop, without us knowing this in advance. >>>>> Non >>>>> termination entails a lack of value, here. yet, a non stopping >>>>> programs >>>>> might access computational states not met by terminating programs. >>>>> >>>> >>>> This doesn't seem true to me. Trivially, whatever computational state a >>>> non stopping program accesses can also be accessed by a variation of >>>> that >>>> program that simply stops at iteration n. What am I missing? >>>> >>>> >>>> You are right, for the relative asteroids reason. But the FPI forces us >>>> to consider the universal winner(s) whose measure might depend on >>>> infinite >>>> histories. We have to reason on all computations, and the infinite one >>>> just >>>> exists and play a role, even if the infinite sequence of finite >>>> approximations plays the same role. That is what make universal >>>> dovetailing >>>> possible, and it dovetails on N^omega_1^CK. >>>> >>> >>> Ok, I think I understand this part of your work. But if we are exploring >>> the hypothesis that computations have to be realised in matter to >>> generate >>> consciousness, then I would say that we have to reject infinities. >>> >>> >>> No problem. On the contrary, my point is that we can test this, or at >>> least the arithmetical interpretation of this, which makes sense by the >>> comp assumption. >>> >>> >>> >>> Otherwise infinite matter is necessary to make us conscious, with all >>> the >>> paradoxes that this leads to. >>> >>> >>> In all case we are confronted with infinities. A priori to much, but >>> then >>> with comp that is what recursion theory is all about. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> So the notion of "value" is a bit too much extensional, and miss >>>>> intensional reality (related to code and means of computation). >>>>> >>>> >>>> Because of my objections above, I'm still unconvinced of that... >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Which objection? >>>> >>> >>> I was objecting to the idea that computations cannot be ultimately seen >>> as mappings between integers (with the possibility of undefined values). >>> >>> >>> But only the computable mappings, which are enumerable. Not *all* >>> mappings, which are non enumerable. >>> >> >> Ok! >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> With the arithmetical FPI we are in all computations. It makes sense >>>> that the infinite one are the winners, as the finite one are of measure >>>> zero. >>>> >>> >>> I agree that it makes sense, but not if the computations are realised in >>> mater. I think this only makes sense if we do the psychology->physics >>> reversal that you propose. Under Peter Jones' assumption, I don't think >>> we >>> can accept infinities. Do you disagree? >>> >>> >>> I think that with comp we cannot avoid them. We don't need more than {0, >>> 1, 2, ...}, from the average machine in the neighborhoods of infinity, >>> the >>> machines are confronted to the transfinite and the continuum. Just >>> taking >>> seriously the FPI on a sigma_1 complete set (later structured by the >>> intensional nuances). >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> A computation is a sequence of mapping done by or in a universal >>>> machine. >>>> >>>> The starting one is not important, and it happens that elementary >>>> arithmetic is already sigma_1 complete, and thus Turing universal. >>>> >>>> But once I started from the combinators, K, S, (K, K), (K, S), ... ((S, >>>> K) (K K)), etc. Then basically we can do the all thing with some >>>> equality >>>> rules and ((K, x) y) = x and (((S x) y) z) = ((x z) (y z)). >>>> >>>> That's Turing universal too. You get Löbianity when you add an >>>> induction >>>> principle on the combinators. >>>> >>> >>> No problem. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> So, taking Lisp as an example, there is a function L such that: >>>>> >>>>> L( (+ 1 1) ) = 2 >>>>> >>>>> By doing the computation, we in the 1p can know the value of L(p) for >>>>> a >>>>> certain p. If p is: >>>>> >>>>> (fact 472834723947) >>>>> >>>>> Then we cannot do it in our heads. We have to have some powerful >>>>> computer, spend a lot of energy and so on. >>>>> >>>>> Of course, due to the halting problem, the mapping is not guaranteed >>>>> to >>>>> exist, and so on. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> OK. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> These mappings already exist in Platonia. Why do we have to spend so >>>>> much energy and effort to obtain some of them? This only seems to make >>>>> sense if we are embedded in the computation ourselves and, somehow, we >>>>> have >>>>> to attain a position in the multiverse where the mapping is known. Once >>>>> the >>>>> mapping is known, I can communicate it to you without any further >>>>> computational effort or energy spending. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I am not sure you are taking into account the FPI. "we" are embedded >>>>> in >>>>> infinities of computations, and we cannot know which one. We cannot use >>>>> a >>>>> god or a matter to select a reality, without betraying the comp >>>>> assumption. >>>>> >>>> >>>> But empirically, I can use my laptop to select a subset of realities >>>> where I know the outcome of some computation. I cannot be sure that I >>>> will >>>> be successful because I might be assassinated by ninjas while waiting, >>>> but >>>> it seems possible to steer things a certain way. >>>> >>>> >>>> Sure! I mean you are lucky. I don't even know if you will get this >>>> post! >>>> >>> >>> I believe I did, but I'm not sure if I'm the same person you sent it to. >>> >>> >>> But then tell me who sends this post! If it is not you, either you have >>> an impostor, or you are an impostor. >>> >> >>> May be you believe we are always our own impostor? >>> >> >> I always felt like and impostor, but then Alan Watts made me relax about >> it. >> >> >> Alan Watts relaxed me on many things. >> >> >> >> >>> And person comes from persona, the mask. >>> No one behind the mask? >>> >> >> No one / everyone behind the mask. Or maybe the humble amoeba :) >> >> >> Or