On 30 Jul 2015, at 01:25, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Jul 29, 2015 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>> The question is why does Bruno Marchal absolutely
insist on using personal pronouns even when duplication
machines makes them so obviously ambiguous?
> I don't see any ambiguity given that we have agreed that
"you" meant, in the 3p, the guy who remember Helsinki.
To hell with this 3p crap! We agreed that "you" meant remembering
being a man in Helsinki
Yes.
PERIOD.
No.
To every man, every you, every sentient beings, you can associate
different views, notably the 1p view and the 3p view.
To say that "you" "meant remembering being a man in Helsinki" does
not determined the 1p, which only the particular copies can be aware of.
Indeed, the whole indterminacy comes from that. You have agreed
yourself that as long as the reconstitution boxes have not been open,
the same consciousness is attached to the copies, and you have agreed
that they differentiate
after opening the door. As both individual are the H-man, with the
criteria above, and as both have differentiate into person seeing one
city, both will admit they got one bit of information.
Sorry, but without the 3p "crap", we can't even address the question.
> And yes, in the 3p, you are in W and you are in M. But in the
1p [blah blah]
The guy has been duplicated, there is no such thing as " the
1p".
It is, obviously, the 1p that you will live in either W or M, as P("W
v M") is equal to 1, for the same reason that you guessed that
P(coffee) = 1 in the extended step-3 + coffee protocol.
The 1p-self cannot feel the split. he would not know the protocol, he
would be unable to know that a duplication has occurred.
>> To complete the experiment after the duplication Bruno
Marchal needs to find the person, the one unique person, who wrote
all that stuff in the diary.
> Er... ? You forget that the guy has been duplicated,
Well somebody has certainly forgotten that the guy has been
duplicated, but John Clark is not the one who keeps talking about
"you" and "the 1p" after the duplication as if there is no ambiguity.
See just above. It follows from the hypothesis that you cannot live
both experience at once, and so you, or any guy doing that experiment
is entitled to mention the unique experience that he will live, even
if presently in Hlesinki, he cannot know which among W and M it will be.
> I need to interview the two copies
Yes indeed. And how many cities will those two yous observe from
the first person? John Clark believes the answer is 2.
Again you say a triviality in the 3p description, and a contradiction
*for* the 1p perspective, when seen *from* the 1p-perspective, which
was the point of the question.
You try hard to blur the 1p/3p distinction to make the pronoun
ambiguous, but you fail, as the 1p/3p description is exactly what we
need to formulate the mind-body problem in the mechanist frame,
without any ambiguity.
Of course this is coherent with your idea that philosophy of mind,
theology, ... are all crap. But you illustrate in step 3 the
incredible convoluted hand-waving you need to hide the key 1p-3p
nuance to avoid the simple natural question of what can happen
*subjectively* to anyone undergoing a self-duplication.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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