On 5/17/2019 7:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No, with mechanism, mind supervenes locally on matter, but matter supervenes on the mind of all universal machines, which compete below our substitution level, and that explains directly the “many-world” appearances of matter and consciousness, where the physical threes have to introduce magical things, from the collapse of the ave to primary substance.
The trouble is there is not a "many-world" appearance of matter and consciousness. Mechanism explains too much. What is this competition and how does it produce one coherent world we seem to share?
Physics is *the* best way to make predictions, but even to relate such predictions to some reality, physics is mute (it not even its subject matter), but physicalism needs an unknown non computational theory of mind.
Science doesn't need anything known...it just tries to find out. And physics has done well for 400yrs without needing to invoke a non-computational theory of mind...or a computational theory either.
That makes primary matter a quite speculative notion, for which we lack evidence.
The evidence, as for any empirical theory, is that it's part of the ontology of a theory that is consilient and has good predictive power.
Brent
It like a creationist who would say that the theory of evolution is wrong, because it does not explain how God made all this in six days.
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