No.
2014-05-18 18:47 GMT+02:00, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com>:
> On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 9:12 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>>
>> On 16 May 2014, at 16:52, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 8:05 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 15 May 2014, at 14:12, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 8:31 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 14 May 2014, at 09:36, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 10:29 AM, Bruno Marchal
>>>> <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 12 May 2014, at 16:12, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sun, May 11, 2014 at 9:46 AM, Bruno Marchal
>>>>> <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 10 May 2014, at 12:12, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 8:30 AM, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 10 May 2014 17:30, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Saturday, May 10, 2014, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I guess one could start from "is physics computable?" (As Max
>>>>>>>>> Tegmark discusses in his book, but I haven't yet read what his
>>>>>>>>> conclusions
>>>>>>>>> are, if any). If physics is computable and consciousness arises
>>>>>>>>> somehow in
>>>>>>>>> a "materialist-type way" from the operation of the brain, then
>>>>>>>>> consciousness will be computable by definition.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Is that trivially obvious to you? The anti-comp crowd claim that
>>>>>>>> even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a
>>>>>>>> computer
>>>>>>>> could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter,
>>>>>>>> and not
>>>>>>>> just a simulation, to generate the consciousness.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If physics is computable, and consciousness arises from physics
>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>> nothing extra (supernatural or whatever) then yes. Am I missing
>>>>>>> something
>>>>>>> obvious?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yeah, I always feel the same about this sort of argument. It seems so
>>>>>> trivial to disprove:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a
>>>>>> computer could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain
>>>>>> matter,
>>>>>> and not just a simulation, to generate the consciousness."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 1. If brain behaviour is computable and (let's say comp)
>>>>>> 2. brain generates consciousness but
>>>>>> 3. it requires actual brain matter to do so then
>>>>>> 4. brain behaviour is not computable (~comp)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> so comp = ~comp
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I also wonder if I'm missing something, since I hear this one a lot.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I guess other might have answer this, but as it is important I am not
>>>>>> afraid of repetition. O lost again the connection yesterday so apology
>>>>>> for
>>>>>> participating to the discussion with a shift.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What you miss is, I think, Peter Jones (1Z) argument. He is OK with
>>>>>> comp (say "yes" to the doctor), but only because he attributes
>>>>>> consciousness to a computer implemented in a primitive physical
>>>>>> reality.
>>>>>> Physics might be computable, in the sense that we can predict the
>>>>>> physical
>>>>>> behavior, but IF primitive matter is necessary for consciousness,
>>>>>> then,
>>>>>> although a virtual emulation would do (with different matter), an
>>>>>> abstract
>>>>>> or arithmetical computation would not do, by the lack of the
>>>>>> primitive
>>>>>> matter.
>>>>>> I agree that such an argument is weak, as it does not explain what is
>>>>>> the role of primitive matter, except as a criteria of existence,
>>>>>> which
>>>>>> seems here to have a magical role. (Then the movie-graph argument, or
>>>>>> Maudlin's argument, give an idea that how much a primitive matter use
>>>>>> here
>>>>>> becomes magical: almost like saying that a computation is conscious
>>>>>> if
>>>>>> there is primitive matter and if God is willing to make it so. We can
>>>>>> always reify some "mystery" to block an application of a theory to
>>>>>> reality.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Ok, I tried to think about this for a while. It appears that it also
>>>>> connects with the issue "can there be computation without a
>>>>> substrate?".
>>>>>
>>>>> Please see what you think of my thoughts, sorry if they are a bit
>>>>> rough
>>>>> and confusing:
>>>>>
>>>>> In a purely mathematical sense, it seems to me that computation is
>>>>> simply a mapping from one value to another.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Well, it is a special sort of mapping. There are 2^aleph_0 mapping in
>>>>> general, but only aleph_0 computational mapping. So it is a bit more
>>>>> than a
>>>>> mapping.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Any computer program p can be represented as a value under some
>>>>> syntax.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Any program + some data,
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Why "+ some data"? Any additional data can be made part of the program,
>>>> no?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Sure. But it helps to think in both ways.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, especially if one actually has to write computer programs :)
>>> I am not trying to be pedantic, I am just trying to remove the
>>> incidental
>>> to examine the "matter is fundamental" claim. I'm aware that you're kind
>>> of
>>> playing devil's advocate here, which is part of the serious scientific
>>> stance, of course.
