> On 17 May 2019, at 22:52, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > On 5/17/2019 7:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> No, with mechanism, mind supervenes locally on matter, but matter supervenes >> on the mind of all universal machines, which compete below our substitution >> level, and that explains directly the “many-world” appearances of matter and >> consciousness, where the physical threes have to introduce magical things, >> from the collapse of the ave to primary substance. > > The trouble is there is not a "many-world" appearance of matter and > consciousness.
It dos not stroke the eyes, but with the two slit experience, we have it, unless you make the non-mechanist move, and add some collapse of the wave postulate. That becomes a particular case of an ontological commitment added to arithmetic, to avoid the consequences of a theory, before any evidences are given. > Mechanism explains too much. I don’t think so, not yet. The “experiments” confirms it, where simple consciousness refutes physicalism directly, unless we abandon mechanism. > What is this competition and how does it produce one coherent world we seem > to share? Take the phi_i (the enumeration of the partial computable function with one argument): I say that x emulates y on z if phi_x(y, z) = phi_y(z) I say that x emulates y if for all z we have phi_x(y, z) = phi_y(z) I say that u is a universal number if u emulates all numbers, Then we can show that there will be an infinity of such u, emulating you, in arithmetic, below your substitution level (defined by what does not interfere with your conscious first person state). Assuming QM, it is like a program simulating you with one election here, in this or that orbital, instead of elsewhere. Below you rsubtitution level, there is are infinitely many computations, going through your right state. That is the “competition” I was alluding to. Why are we able to share it? Because we are part to a common histories/computations, and we get multiplied together on what is below our similar substation level. You have a computation different, even when just an election is moved (but kept in the same energetic orbital) in my body. Contrary to what Bruce says, this gives a notion of entanglement quite similar to the one in QM. Of course only the further research on the material modes of the Universal Löbian numbers will confirm or refute this. > >> Physics is *the* best way to make predictions, but even to relate such >> predictions to some reality, physics is mute (it not even its subject >> matter), but physicalism needs an unknown non computational theory of mind. > > Science doesn't need anything known...it just tries to find out. And physics > has done well for 400yrs without needing to invoke a non-computational theory > of mind...or a computational theory either. Yes, that it needs a non computational theory is a recent discovery. And, to be sure, it needs it only if we assume Digital Mechanism. But Plato and the neopythagoreans, as well as the neoplatonicans, got already the correct mechanist insight that physics cannot work, without eliminating person and consciousness. So, that is not really new. It is forgotten and rediscovered. Aristotle theology (materialism) has hidden the mind body problem under the rug from 1500 years. People think that Chalmers discovered the hard problem of consciousness, but that shows how much the mind-body problem has been successfully hidden. The “hard problem of consciousness” is just a materialist formulation of the mind-body problem. > >> That makes primary matter a quite speculative notion, for which we lack >> evidence. > > The evidence, as for any empirical theory, is that it's part of the ontology > of a theory that is consilient and has good predictive power. It is not much consilient. QM is the first theory which looks consilient, but as long as QM and GR are not fixed to be married, we cannot even say that physics has a theory of the “physical reality”, then, as I explained, if we assume mechanism we see that physics has to be reduced to machine’s bio-psycho-theology. And that works, where physics fails, not in any prediction, but in accounting for our consciousness on what we predict. It fails on the metaphysics, or it dismiss consciousness, or it invokes some magic unavailable with Mechanism. Bruno > > Brent > >> It like a creationist who would say that the theory of evolution is wrong, >> because it does not explain how God made all this in six days. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6fa4493a-68ef-541c-0ece-67d8616eedbe%40verizon.net. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/597AE6E1-FEBF-4E56-9C80-7C93864545F4%40ulb.ac.be.
