Edwina, List: Once again, I find your use of terminology inconsistent with Peirce's. Firstness is real, but does not exist. It has no Relations, because any Relation requires Secondness. "Pure nothing" is the chaos of Firstness and Secondness in the absence of Thirdness. Accepting any matter of fact--such as the origin of our existing universe--as inexplicable is unacceptable, because it blocks the way of inquiry. Nothing new here, so I will leave it at that.
Regards, Jon On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 5:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > I think that 'actualization' and 'cause' are two entirely different > actions. > > With regard to Firstness, I see it, as a spontaneous *state* *of > existence* which *might* then act upon/be reacted to.., in the 'fullness > of this state'. The point of all the categories is that they operate within > Relations; they are not isolate in themselves. Firstness, as that *spontaneous > state of existence* [which might dissipate in a nanosecond if it doesn't > *bond/relate* to another entity]...can provide a novel form of existence. > > For example, a spontaneous mutation of a cell *might* be accepted by > other cells and might become part of the organism's nature. Or, *might > not* be accepted and its energy-content would dissipate. > > Or, a novel mode of transportation [*Uber*] might suddenly develop and > might spread to other domains. Or, like many a new invention - it might > disappear in a month. > > The causality of Firstness is the Relations that the novelty ir > provides has on other organisms/entities. It can actually cause/effect > changes in the larger system. > > Yes, I see the universe as self-emergent and self-organizing - and refer > to 1.412 for the Peircean outline of these actions. But I don't see this as > a transition from Firstness to Secondness, for I don't consider that the > pre-universe was in any categorical mode [ie, not in a mode of Firstness, > Secondness or Thirdness. It was simply nothing]. > > Certainly, the 'somehow', i.e., the bridge between 'nothing' and > 'something' is not explained beyond a 'chance flash'. But because there is > no explanation, does not mean that I can or even should come up with one - > certainly, science hasn't been able to do so, and since I'm an atheist, > then, I'm not going to offer a self-organized belief in god as having been > First Cause. I simply don't know. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *To:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> > *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 5:59 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology) > > Clark, List: > > Your points, as usual, are well-taken. Is it helpful at all to refer to > "actualization," rather than "cause"? Edwina's position, as I understand > it, is that our existing universe is not only self-*organizing *but also > self-*generating *or self-*originating*; as Houser put it in his > introduction to EP 1, "Somehow, the possibility or potentiality of the > chaos is self-actualizing." This is the crucial transition from Firstness > (possibility) to Secondness (actuality), and the word "somehow" reflects > the fact that Houser's attempt to summarize Peirce's cosmology effectively > leaves this step unexplained. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:29 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > >> On Nov 3, 2016, at 1:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> ET: Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force by the >> term of 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a matter of >> habit. Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal manner leads him >> to such conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or spontaneity as a >> causal force - and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just this state. >> >> No, I understood exactly what you meant. My disagreement is that I take >> "chance" (in Peirce's usage) to be freedom or spontaneity, rather than >> randomness or inexplicability; and it is certainly not something that could >> ever be "a causal force." I even quoted Peirce to support this view, but >> you refer to my "tendency to read in a literal manner" as if it were a bad >> thing! >> >> Again I think we’re all talking past one an other by equivocating over >> the term ‘cause.’ In a certain cause pure freedom or spontaneity isn’t >> causal and in an other sense it must be. Effectively each firstness is its >> own unmoved mover. The problem is that making sense of causality at all >> when little is necessary and most things are underdetermined is >> problematic. >> >> I think causality is problematic for a variety of other reasons too. For >> instance in terms of physics we could oppose the classic Newtonian >> formulation of mechanics in terms of forces and masses to the Hamiltonian >> or Lagrangian forms. They’re mathematically equivalent yet metaphysically >> quite conceptually different. The Hamiltonian is the evolution of the wave >> function (what in quantum mechanics becomes the Dirac or Schrodinger >> equation) and it’s hard to make sense of causality in terms of it. >> >> Likewise again turning to Duns Scotus we have classic arguments against >> causality being continuous. (Basically part of the same extended argument I >> linked to earlier for a first cause) For Peirce where any sign can be >> divided it’s worth asking if we have causality at all. >> >> Despite these problems of causality we all use the term causality. >> >> He referenced the same series of articles in what was probably his very >> first draft of "A Neglected Argument" (1908), and made a few other comments >> about it that are relevant to this discussion. >> >> CSP: I there contended that the laws of nature, and, indeed, all >> experiential laws, have been results of evolution, being (such was my >> original hypothesis,) developments out of utterly causeless determinations >> of single events, under a certain universal tendency toward habit-forming >> ... But during the long years which have elapsed since the hypothesis first >> suggested itself to me, it may naturally be supposed that faulty features >> of the original hypothesis have been brought [to] my attention by others >> and have struck me in my own meditations. Dr. Edward Montgomery remarked >> that my theory was not so much evolutionary as it was emanational; and >> Professor Ogden Rood pointed out that there must have been some original >> tendency to take habits which did not arise according to my hypothesis; >> while I myself was most struck by the difficulty of so explaining the law >> of sequence in time, if I proposed to make all laws develope from single >> events; since an event already supposes Time. (R 842, emphasis added) >> >> I think this might be better read as there being no cause *for* firstness >> not that firstness can’t be seen a not causal. Again I suspect we’re >> talking past one an other again but the mere fact firstness can be an >> element in a triadic sign more or less entails a certain sense of >> causation. (Although I prefer Peirce’s term determination although that too >> has the genealogy in problematic metaphysical understanding) >> >> I should add that this problem of language for this foundational event >> isn’t new. You see similar debates in late antiquity over whether the >> platonic One is one or ought to be considered two emanation steps. While >> I’ll confess to finding such matters idle talk there’s usually a logical >> reason for the analaysis. (Much like the whole disparaged “how many angels >> could dance on a pin” makes sense in the context of the debates over kinds >> in medieval scholasticism) >> >
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