>>>
>>>
>>> And then what is matter? What obeys this or that equations? Known one
>>> are
>>> Turing emulable, and it is like saying it is this universal numbers and
>>> no
>>> other one, where comp asks "OK, shows it wins the computation of the
>>> infinitely many computations of basically all universal machine to get
>>> your
>>> "here and now" computational states".
>>>
>>> It is a problem for comp. It has to justify the laws of stable
>>> observation from the invariance for the universal machine.
>>>
>>> With UDA, at first sight physical can be approximated by []p, with p
>>> sigma_1 (UD accessible), and "[]" sigma_complete or even Löbian (proves
>>> p
>>> -> []p for all sigma_1 sentences).
>>>
>>> But that does not work, nor even make sense, as you need at least a
>>> reality <>t (by Gödel completeness, from outside, consistency is
>>> equivalent with having a model/Interpretation/sense), and this
>>> explicitly,
>>> as required by incompleteness: thus matter (in the FPI sense by UDA)
>>> becomes []p & <>t, or stronger []p & <><>t, or .... the strongest one:
>>> []p
>>> & p.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> and don't forget that the universality requirements makes obligatory
>>>>> that some programs will not stop, without us knowing this in advance.
>>>>> Non
>>>>> termination entails a lack of value, here. yet, a non stopping
>>>>> programs
>>>>> might access computational states not met by terminating programs.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This doesn't seem true to me. Trivially, whatever computational state a
>>>> non stopping program accesses can also be accessed by a variation of
>>>> that
>>>> program that simply stops at iteration n. What am I missing?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You are right, for the relative asteroids reason. But the FPI forces us
>>>> to consider the universal winner(s) whose measure might depend on
>>>> infinite
>>>> histories. We have to reason on all computations, and the infinite one
>>>> just
>>>> exists and play a role, even if the infinite sequence of finite
>>>> approximations plays the same role. That is what make universal
>>>> dovetailing
>>>> possible, and it dovetails on N^omega_1^CK.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Ok, I think I understand this part of your work. But if we are exploring
>>> the hypothesis that computations have to be realised in matter to
>>> generate
>>> consciousness, then I would say that we have to reject infinities.
>>>
>>>
>>> No problem. On the contrary, my point is that we can test this, or at
>>> least the arithmetical interpretation of this, which makes sense by the
>>> comp assumption.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Otherwise infinite matter is necessary to make us conscious, with all
>>> the
>>> paradoxes that this leads to.
>>>
>>>
>>> In all case we are confronted with infinities. A priori to much, but
>>> then
>>> with comp that is what recursion theory is all about.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> So the notion of "value" is a bit too much extensional, and miss
>>>>> intensional reality (related to code and means of computation).
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Because of my objections above, I'm still unconvinced of that...
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Which objection?
>>>>
>>>
>>> I was objecting to the idea that computations cannot be ultimately seen
>>> as mappings between integers (with the possibility of undefined values).
>>>
>>>
>>> But only the computable mappings, which are enumerable. Not *all*
>>> mappings, which are non enumerable.
>>>
>>
>> Ok!
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> With the arithmetical FPI we are in all computations. It makes sense
>>>> that the infinite one are the winners, as the finite one are of measure
>>>> zero.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I agree that it makes sense, but not if the computations are realised in
>>> mater. I think this only makes sense if we do the psychology->physics
>>> reversal that you propose. Under Peter Jones' assumption, I don't think
>>> we
>>> can accept infinities. Do you disagree?
>>>
>>>
>>> I think that with comp we cannot avoid them. We don't need more than {0,
>>> 1, 2, ...}, from the average machine in the neighborhoods of infinity,
>>> the
>>> machines are confronted to the transfinite and the continuum. Just
>>> taking
>>> seriously the FPI on a sigma_1 complete set (later structured by the
>>> intensional nuances).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> A computation is a sequence of mapping done by or in a universal
>>>> machine.
>>>>
>>>> The starting one is not important, and it happens that elementary
>>>> arithmetic is already sigma_1 complete, and thus Turing universal.
