On 01 Aug 2016, at 03:50, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 31/07/2016 6:41 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/30/2016 1:14 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Jul 29, 2016 at 2:30 AM, Brent Meeker
<[email protected]> wrote:
> I'm the one person I was a moment ago because I have all
the memories of that person
Yes.
> If duplicating machines are ever invented
It's only a matter of time. I'd be amazed if it took less than
10 years and equally amazed if it took more than 100.
> then we can choose some rough and ready legal definitions.
Sure, but if history has taught us anything it's that what the
law says and what is true are two entirely different things.
> But all this discussion of theories of personal identity
seems more about semantics and pronouns.
Getting the semantics and pronouns right is the first step,
after that the personal identity theory could still be wrong but
at least it's a theory and not gibberish.
--
But instead or arguing about whether "personal identity" is an
identity (i.e. reflexive, transitive relation), which it isn't, why
not just make up a new word for the concept that the Wman and the
Mman are the "continuson" of the Hman but not of each other.
That is essentially Parfit's solution.
And then explicate what is implicit in a the continuson relation.
This is way science would proceed if we actually had a duplication
machine. We'd make duplicates and we'd define continusation
ostensively and then we'd study it's properties - instead of
assuming things about computation and physics.
I am sure that the empirical approach is the only way we will ever
reach any understanding of what happens to people in duplicating
machines.
Exactly, and that is exactly what I prove and make precise. By testing
empirically the machine logic of observable (S4Grz1 logic and also the
X1* and Z1* logics), we test a precise possible departure from
computationalism, assuming we are not in a emulation done by people
who decided to afford a lot of energy in failing us (that last point
is a bit trivial but it needs to be said to be exact (I will not
repeat it)).
Note that without the actual known quantum logic, computationalism
would already be refuted. The aristotelian intuition that the physical
reality is refuted by nature, and by computationalism, and in the same
way, as far as we know today.
We can say that both Gödel *and* the Quantum are the savior of
Mechanism today. But for materialism, this is bad news, as primary
matter, or any *first* physical principle are shown, assuming
Mechanism, being redundant useless ideas or contradictions.
Bruno
Bruce
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