the humble bacteria. >> >> But the solution of phi_x = x are not enough for universality, and my >> feeling is that it makes sense to talk about a person when there is a >> universal machine. The humble amoeba succeeded to send some of its >> colonies >> to the moon, you know. >> >> In the very long run we will come back to bacteria, again to ease >> colonization of the solar system and beyond.This does not mean we will >> abandon our values, nor even our images, it is as you want. >> > > I have similar hopes, but the "big filter" argument gets to me. Basically > the idea is to self-apply the anthropic principle. If a future civilisation > succeeds in colonising the galaxy and further, surely they will generate > millions of years times quadrillions of post-human's worth of observer > moments. So why do I find myself in this young and civilisation, still > stuck to its original planet? It seems like a very low probability event. > Of course, there's the possibility that the super-advanced civilisations > are offset by a long tail of low-tech civilisations. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> But it is that lawful normality that we have to justify on some measure >>>> on the sigma_1 closed sentences. >>>> >>>> Of course, I bet there is a stable physical reality. But comp explains >>>> that reality in term of measure on computations which somehow try to >>>> satisfy you. It is a continuum. >>>> >>> >>> No problem with that. I make the same bet, of course. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> So according to Peter Jones, consciousness is generated by the effort >>>>> of moving from one observer position to another. (even rejecting the >>>>> MWI, >>>>> even in the classical world, the thing can be seen as a tree of >>>>> possible >>>>> future states). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> But Peter Jones point is that there must be primitive matter for both >>>>> the computation and consciousness existing "really". >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The result of the computation does not change depending on when I >>>>> started it, who started it and so on. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Peter Jones would say that it does matter. There are diophantine >>>>> equation which emulate you in our galaxy, but this will count for zero >>>>> in >>>>> the measure because they are immaterial and not really existing, >>>>> according >>>>> to Jones. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I understand that distinction, but it still seems to me that it >>>> increases the explanation gap without adding anything. >>>> >>>> >>>> I agree. It is basically equivalent to "don't try to search an >>>> explanation". But that is a normal reaction for those taken Aristotle >>>> for >>>> granted. >>>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> This seems, as you say, as an appeal to magic. The main questions that >>>>> occur to me are: how can such an hypothesis be falsified, and if it is >>>>> true, where is the ontological difference? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> By comparing the measure of computation going through my state in >>>>> arithmetic, and the measure of computations going through my states >>>>> according to the theory infered from observation. >>>>> >>>>> Unfortunatelmy we cannot compute such measure, as we cannot know which >>>>> machine we are. but we can compare the logic obeyed by such measure, >>>>> and >>>>> the math shows or suggests that the comp measure obeys a quantum >>>>> probability calculus, like nature seems to confirm. This makes the >>>>> quantum >>>>> explained by digitalness + internalization of the views. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> If you accept comp but then make such a move, you are proposing >>>>> something that is fundamentally untestable and that leads to the exact >>>>> same >>>>> consequences of its opposite. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> See above. >>>>> >>>> >>>> So in fact you're saying that Peter Jones' hypothesis is already >>>> falsified if you assume comp? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Not falsified. But naked. It is an act of introducing something unclear >>>> and unseen (primitive matter) to freeze a conception of reality. >>>> >>> >>> Ok. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> It feels to me a bit like the "free will" discussion which, in my >>>>> view, >>>>> is solved by the simple realisation that the question does not make >>>>> sense >>>>> in the first place (here I agree with John Clark). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I have no problem with free-will. With Clark's definition, it does not >>>>> exist, but with a slight weakening of that definition, it makes sense. >>>>> Not >>>>> sure free-will is related to this topics, though. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I just gave it as an example of an open question that I consider >>>> non-sensical to begin with. My view is not that we have free will or >>>> don't >>>> have free will, it's that the question doesn't actually mean anything. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I believe in responsibility, and in my theory of responsibility there >>>> is >>>> a need for a theory of free will, and a simple one, even mentioned by >>>> John >>>> Clark, is that free-will is the ability to be ignorant on cluster on >>>> alternatives and aware we have partial local control on this. >>>> >>> >>> Sorry if this is going off topic but I don't understand the above >>> sentence. Could you expand? >>> >>> >>> Free-will is just will with the necessary degrees of freedom, and it >>> gives you the command between cooperate or not in your relation with >>> universal and non universal neighbors/data/environments. >>> >>> Free will needs more determinacy than randomness, because free will is >>> self-determinacy in a neighborhood offering possibilities. >>> >> >> Ok, but then it's just part of the structure of reality no? Sure, I can >> chose to go grab a coffee now, but am I not just