>>>>
>>>> But once I started from the combinators, K, S, (K, K), (K, S), ... ((S,
>>>> K) (K K)), etc. Then basically we can do the all thing with some
>>>> equality
>>>> rules and ((K, x) y) = x and (((S x) y) z) = ((x z) (y z)).
>>>>
>>>> That's Turing universal too. You get Löbianity when you add an
>>>> induction
>>>> principle on the combinators.
>>>>
>>>
>>> No problem.
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> So, taking Lisp as an example, there is a function L such that:
>>>>>
>>>>> L( (+ 1 1) ) = 2
>>>>>
>>>>> By doing the computation, we in the 1p can know the value of L(p) for
>>>>> a
>>>>> certain p. If p is:
>>>>>
>>>>> (fact 472834723947)
>>>>>
>>>>> Then we cannot do it in our heads. We have to have some powerful
>>>>> computer, spend a lot of energy and so on.
>>>>>
>>>>> Of course, due to the halting problem, the mapping is not guaranteed
>>>>> to
>>>>> exist, and so on.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> OK.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> These mappings already exist in Platonia. Why do we have to spend so
>>>>> much energy and effort to obtain some of them? This only seems to make
>>>>> sense if we are embedded in the computation ourselves and, somehow, we
>>>>> have
>>>>> to attain a position in the multiverse where the mapping is known. Once
>>>>> the
>>>>> mapping is known, I can communicate it to you without any further
>>>>> computational effort or energy spending.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I am not sure you are taking into account the FPI. "we" are embedded
>>>>> in
>>>>> infinities of computations, and we cannot know which one. We cannot use
>>>>> a
>>>>> god or a matter to select a reality, without betraying the comp
>>>>> assumption.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But empirically, I can use my laptop to select a subset of realities
>>>> where I know the outcome of some computation. I cannot be sure that I
>>>> will
>>>> be successful because I might be assassinated by ninjas while waiting,
>>>> but
>>>> it seems possible to steer things a certain way.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Sure! I mean you are lucky. I don't even know if you will get this
>>>> post!
>>>>
>>>
>>> I believe I did, but I'm not sure if I'm the same person you sent it to.
>>>
>>>
>>> But then tell me who sends this post! If it is not you, either you have
>>> an impostor, or you are an impostor.
>>>
>>
>>> May be you believe we are always our own impostor?
>>>
>>
>> I always felt like and impostor, but then Alan Watts made me relax about
>> it.
>>
>>
>> Alan Watts relaxed me on many things.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> And person comes from persona, the mask.
>>> No one behind the mask?
>>>
>>
>> No one / everyone behind the mask. Or maybe the humble amoeba :)
>>
>>
>> Or the humble bacteria.
>>
>> But the solution of phi_x = x are not enough for universality, and my
>> feeling is that it makes sense to talk about a person when there is a
>> universal machine. The humble amoeba succeeded to send some of its
>> colonies
>> to the moon, you know.
>>
>> In the very long run we will come back to bacteria, again to ease
>> colonization of the solar system and beyond.This does not mean we will
>> abandon our values, nor even our images, it is as you want.
>>
>
> I have similar hopes, but the "big filter" argument gets to me. Basically
> the idea is to self-apply the anthropic principle. If a future civilisation
> succeeds in colonising the galaxy and further, surely they will generate
> millions of years times quadrillions of post-human's worth of observer
> moments. So why do I find myself in this young and civilisation, still
> stuck to its original planet? It seems like a very low probability event.
> Of course, there's the possibility that the super-advanced civilisations
> are offset by a long tail of low-tech civilisations.
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> But it is that lawful normality that we have to justify on some measure
>>>> on the sigma_1 closed sentences.
>>>>
>>>> Of course, I bet there is a stable physical reality. But comp explains
>>>> that reality in term of measure on computations which somehow try to
>>>> satisfy you. It is a continuum.
>>>>
>>>
>>> No problem with that. I make the same bet, of course.
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> So according to Peter Jones, consciousness is generated by the effort
>>>>> of moving from one observer position to another. (even rejecting the
>>>>> MWI,
>>>>> even in the classical world, the thing can be seen as a tree of
>>>>> possible
>>>>> future states).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But Peter Jones point is that there must be primitive matter for both
>>>>> the computation and consciousness existing "really".
