On 11 Jul 2015, at 19:34, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Jul 11, 2015 at 3:14 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
> there is no problem with the pronouns when you understand and
apply the 1p and 3p distinction.
The problem is that there is no such thing as "*THE* 1p", there
is only "*A* 1p".
There is the 1p of the W-guy, and the 1p of the M-guy, and as first
person experience they are incoptaible. You know in Helsinki with
certainty (accepting comp and the default hypotheses) that you will en
up, whoever you can be after the duplication seeing a city.
Another problem
Which problem? I don't see any problem. Just play with words.
is that it is never specified who is making this all important "1p
and 3p distinction".
The guy in Helsinki when trying to evaluate what to expect from the
experiential view.
Who's "1p" are we talking about?
The 1p described in the diary of the experiencers.
> Who will *experience* two-cities?
The Helsinki Man.
Nobody ever experience "two cities" in the sense we have provided for
first person experience, because, trivially, nobody evcer open a door
and see two cities simultaneously from its first person experience pov.
> Nobody will ever experience both cities. Nobody.
Then today The Helsinki Man can't mean someone who remembers
being The Helsinki Man yesterday, so what does "The Helsinki
Man" mean?
We have already agreed that both the W-guy and the M-guy are the
Helsinki man. It is not a Leibnizian identity, as we have also agreed
that after the duplication, the Helsinki man has two incompatible
continuations, as they both experience a unique city. We loss often
the Leibnizian identity in intensional or modal contexts. There is no
problem with that, and that is handled in arithmetic easily later.
And so by analogy today Bruno Marchal can't mean someone who
remembers being Bruno Marchal yesterday. So who are you?
We do agree on the notion of personal identity. No need to come back
on this. I am the guy who has BM's private memory. being duplicated
would not change that. It would just bifurcate my future and introduce
an indeterminacy on which future I will live.
> You ill be in both city, for an outsider point of view (the
3-1 view), and you will se only one city (the 1-view).
The use of ambiguous personal pronouns comes so easily that Bruno
doesn't even seem to realize that Bruno is using them; it's like
breathing, thought is required for neither activity.
Only in your head. There is no atoms of ambiguity, as I specify the
type of view on which the expectations are evaluated.
You are the one introducing again and again the same ambiguity by
confusing the 3p views and the 1p views.
> He means the guy who has been in Helsinki and has the
corresponding memory,
And there are TWO people who have that memory,
Yes, that is why there is an indeterminacy.
and those TWO people live in different cities, and if we accept your
definition of "he" then it doesn't take a Kurt Godel to form
the logical conclusion that "he" will see TWO cities.
In the 3-1 view, but "he" will never see "two cities", and that
explained why he cannot predict what he will *live* as experience. You
never describe the experience lived by each survivors, you describe
the two survivors experience without taking their content into account
which can only be W, or M.
That trick has been debunked, many times, but you never quote them, or
just isolate sentence to make opportunist irrelevant remarks.
> the M man, and the W man are both the Helsinki man,
Yes.
Pop Quiz: If for the sake of argument we assume the controversial
idea that 1+1=2 is true then how many cities did the Helsinki man
see?
Two in the third description of the 1-views of the survivors.
One, in each first person view of each experiencers.
> but of course they are now different person
Yes.
> and both the W and the M man see only once city.
Yes.
So you agree that P(W or M) = 1, and P(W & M) = 0, as P(W) = P(M) is
very reasonable, we get P(M) = P(W) = 1/2.
Move to step 4, please.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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