On 5/20/2019 3:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 May 2019, at 22:52, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
<[email protected]> wrote:
On 5/17/2019 7:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No, with mechanism, mind supervenes locally on matter, but matter supervenes on
the mind of all universal machines, which compete below our substitution level,
and that explains directly the “many-world” appearances of matter and
consciousness, where the physical threes have to introduce magical things, from
the collapse of the ave to primary substance.
The trouble is there is not a "many-world" appearance of matter and
consciousness.
It dos not stroke the eyes, but with the two slit experience, we have it,
unless you make the non-mechanist move, and add some collapse of the wave
postulate. That becomes a particular case of an ontological commitment added to
arithmetic, to avoid the consequences of a theory, before any evidences are
given.
All the evidence IS that the wave-function collapses. That's why people
have to suppose there are infinitely many orthogonal worlds we can't
intereact with in order to avoid the collapse. Are you claiming that is
something like Roger Penrose's gravity induce collapse were true then
"mechanism" (CT+YD) would be empirically invalidated? I don't see how
this follows.
Brent
Mechanism explains too much.
I don’t think so, not yet. The “experiments” confirms it, where simple
consciousness refutes physicalism directly, unless we abandon mechanism.
What is this competition and how does it produce one coherent world we seem to
share?
Take the phi_i (the enumeration of the partial computable function with one
argument):
I say that x emulates y on z if phi_x(y, z) = phi_y(z)
I say that x emulates y if for all z we have phi_x(y, z) = phi_y(z)
I don't see that the two above sentences express different ideas? What's
the difference between "on z" with no specification of z and "for all z"?
I say that u is a universal number if u emulates all numbers,
Then we can show that there will be an infinity of such u, emulating you, in
arithmetic, below your substitution level (defined by what does not interfere
with your conscious first person state).
Introducing "below your substitution level" implies some kind of
approximation. But I don't see the definition of "emulates" has any
natural extension to define "approximately emulates". You seem to
assume that one element competing to your consciousness is a stream of
computed numbers and there are many such streams that exactly
instantiate your consciouness but which are different "at a lower
level"...which we call physics.
Assuming QM, it is like a program simulating you with one election here, in
this or that orbital, instead of elsewhere. Below you rsubtitution level, there
is are infinitely many computations, going through your right state. That is
the “competition” I was alluding to.
Seems undefined to me. Even if you define "approximately emulate" I
don't see how they "compete"? That would imply that one wins and other
lose. Is this base on Dennett's multiple draft model?
Why are we able to share it? Because we are part to a common
histories/computations, and we get multiplied together on what is below our
similar substation level.
But what is below our level of consciousness is exactly what we can't share.
You have a computation different, even when just an election is moved (but kept
in the same energetic orbital) in my body.
Contrary to what Bruce says, this gives a notion of entanglement quite similar
to the one in QM. Of course only the further research on the material modes of
the Universal Löbian numbers will confirm or refute this.
Physics is *the* best way to make predictions, but even to relate such
predictions to some reality, physics is mute (it not even its subject matter),
but physicalism needs an unknown non computational theory of mind.
Science doesn't need anything known...it just tries to find out. And physics
has done well for 400yrs without needing to invoke a non-computational theory
of mind...or a computational theory either.
Yes, that it needs a non computational theory is a recent discovery.
And, to be sure, it needs it only if we assume Digital Mechanism.
But Plato and the neopythagoreans, as well as the neoplatonicans, got already
the correct mechanist insight that physics cannot work, without eliminating
person and consciousness.
But experimental physics generally assumes that experimenters have "free
will" in the sense that they make choices that are statistically
independent of one another. So far as I know, only t'Hooft advocates
superdeterminism.
Brent
So, that is not really new. It is forgotten and rediscovered. Aristotle
theology (materialism) has hidden the mind body problem under the rug from 1500
years. People think that Chalmers discovered the hard problem of consciousness,
but that shows how much the mind-body problem has been successfully hidden. The
“hard problem of consciousness” is just a materialist formulation of the
mind-body problem.
That makes primary matter a quite speculative notion, for which we lack
evidence.
The evidence, as for any empirical theory, is that it's part of the ontology of
a theory that is consilient and has good predictive power.
It is not much consilient. QM is the first theory which looks consilient, but
as long as QM and GR are not fixed to be married, we cannot even say that
physics has a theory of the “physical reality”, then, as I explained, if we
assume mechanism we see that physics has to be reduced to machine’s
bio-psycho-theology. And that works, where physics fails, not in any
prediction, but in accounting for our consciousness on what we predict. It
fails on the metaphysics, or it dismiss consciousness, or it invokes some magic
unavailable with Mechanism.
Bruno
Brent
It like a creationist who would say that the theory of evolution is wrong,
because it does not explain how God made all this in six days.
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