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The result of the computation does not change depending on when I
>>>>> started it, who started it and so on.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Peter Jones would say that it does matter. There are diophantine
>>>>> equation which emulate you in our galaxy, but this will count for zero
>>>>> in
>>>>> the measure because they are immaterial and not really existing,
>>>>> according
>>>>> to Jones.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I understand that distinction, but it still seems to me that it
>>>> increases the explanation gap without adding anything.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I agree. It is basically equivalent to "don't try to search an
>>>> explanation". But that is a normal reaction for those taken Aristotle
>>>> for
>>>> granted.
>>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This seems, as you say, as an appeal to magic. The main questions that
>>>>> occur to me are: how can such an hypothesis be falsified, and if it is
>>>>> true, where is the ontological difference?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> By comparing the measure of computation going through my state in
>>>>> arithmetic, and the measure of computations going through my states
>>>>> according to the theory infered from observation.
>>>>>
>>>>> Unfortunatelmy we cannot compute such measure, as we cannot know which
>>>>> machine we are. but we can compare the logic obeyed by such measure,
>>>>> and
>>>>> the math shows or suggests that the comp measure obeys a quantum
>>>>> probability calculus, like nature seems to confirm. This makes the
>>>>> quantum
>>>>> explained by digitalness + internalization of the views.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> If you accept comp but then make such a move, you are proposing
>>>>> something that is fundamentally untestable and that leads to the exact
>>>>> same
>>>>> consequences of its opposite.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> See above.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So in fact you're saying that Peter Jones' hypothesis is already
>>>> falsified if you assume comp?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Not falsified. But naked. It is an act of introducing something unclear
>>>> and unseen (primitive matter) to freeze a conception of reality.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Ok.
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It feels to me a bit like the "free will" discussion which, in my
>>>>> view,
>>>>> is solved by the simple realisation that the question does not make
>>>>> sense
>>>>> in the first place (here I agree with John Clark).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I have no problem with free-will. With Clark's definition, it does not
>>>>> exist, but with a slight weakening of that definition, it makes sense.
>>>>> Not
>>>>> sure free-will is related to this topics, though.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I just gave it as an example of an open question that I consider
>>>> non-sensical to begin with. My view is not that we have free will or
>>>> don't
>>>> have free will, it's that the question doesn't actually mean anything.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I believe in responsibility, and in my theory of responsibility there
>>>> is
>>>> a need for a theory of free will, and a simple one, even mentioned by
>>>> John
>>>> Clark, is that free-will is the ability to be ignorant on cluster on
>>>> alternatives and aware we have partial local control on this.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Sorry if this is going off topic but I don't understand the above
>>> sentence. Could you expand?
>>>
>>>
>>> Free-will is just will with the necessary degrees of freedom, and it
>>> gives you the command between cooperate or not in your relation with
>>> universal and non universal neighbors/data/environments.
>>>
>>> Free will needs more determinacy than randomness, because free will is
>>> self-determinacy in a neighborhood offering possibilities.
>>>
>>
>> Ok, but then it's just part of the structure of reality no? Sure, I can
>> chose to go grab a coffee now, but am I not just observing? Maybe there
>> is
>> another realisation of me that avoid caffeine. Maybe I can observe that,
>> but then...
>>
>>
>>
>> You observe, but you participate too. With or without coffee. With sugar,
>> or without sugar. Your choice.
>>
>> You can intellectually believe it is determinate, but you can't compute
>> yourself the result,
>>
>
> Ok, it seems to me that this is more "indeterminacy" than "free will". In
> any case, indeterminacy is good enough for me. At a local level we feel
> like we have free will, and that is the same as having it (the question
> becomes silly when dropping locality, that's all I mean).
>
>
>> yet solve the problem most the time rather easily. Not always that
>> simple,
>> like talking or not under torture to denounce people.
>>
>> Free will is for me not much more than a right. Free will is a right as
>> long as it is not inconsistent with the free will of the neighbors.
>>
>
> I strongly agree with this. In fact, I believe that the whole of morality
> can be reduced to "do not initiate the use of force against someone else".
