On 30 Jul 2016, at 23:27, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Jul 30, 2016 at 4:41 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]>
wrote:
> instead or arguing about whether "personal identity" is an
identity (i.e. reflexive, transitive relation), which it isn't, why
not just make up a new word for the concept that the Wman and the
Mman are the "continuson" of the Hman but not of each other.
When duplication machines are invented no doubt the entire
English language will have to undergo a major overhaul,
particularly in the way pronouns are used;
Computer scientists, and users, duplicate programs and machines all
the time, and biological reproduction is arguably a variant of this.
The only thing you need to do is to be a little bit more cautious in
the 3p-1p distinction.
but I fear some will still insist in asking nonsensical questions
like "what is the probability "you" will see Moscow?".
This reminds me that you have not yet answered my recent question. Do
you agree that the guy in Helsinki can expect to drink a cup of coffee
with certainty (modulo the (default) hypotheses) when we add in the H-
WM step 3 protocol that both copies will be offered a cup of coffee,
in Washington and in Moscow?
Is is OK to deduce from step 1 (we survive simple classical
teleportation with P = 1) that P("the H-guy will feel drinking a cup
of coffee") = 1?
My question was:
"Let me try something different; but I will go with numbered
questions. I will proceed when I get the answer.
Question 1 (30-07-2016)
We are in the step 3 protocol (read and annihilated in Helsinki,
copied in Washington and Moscow soon after).
Now, we add that in both Washington and Moscow, you will receive a cup
of coffee.
Do you agree that in Helsinki, the H-guy who believes he survive
teleportation/duplication, can expect to certainly drink a cup of
coffee soon (assuming computationalism, the correctness of the
substitution level, the default hypotheses, ...). That is, would you
agree that in Helsinki P(H-guy will-feel-drinking-coffee) = 1.
I think you have already answered this by the affirmative some times
ago, but I want to be sure."
Anyone who would still harbor the slightest doubt on step 3 is invited
to jump on this occasion to make their point clearer. Brent? Bruce?
Are you OK that the guy in Helsinki, a coffee addict (say), should not
worry and that no matter what, his current (in Helsinki) need of
caffein will be satisfied?
Bruno
John K Clark
On 7/30/2016 1:14 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Jul 29, 2016 at 2:30 AM, Brent Meeker
<[email protected]> wrote:
> I'm the one person I was a moment ago because I have all
the memories of that person
Yes.
> If duplicating machines are ever invented
It's only a matter of time. I'd be amazed if it took less than 10
years and equally amazed if it took more than 100.
> then we can choose some rough and ready legal definitions.
Sure, but if history has taught us anything it's that what the
law says and what is true are two entirely different things.
> But all this discussion of theories of personal identity
seems more about semantics and pronouns.
Getting the semantics and pronouns right is the first step, after
that the personal identity theory could still be wrong but at least
it's a theory and not gibberish.
--
But instead or arguing about whether "personal identity" is an
identity (i.e. reflexive, transitive relation), which it isn't, why
not just make up a new word for the concept that the Wman and the
Mman are the "continuson" of the Hman but not of each other. And
then explicate what is implicit in a the continuson relation. This
is way science would proceed if we actually had a duplication
machine. We'd make duplicates and we'd define continusation
ostensively and then we'd study it's properties - instead of
assuming things about computation and physics.
Brent
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