On 10 Aug 2017, at 20:44, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 11:36 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]
> wrote:
> I've asked the following question 4 times and you've refused
to answer 4 times but I'm going to ask for a fifth time because it
gets to the very heart of the topic:
Are the following 2 questions equivalent?
1) What will I see tomorrow?
2) Tomorrow what will the person who remembers being me right now see?
I can answer that question and the answer is YES. You should be able
to answer it too with a simple YES or NO, and I don't want to hear
any pee dodges of the question because the same level of pee and
iterations of pee and any other convolutions of pee applies equally
to both questions. So are they equivalent or are they not? If you
can't provide a simple one word answer to that question then you
quite literally don't know what you're arguing in favor of and
you're wasting your time and ours.
> The two questions are not equivalent. Question 2) implies
that there will be a unique individual who remembers being me,
whereas in fact there will be two of them. Question 2) therefore
includes a false proposition about the world.
If I understand you correctly you must think, because Mr. I is
about to be duplicated, question 2 should be rephrased as:
"Tomorrow what will the people who remember being me right now see?
"
And yes I agree that might make things a little clearer.
> Question 1) does not include any false proposition.
I'm not primarily worried about propositions that are false, I'm
much more worried about propositions that are gibberish. The
question "What will I see tomorrow?" doesn't contain any
gibberish propositions if "I" means anyone tomorrow who remembers
being "I" today;
That is slightly ambiguous, but very close to the definition we agreed
on for the 1-I, in our context. AnyONE who will remember being the H-
guy.
but that is obviously not what Bruno means by "I" because he thinks
you could set up a bet in which the payoff depends on what a unique
individual, the one and only Mr. I, will and will not
see. Nobody knows what Bruno means by "I"
That is a lie. The 1p means anyONE who remembers having been the H-
guy, and indeed both, after duplication, expmains they see only one
city, confirming P("I will see one city") = 1, and both confirms not
seeing two cities, confirming P("I will see W and M") = 0, and our
symmetrical context justifies P(M) + P(W) = 1, and thus P(M) = P(W) =
1/2.
This is easily confirmed and render more plausible in the iteration,
where the vast majority of the 1p-I's diary contains an incompressible
sequence.
Note that if the sequence is enough long, almost all 1p-I get a non
compressible sequence although they will not been able to prove it,
but that does not change the fact that we can prove most are random-
incompressible.
when projected into the future nor who judges who won and who lost
the bet, and until he tells us we're just spinning our wheels.
It depends on the bet. All those betting "W & M" lost, and all who
based their prediction on the usual Pascal triangle or on e^-x^2
(renormalized) win.
You make the thing looks gibberish by avoiding the nuances given in
the question, that's all.
Bruno
John K Clark
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