> In my view self-defence is fine and jailing a rapist is fine (he initiated
> the use of force). Having an army is fine as long as you don't use it to
> initiate a war. Taxation is immoral, unless you can opt out. The only moral
> laws are the ones that prohibit the initiation of the use of force in some
> for or another.
>
>
>> Free will is the right to cross the ocean with a sieve.
>>
>> It is not the right to disobey the gravitation laws.
>>
>> I am OK that is part of the structure of reality, that is not a problem.
>> I
>> believe only on elementary arithmetic, the rest is arithmetic seen from
>> inside from different views and angles.
>>
>
> Ok!
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Tell me if my short explanation did work. My hole point is that the
>>>>> immaterial consequences of comp are testable, by the indirect impact on
>>>>> the
>>>>> structure of physical reality when the laws of physics emerge from
>>>>> arithmetic. Roughly speaking, we can use the arithmetical hypostases
>>>>> to
>>>>> measure experimentally our degree of computationalism.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I believe I understand you, but "unfortunately we cannot compute such
>>>> measure" still makes me suspicious. I have a Popperian view of science,
>>>> and
>>>> this still smells of an unfalsifiable claim because we cannot compute
>>>> such
>>>> measures.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The theory is eminently testable, and not yet refuted, despite its
>>>> simple propositional forms.
>>>>
>>>> I am Popperian in that way too. But the whole point of Platonism is
>>>> that
>>>> reality is not what you wish, but the truth, which what you know + what
>>>> you
>>>> don't know. Then assuming comp, we can use mathematical logic to
>>>> measure
>>>> the gap between both, it has mathematical structures.
>>>>
>>>> The measure is not computable, like the knower is not definable, but
>>>> the
>>>> logic of the measure one can be known, and it is a decidable quantum
>>>> like
>>>> logic, and the logic of the knower can be derived, it is S4Grz, and
>>>> provide
>>>> an arithmetical interpretation of an intuitionist knower. S4Grz1, that
>>>> is
>>>> S4Grz but where the arithmetical interpretation is restricted on the
>>>> sigma_1 sentences, gives already a quantization. If we follow literally
>>>> the
>>>> arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus, this means that the physics of
>>>> heaven is also quantum.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Ok, this requires more study on my part.
>>>
>>>
>>> It is technical. I try to explain a bit in the "modal" or "math" thread.
>>> The key is that we can defined provable in a language understandable by
>>> the
>>> prover itself. And we can't prove that we can't define a knower in that
>>> way, but platonistically we can recognize or identify, like Theaetetus,
>>> the
>>> knower with the believer/prover when what is proved happens to be also
>>> true
>>> (by definition).
>>>
>>
>> Ok, I think I understand this at a general level but will continue to
>> study the necessary concepts as time permits. I made some advances in
>> modal
>> logic, but still have to dive in some of its weirder worlds...
>>
>>
>> Thanks for the efforts.
>>
>
> The benefit is all mine!
>
> Telmo.
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> By incompleteness, that definition works, and associate a non
>>> identifiable (by the machine) knower to a prover/believer.
>>>
>>> Like modal logicians define sometimes the sense of a proposition by the
>>> set of worlds in which that proposition is true, with computationalism
>>> (and
>>> classical knowledge theory) the first person is related to the set of
>>> computations which realize that first person states in the (sigma_1
>>> complete) part of arithmetic.
>>>
>>
>> I have no problem with this. It seems to match well my way of thinking.
>>
>>
>>
>> Nice. Then comp imposes some structuring from theoretical computer
>> science.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Telmo.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Cheers
>>> Telmo.
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> If we believe in the Peano Arithmetic theorems, and if we say yes to
>>>> the
>>>> doctor, I think this concerns us.
>>>>
>>>> Best,
>>>>
>>>> Bruno
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Best,
>>>> Telmo.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Best,
>>>>> Telmo.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Telmo.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
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>>>>>>
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>>>>>>
>>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
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>>>>>
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>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
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>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
>>>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
>>>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>> Groups
>>> "Everything List" group.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
>>> an
>>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>>
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>> Groups
>>> "Everything List" group.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
>>> an
>>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>
--
Alberto.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