observing? Maybe there >> is >> another realisation of me that avoid caffeine. Maybe I can observe that, >> but then... >> >> >> >> You observe, but you participate too. With or without coffee. With sugar, >> or without sugar. Your choice. >> >> You can intellectually believe it is determinate, but you can't compute >> yourself the result, >> > > Ok, it seems to me that this is more "indeterminacy" than "free will". In > any case, indeterminacy is good enough for me. At a local level we feel > like we have free will, and that is the same as having it (the question > becomes silly when dropping locality, that's all I mean). > > >> yet solve the problem most the time rather easily. Not always that >> simple, >> like talking or not under torture to denounce people. >> >> Free will is for me not much more than a right. Free will is a right as >> long as it is not inconsistent with the free will of the neighbors. >> > > I strongly agree with this. In fact, I believe that the whole of morality > can be reduced to "do not initiate the use of force against someone else". > In my view self-defence is fine and jailing a rapist is fine (he initiated > the use of force). Having an army is fine as long as you don't use it to > initiate a war. Taxation is immoral, unless you can opt out. The only moral > laws are the ones that prohibit the initiation of the use of force in some > for or another. > > >> Free will is the right to cross the ocean with a sieve. >> >> It is not the right to disobey the gravitation laws. >> >> I am OK that is part of the structure of reality, that is not a problem. >> I >> believe only on elementary arithmetic, the rest is arithmetic seen from >> inside from different views and angles. >> > > Ok! > > >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Tell me if my short explanation did work. My hole point is that the >>>>> immaterial consequences of comp are testable, by the indirect impact on >>>>> the >>>>> structure of physical reality when the laws of physics emerge from >>>>> arithmetic. Roughly speaking, we can use the arithmetical hypostases >>>>> to >>>>> measure experimentally our degree of computationalism. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I believe I understand you, but "unfortunately we cannot compute such >>>> measure" still makes me suspicious. I have a Popperian view of science, >>>> and >>>> this still smells of an unfalsifiable claim because we cannot compute >>>> such >>>> measures. >>>> >>>> >>>> The theory is eminently testable, and not yet refuted, despite its >>>> simple propositional forms. >>>> >>>> I am Popperian in that way too. But the whole point of Platonism is >>>> that >>>> reality is not what you wish, but the truth, which what you know + what >>>> you >>>> don't know. Then assuming comp, we can use mathematical logic to >>>> measure >>>> the gap between both, it has mathematical structures. >>>> >>>> The measure is not computable, like the knower is not definable, but >>>> the >>>> logic of the measure one can be known, and it is a decidable quantum >>>> like >>>> logic, and the logic of the knower can be derived, it is S4Grz, and >>>> provide >>>> an arithmetical interpretation of an intuitionist knower. S4Grz1, that >>>> is >>>> S4Grz but where the arithmetical interpretation is restricted on the >>>> sigma_1 sentences, gives already a quantization. If we follow literally >>>> the >>>> arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus, this means that the physics of >>>> heaven is also quantum. >>>> >>> >>> Ok, this requires more study on my part. >>> >>> >>> It is technical. I try to explain a bit in the "modal" or "math" thread. >>> The key is that we can defined provable in a language understandable by >>> the >>> prover itself. And we can't prove that we can't define a knower in that >>> way, but platonistically we can recognize or identify, like Theaetetus, >>> the >>> knower with the believer/prover when what is proved happens to be also >>> true >>> (by definition). >>> >> >> Ok, I think I understand this at a general level but will continue to >> study the necessary concepts as time permits. I made some advances in >> modal >> logic, but still have to dive in some of its weirder worlds... >> >> >> Thanks for the efforts. >> > > The benefit is all mine! > > Telmo. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> By incompleteness, that definition works, and associate a non >>> identifiable (by the machine) knower to a prover/believer. >>> >>> Like modal logicians define sometimes the sense of a proposition by the >>> set of worlds in which that proposition is true, with computationalism >>> (and >>> classical knowledge theory) the first person is related to the set of >>> computations which realize that first person states in the (sigma_1 >>> complete) part of arithmetic. >>> >> >> I have no problem with this. It seems to match well my way of thinking. >> >> >> >> Nice. Then comp imposes some structuring from theoretical computer >> science. >> >> Best, >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> Cheers, >> Telmo. >> >> >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> Cheers >>> Telmo. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> If we believe in the Peano Arithmetic theorems, and if we say yes to >>>> the >>>> doctor, I think this concerns us. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Telmo. >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Telmo. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Telmo. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to >>>>>>> [email protected] >>>>>>> . >>>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>> send >>>>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>>>> To post to this group, send email to >>>>>> [email protected]. >>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>> send >>>>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>>>> To post to this group, send email to >>>>>> [email protected]. >>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >
-- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
